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Preface
How small a thought it takes to fill a whole life!
–Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture & Value
It hasn’t been a whole life, but sometimes it did feel that way. One day I woke up and
asked myself the question, “What does it mean to say that some event caused another?”,
and here I am, more than four years later, with this dissertation in front of me. Old
people tend to warn young people “that time flies by”, and young people tend to ignore
old people when they do. Yet that description perfectly captures the passage of time as
it occurred during my PhD. When I started, I was in my twenties, I lived in Brussels
renting a small studio, I would attend parties and/or bars at least once a week, and did
not know anyone in the academic community outside of Leuven. Today, I am in my
thirties, I live in the United States while owning an apartment in Brussels, I attend
lectures and/or receptions at least once a week, and have made academic connections
with people from all over the world. Still, the most fundamental change in my life
during this period has been the writing of this text. As a young boy I already cherished
vague dreams of some day joining the ranks of the “thinkers”, i.e., those whose labour
is visible only by reproducing their efforts in one’s own mind. Whatever purpose this
PhD dissertation may serve in aiding others with an interest in its topic, if nothing else
it fulfills the promise that I made to that young boy.
In doing so, I also fulfilled my promise towards the kind people of the Flemish Agency
for Innovation by Science and Technology (IWT). Without the scholarship that they
awarded me, it would have been financially impossible to exclude myself from the
labour market for four years whilst continuing a comfortable life. For this reason I
would like to thank them first and foremost.
It is a common practice to thank several people who assisted the PhD student on his
journey, but in my case it is far more appropriate to thank one person several times.
Although for all official purposes Hendrik Blockeel is to be considered my principal
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supervisor, anyone who has witnessed the progress of this work knows that it was Joost
Vennekens who performed that role. These few lines written here are vastly insufficient
to express my gratitude towards Joost for his support. To say that this work could not
have been finished without him should not come as a surprise, as that probably holds
true for any good supervisor. However in my case it is no overstatement to say that this
work could not even have started without Joost.
I met Joost about halfway through my Master’s degree in Mathematics, for which I
was writing a thesis under the supervision of Marc Denecker. After having struggled
for a long time with finding the right topic that was suitable with regards to both my
competencies as a mathematician, and Marc’s competencies in communicating the
expected work to be performed, Marc contacted Joost in a final effort to help me
complete my thesis. He guided me towards a topic to work on, and from that moment
onwards he took on the role as my thesis supervisor. Hence I have him to thank for
obtaining my Mathematics degree.
However my thanks extends even further. We got to know each other, and after a while
he encouraged me to apply for a research position at Campus De Nayer, again under
his supervision. It stands beyond a doubt that I lacked the proper qualifications for
the position at hand, and I would not have stood a chance of obtaining it through any
orthodox bureaucratic application procedure. Yet Joost had faith that I would be able
to meet the challenge, and convinced his colleagues to hire me. Hence I have him to
thank for obtaining my first research position.
After a year the project I had been working on came to an end, and I started thinking
about research proposals for a PhD. In philosophical circles I noticed a growing interest
in the issue of formally studying causality, and that sounded like an ideal field to get
involved in. By delving into the literature, I came across a paper by Daan Fierens, who
I was surprised to discover worked at this very department. So I send him an e-mail
asking if he would consider helping me find a suitable research question. In his reply,
he directed me towards a colleague of his, who he claimed was far more knowledgeable
about the subject, as he had written several articles on it. Of course by now you can
guess to which colleague he was referring. Unbeknownst to the both of us, I had been
investigating a subject matter on which Joost was an expert. The very next day when I
came into the office, I said to Joost: “We have to talk.” A month later, we had written a
research proposal on the topic of actual causation, and the rest is history. Hence I have
him to thank for obtaining my second research position as well.
All of the former does not even mention the thanks I owe Joost for his assistance
during the actual PhD itself. Some might not have enjoyed having Joost as a supervisor.
More specifically, anyone who expects his supervisor to arrange weekly meetings, who
expects him to work out a concrete plan on how to proceed, expects to be reminded
of important deadlines, or expects him to be in his office most of the time, would
probably not welcome Joost as a supervisor. Fortunately I expected none of those
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things. Likewise, some supervisors might not have enjoyed me as a student. More
specifically, anyone who expects his student to send a weekly overview of what he has
done, who expects his work to be structured in concrete goals and tasks, who expects
a PhD student in computer science not to spend most of his time engaging with the
philosophy literature, or expects him to be in his office more than once a month, would
probably not welcome me as a PhD student. Fortunately Joost expected none of those
things. In that sense, we were a perfect match.
But I believe it is fair to say that we were also highly compatible when it comes
to the substance of our work. Basically, Joost is an AI researcher with an interest in
philosophy, and I am a philosopher with an interest in AI. Given the strong opinions that
both of us hold on many issues, it is nothing short of remarkable that we always ended
up finding a suitable compromise in the long run. I cannot overestimate the influence
that he has had on directing me towards the views expressed in this work. He was quick
to point out flaws in my reasoning, but never without suggesting alternative solutions.
Further, his experience in writing technically solid and precisely articulated articles
has proven invaluable for improving my own writing. Most importantly, working with
Joost has always been a pleasant and stimulating experience. Hence I have him to thank
not only for his help in completing my PhD, but also for making the process of doing
so enjoyable during all this time.
Further, I would like to thank Hendrik for helping me settle in at the department, and
for his willingness to take up the official role as my supervisor. I also owe many thanks
to Marc Denecker and Joe Halpern for very stimulating discussions on actual causation.
That gratitude extends to the other members of the jury as well, for having taken the
time to critically read this work, and offering helpful comments.
I also want to thank my colleagues, both of the KRR research group, and at Campus
De Nayer. Usually such thanks is owed due to the pleasant working environment they
create, including the many coffee breaks, lunches, and office discussions. However it
would be unfair to restrict my gratitude to those events, as they rarely took place. I
probably deserve the title of least visible member of the computer science department,
as I hardly ever made it to the office. Therefore I take full responsibility for the
lack of social engagement with my co-workers, and I thank them for accepting my
overwhelming absence without ever making me feel unwelcome.
Lastly, I want to thank my friends and family for taking my word on it that what
sometimes seemed to them like a four-year long holiday was actually a valuable
contribution to the development of human knowledge. Their relentless efforts in
confronting me with the harsh realities of the world outside academia have not been in
vain, as it motivated me to secure my current academic position, and has strengthened
my intention to never again leave academia. On a more serious note, I thank them for
their infinite support and understanding. Working on a PhD is undoubtedly a great
privilege granted to me by society, but at the same time one should not underestimate
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the accompanying mental burden that it can give rise to every now and then. I owe it to




actual causation Relation between two events/omissions (x,y) that occur in a
story, which holds iff x caused y. (Definitions 1, 3, 32, and 33,
Section 3.3, 3.4, and 3.7.)
anti-symmetry Holds for a binary relation R(x,y) iff R(x,y) ⇒ R(¬x,¬y).
(Corollary 2.)
asymmetry Holds for a binary relation R(x,y) iff R(x,y) ⇒ ¬R(¬x,y).
(Principle 4, Section 7.5.1.)
branch A branch of a probability tree in CP-logic, used to formalise a
story. (Section 2.3.1.)
contributor Relation between two events/omissions (x,y) that occur in a
story, which holds iff x contributed in a very minimal sense to
bringing about y. (Section 6.3 and 7.4.1.)
counterfactual dependence Relation between two events/omissions (x,y) that occur
in a story, which holds iff intervening on x would have prevented
y from occurring. (Definitions 2 and 31, Sections 3.4.1, 6.2, and
6.7.)
CP-law Formal representation of an independent causal mechanism in
CP-logic. (Section 2.3.1.)
CP-theory Set of CP-laws which together make up a causal model that is an
appropriate formalisation of a small part of the world. (Section
2.3.1.)
default The value a variable takes if nothing acts upon it. (Section
2.3.1.)
deviant Any value a variable takes if it is acted upon. (Section 2.3.1.)
v
vi NOMENCLATURE
early preemption Common story used in the literature to gauge intuitions of
actual causation. It involves two causal mechanisms, one
which is successful in causing an effect, and another which
was preempted before the effect occurred. (Figure 2.3, Table
3.1, Section 5.2.1 and 7.3.1, Examples 12 and 13.)
endogenous Property of variables that holds if the variable is internal to the
causal model of interest. Each endogenous variable has a unique
equation in structural equations modelling. (Section 2.2.)
exogenous Property of variables that holds if the variable is external to the
causal model of interest. An exogenous variable does not have
an equation in structural equations modelling, rather its value is
stipulated. (Section 2.2.)
intrinsic Property of a CP-law as it appears in a branch when considering
an effect x, which holds if the law definitely played a role in
causing x. (Section 3.2.1.)
irrelevant Property of a CP-law as it appears in a branch when considering
an effect x, which holds if the law definitely did not play a role
in causing x. (Section 3.2.1.)
late preemption Common story used in the literature to gauge intuitions of
actual causation. It involves two causal mechanisms, one
which is successful in causing an effect, and another which
was preempted by the occurrence of the effect. (Examples 2 and
9, Table 3.1.)
literal Atomic formula of the form Vi = vi, where Vi is a variable and
vi is one of the values it can take on.
necessary Property of a CP-law as it appears in a branch when considering
an effect x, which holds if the law occurs in every reduction of
the story, and has the same effect. (Definition 5.)
neuron diagram Graphical representation of a causal model. (Section 2.4.)
normality ranking An ordering of states of affairs based on how normal they are in
the given context. (Section 4.2.)
preempted A contributor that failed to be a producer. (Section 6.4.2.)
probability tree Formal representation of the possible stories that a CP-theory
allows. (Section 2.3.1.)
NOMENCLATURE vii
producer Relation between two events/omissions (x,y) that occur in a
story, which holds iff x brings about y. (Sections 3.4.2 and 6.4.)
reduction Simplification of a story containing an effect x, so that the causes
of x are still present. (Section 3.7, Lemma 1.)
simple Property of a story, which holds if there are no limitations on
the choices made for laws that are not necessary. (Definition 7.)
story An example of a causal scenario in which two events/omissions
x and y occur. Informally a story is given as a short description in
natural language, formally a story can be described as a branch
(CP-logic), a neuron diagram together with the states of its
neurons, or the combination of a causal model M and the values
of its exogenous variables ~U (structural equations modelling).
structural equation Formal representation of a causal mechanism in structural
equations modelling. (Section 2.2.)
switch Common story used in the literature to gauge intuitions of
actual causation. It involves two causal mechanisms, one which
is successful in producing an effect, and another which was
preempted before the effect occurred, but would otherwise have
certainly been successful in producing the effect. (Table 3.1,
Section 5.2.2 and 6.5.)
symmetric overdetermination Common story used in the literature to gauge intuitions
of actual causation. It involves two causal mechanisms which
are each sufficient for causing an effect, that both occur at the
same time and thus symmetrically overdetermine the occurrence
of the effect. (Section 5.3.1, Example .)
timing Formal representation of the order in which events occur in a
story, that can be added to extend structural equation modelling.
(Definition 22.)
transitivity Holds for a binary relation R(x,y) iff R(x,y)∧R(y,z)⇒ R(x,z).
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This work is a study of the concept of actual causation. More specifically, the aim of
this text is to develop formal definitions of actual causation that capture its informal
meaning. We will do so from within two different perspectives. In Part I we use CP-
logic to address actual causation from a practical perspective, meaning that the focus
lies on quantifying the notion of actual causation, and adding extensions that allow
taking into account the context-sensitivity of causation. In Part II we use structural
equations modelling, and look at actual causation from a purely theoretical perspective.
Concretely, we develop formal principles which a suitable definition of actual causation
should satisfy, and present a definition that does so.
Actual causation, a.k.a. token causation, should be contrasted with general causation,
a.k.a. type causation. Put briefly, actual causation is a relation between particular
events, whereas general causation is a relation between types of events. We will have
very little to say about the latter, but we can illustrate the difference between the two
with a simple example.
In the statement “Smoking is a cause of lung-cancer”, causation is to be interpreted
as general causation: there are laws of nature such that many people who smoke will
develop lung-cancer as a result. A general causal law is useful in predicting what will
happen given that certain events occur. Therefore it is useful before we decide how
to act. For example, we try to discourage people from smoking precisely because in
general this causes lung-cancer.
On the other hand, in the statement “John’s lung-cancer was caused by smoking”,
causation figures as actual causation: in the particular case of John, his lung-cancer was
the result of him smoking (rather than, say, working in a coal mine). Actual causation
is a relation that we can establish only after the facts have occurred, and only given that
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we know all the relevant general causal laws. Note that the statement about smoking as
an actual cause does not follow from the statement about smoking as a general cause: it
is not because smoking is generally a cause of lung-cancer, that for every single person
who both smokes and has lung-cancer, the latter was caused by the former.
The distinction between general and actual causation implies a first note of clarification.
Our study is not an empirical inquiry regarding what causal laws can be discovered, but
it is a conceptual investigation regarding the meaning of statements involving actual
causation. Concretely, we assume all data that is relevant to a particular question of
actual causation is given, and all the relevant general causal laws are known. In terms
of our example from above, we assume that all details of John’s physical condition
are given, and we assume that all the relevant physiological mechanisms regarding
lung-cancer are known. In other words, our study is an enquiry into the necessary and
sufficient conditions for saying that some event C is an actual cause of some event E.
A second note of clarification is that we do not restrict actual causation to events, but
also include omissions. An omission is here understood as the absence of an event, i.e.,
the non-occurrence of an event. For example, rather than stating that the event “Billy
showed up in class today” did not occur, we can state the omission “Billy did not show
up for class today”.
A third note of clarification is that in this work we only consider so-called counterfactual
approaches to actual causation. Other significant approaches (such as regularity based
accounts, probability-raising accounts, or process-theories of causation) will not be
discussed. The reason for this is that the former have proven far more successful in
dealing with difficult examples, and are more readily expressed using the formal tools
commonly found in the Artificial Intelligence literature. As a result, these types of
approaches have received far more attention over the last few years and are in fact
being applied in a wide range of domains going from legal reasoning, to fault diagnosis
in software systems, to history, medicine, etc.
Although the concept of actual causation is rather technical, and our analysis will share
that feature, it is one with which we are all very familiar: we use it to offer explanations.
In the overwhelming majority of cases where one asks the question: “Why did this
event happen?”, the answer given will refer to the actual causes of that event. To be
sure, the concepts of explanation and actual causation – or causation, for short – are
not entirely reducible to one and other, and the precise relation between them is an
interesting subject matter in its own right. (For example, in some cases, the answer
to the question posed might be a mathematical argument, or a piece of information
regarding the relevant causal laws, or possibly another form of information that does
not consist of actual causes.)
Nevertheless it will prove helpful to keep in mind the close connection between them,
because the concept of “explanation” is far more familiar than that of “causation”.
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More specifically, throughout this work we will often present small, simple stories, and
ask of two events – for which we shall use the letters C and E – that occur in this story,
whether or not the one is a cause of the other. An important tool in answering that
question is to consider whether or not the answer to the question “Why did E happen?”
should contain a reference to C.
This brings us to the issue of methodology. On what grounds shall we decide if a
suggested definition of causation is correct?1 The previous paragraph suggests one
important source of insight: common intuitions regarding everyday usage of the term.
In some cases intuitions are universal and very strong, so that any definition which
violates them ought to be immediately dismissed.
But of course intuitions can only get you so far. Very often they are not shared by
everyone, or they are too vague, or simply inconsistent. In these situations, intuitions
serve mainly as a source of inspiration, but do not have the last word. Rather, we aim
to build up a definition of causation based on a small set of fundamental principles that
causation satisfies.
Still, although in the end this work will exhibit a strong preference for one particular
definition of causation based on such principles, we consider it safest to adopt a pluralist
perspective, i.e., we will develop and defend several definitions of causation.
1.1 Structure of the text
Chapter 2 introduces the required formal tools that will be used in our investigations.
Concretely, it introduces the formal languages of CP-logic and structural equations,
and briefly discusses neuron diagrams. Further, it presents a method for translating
between these three.
The remainder of the work is divided into two parts, the first consisting of Chapters 3
through 5, and the second consisting of Chapters 6 and 7.
Rather than focussing on one particular definition, in Part I we use the formal language
of CP-logic to develop a general framework that allows for several definitions of
causation, all of which offer a probabilistic degree of causation, and can be extended in
order to incorporate context-sensitive factors regarding normality. Concretely, Chapter
3 develops a general parametrised definition of causation, and Chapter 4 shows how
this definition can be extended to incorporate the influence of normality.
The focus in this part lies on searching definitions of causation that lend themselves to a
wide variety of applications. The main result will be two definitions, Hall07 and BV12,
which are both compromises between the concepts of dependence and production,
1For a more elaborate analysis of this issue, see (Paul & Hall, 2013)[Ch. 2].
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defined here as well. Unfortunately both definitions have certain shortcomings, which
we discuss in Chapter 5.
Part II focusses entirely on finding a single, binary, definition of actual causation that is
founded on suitable underlying principles, and does so using the language of structural
equations. (We point out that we do extend structural equations with a timing, in order
to mimic the temporal information captured by the semantics of CP-logic.)
Chapter 6 discusses several paradigmatic examples that lead the way to four important
principles underlying causation, and a definition of causation that satisfies them.
Chapter 7 complements this discussion by analysing the importance of one controversial
principle, namely the transitivity of causation. This analysis ends up offering further
support for the definition developed in Chapter 6.
Although the resulting definition corrects the shortcomings presented in Chapter 5, all
three definitions here presented agree on a majority of examples. Further, similar to the
two definitions from Part I, the definition from Part II is also a compromise between
dependence and production, be it that the concept of production used here is more




Ever since Lewis (1973) first analyzed the problem of actual causation in terms of
counterfactual dependence, philosophers and researchers from the AI community
alike have been trying to improve on his attempt. The literature now contains many
definitions of actual causation, each with its own strengths and weaknesses. The
fact that the formulations of these different definitions diverge widely, proves a major
obstacle for evaluating and comparing them. A second problem is posed by the standard
practice of assuming that questions of causation can be separated from their field of
application, because this conflicts with recent research that suggests actual causation
is a strongly context-dependent concept. In this first part we address both issues, by
presenting a formal framework for expressing definitions and extensions of actual
causation.
Following Pearl (2000), structural equations have become a popular formal language
for defining actual causation (Halpern, 2015a; Halpern & Pearl, 2005a; Hitchcock,
2007, 2009; Weslake, 2015; Woodward, 2003). A notable exception is the work of
Ned Hall, who has extensively critiziced the privileged role of structural equations for
causal modelling, as well as the definitions that have been expressed with it. He has
proposed several definitions himself (Hall, 2004, 2007; Hall & Paul, 2003), the latest
of which is a sophisticated attempt to overcome the flaws he observes in those that
rely too heavily on structural equations. Building on a definition by Vennekens (2011),
we have developed a definition of our own (Beckers & Vennekens, 2012) within the
language of CP-logic (Causal Probabilistic logic). CP-logic (Vennekens, Denecker, &
Bruynooghe, 2009) is a probabilistic logic programming language, based on Sato’s
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distribution semantics (Sato, 1995).
The relation between these different approaches is currently not well understood.
Indeed, they are all expressed using different formalisms (e.g., neuron diagrams,
structural equations, CP-logic, or just natural language). Therefore, comparisons
between them are limited to verifying on which examples they (dis)agree. Our first goal
in this part is to work towards a remedy for this situation. We will present a general,
parametrized, and probabilistic definition of actual causation.
We will develop this definition in the context of CP-logic, because this language offers
all the features that are required to define the necessary concepts in a straightforward
and natural way. In particular, we make use of the fact that CP-logic has a modular
rule-based structure and a semantics that is explicitly temporal and makes a distinction
between the default and deviant values of variables. In the context of structural
models, which lack these features, our general framework would be significantly more
cumbersome to define.
Exploiting the fact that neuron diagrams and structural equations – at least those
typically used in the actual causation literature – can be reduced to CP-logic, we will
then show that our definition and three definitions by Ned Hall can be seen as particular
instantiations of this parametrized definition. Our analysis thus allows for a formal and
fundamental comparison between these approaches, which is a first step towards an
improved account. Also, it generalises the definitions by Hall from a deterministic to a
non-deterministic setting. Still, all of these definitions share one feature: they do not
take into account the context in which the question of actual causation is posed.
Halpern and Hitchcock (2015) draw on empirical research regarding people’s causal
judgments, to suggest a graded and context-sensitive notion of actual causation.
Concretely, they propose an extension to actual causation that takes into account
the normality of different settings. Although we sympathise with many of their
observations, their restriction to a merely partial normality ordering runs into trouble for
more complex examples. Therefore we aim to improve on their approach, by defining
an extension to our general definition of causation, completing our general framework
for the study of actual causation.
In the next section we introduce structural equations, and present the definition of
actual causation the success of which has made them such a popular tool, namely that
of Halpern and Pearl (2005a). This is followed by an introduction to the CP-logic
language in Section 2.3. Since Hall presents his examples using neuron diagrams, we
also briefly discuss these in Section 2.4, followed by a method for translating causal
models between these three different formal representations.
With those preliminaries out of the way, Chapter 3 presents a general definition of
actual causation using CP-logic. This definition is then instantiated into four concrete
definitions. We offer a succinct representation of all these definitions, and an illustration
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of how they compare to each other. The second goal of this first part is addressed
in Chapter 4, where we focus on the extension to actual causation by Halpern and
Hitchcock. First we translate their work into the CP-logic language, after which
we offer several improvements, and a generalisation to allow for non-deterministic
examples. In Chapter 5 we present some problems for the definitions developed so far,
which leads the way to an improved approach to actual causation in the second part.
2.2 Structural Equations Modelling
We briefly introduce a simple version of structural equations modelling, which is the
most popular formal language used to represent causal models. In general, structural
equations allow functional dependencies between continuous variables, or discrete
variables with possibly an infinite domain. However, the actual causation literature
typically considers only examples made up of discrete variables with a finite domain,
and propositional formulas. Further, in the majority of cases the variables are Boolean.
This is why we restrict attention to those kinds of models. For a detailed introduction,
see (Pearl, 2000).
A structural model consists of a set of endogenous variables ~V , a set of exogenous
variables ~U , and a causal model M. Although we only consider models with Boolean
variables, we should point out that the results we will present can easily be generalized
to allow for multi-valued variables as well. We explain this below.
The model M is a set of structural equations so that there is exactly one equation for
each variable Vi ∈~V . An equation takes the form Vi := φ , where φ is a propositional
formula over ~V ∪~U . For any variable Vi, we denote by φVi the formula in the equation
for Vi in M. We follow the customary practice of leaving the equations for variables
that depend directly on the exogenous variables implicit, and simply state the value
they take in each particular story.
For an assignment (~v,~u) of values to the variables in ~V ∪ ~U , we denote by φ (~v,~u) the
truth value obtained by filling in the truth values (~v,~u) in the formula φ . An assignment
(~v,~u) respects M, if for each endogenous variable Vi, its value vi = φ
(~v,~u)
Vi . As usual, we
only consider models M in which the equations are acyclic, which implies that for each
assignment~u to ~U , there is exactly one assignment (~v,~u) that respects M. Therefore,
we refer to ~U =~u as a context. For every value~u of ~U , we call the pair (M,~u) a causal
setting. We write (M,~u) |= φ if φ (~v,~u) = true for the unique assignment (~v,~u) that
respects M.
A literal L is a formula of the form Vi = vi or Ui = ui. Our restriction to Boolean
variables is made concrete here: the only values vi and ui we consider are true and
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false. Hence our definitions and results can be generalised by simply lifting this
restriction. The same comment applies to CP-logic, introduced in the next section.
We will use the atom Vi as a shorthand for Vi = true, and the negated atom ¬Vi as a
shorthand for Vi = false. Regardless of whether Li ≡ Vi or Li ≡ ¬Vi, we write φLi to
mean φVi . Hence in the case where Li ≡ ¬Vi, ¬φLi will be a propositional formula that
makes Li true in any assignment that respects M. Further, we denote by L(M,~u) the set
of all literals Li such that (M,~u) |= Li. Further, we denote by L(M,~u) the set of all literals
Li such that (M,~u) |= Li.
A causal model M is a tool to represent counterfactual relations between variables, in
the sense that changing the values of the variables on the right-side of an equation can
change the value of the variable on the left-side, but not vice versa. This makes them
suitable devices to model interventions on an actual setting, meaning changes to the
value of a variable Vi that affect only the values of variables that depend on Vi, but not
those on whom Vi itself depends.
Syntactically, we make use of the do()-operator introduced by Pearl (2000) to represent
such an intervention. For a model M and an endogenous variable Vi, we denote by
Mdo(Vi) and Mdo(¬Vi) the models that are identical to M except that the equations for Vi
are Vi := true and Vi := false, respectively. Hence for a causal setting (M,~u) such that
(M,~u) |=C, the causal setting (Mdo(¬C),~u) corresponds to the counterfactual setting
resulting from the intervention on (M,~u) that prevents C. We generalise the do()-
operator to a set of literals in an obvious way, namely by replacing the equation for
each literal in the set in the manner explained above.
2.2.1 HP-definition of Actual Causation
A detailed discussion of the HP-definition from (Halpern & Pearl, 2005a) is delayed
until Part II. We already present it here because we will make reference to it every
now and then throughout this text. We here present a somewhat simplified version.
Concretely, we only consider single literals as causes or effect, as opposed to Boolean
combinations of literals.
Definition 1 (HP definition of actual causation). Given (M,~u) |=C∧E, we define C
to be an actual cause of E w.r.t. (M,~u) if there exists a partition (~Z, ~W ) of L(M,~u) with
C ∈~Z such that both of the following conditions hold:
1. (Mdo(¬C,¬~W ),~u) |= ¬E. In words, changing the actually satisfied literals
C,W1, . . . ,Wn to their negation changes E from true to false.
2. (Mdo(C,¬~W ′,~Z′),~u) |= E for all subsets ~W ′ of ~W and all subsets ~Z′ of ~Z. In words,
changing the values of any subset of literals in ~W should have no effect on E, as
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long as C is held fixed, even if all the literals in an arbitrary subset of ~Z are set
to their original values in the context~u.
Here, the interventions do(¬~W ) represent changes to the actual setting beyond an
intervention on the putative cause C, and are referred to as structural contingencies.
The idea is, roughly, that do(¬C) is not sufficient to guarantee the truth of ¬E by itself,
and other interventions may be required, but C is sufficient to make sure E holds in the
current context.
2.3 CP-logic
CP-logic (short for Causal Probabilistic logic) was originally introduced by Vennekens
et al. (2009) as an expressive causal modelling language. Although there is much to
say in favour of expressivity in general, for the current investigations it will be helpful
to have a little less of it. Specifically, CP-logic is designed to be a useful tool for
modelling general causal relations, rather than actual causal relations. Therefore we
shall only use a fragment of CP-logic throughout this work.
2.3.1 Formal Semantics of CP-logic
A CP-law
The basic syntactical unit of CP-logic is a CP-law, which takes the general form:
(A1 : α1)∨ . . .∨ (An : αn)← φ
Here each Ai is a Boolean variable, or an atom, each αi belongs to [0,1], and ∑αi ≤ 1.
φ is a formula, the form of which we describe below. We refer to the part to the left of
the arrow as the head of the CP-law, and to the right as its body.
A CP-law represents an independent, non-deterministic, causal mechanism: the body
represents the cause for the mechanism to be “activated”, or “applied”, and the head
represents the probability distribution over all its possible effects. Thus, each Ai
represents an event that can be the result of the mechanism. The reason we do not
demand ∑αi = 1, is that we want to allow for a mechanism having no effect at all.
Another way to interpret this is by considering the head to contain an empty disjunct,
representing the lack of an effect. The probability for this disjunct is then given by
(1−∑αi).
In CP-logic in general, φ may consist of any first-order logic formula. That we are
considering only a fragment of CP-logic, is made concrete by the fact that we only
10 FORMAL BACKGROUND
consider φ as a conjunction of ground literals, i.e., a conjunction of atoms and negated
atoms. The motivation behind this restriction goes in two steps.
First, actual causation is taken to be a relation between an event or an omission, and
another event or omission, and those are represented by literals. More specifically, we
represent an event by an atom, and an omission, i.e., the non-occurrence of an event, by
a negated atom. Complex events are then represented by propositional combinations
thereof. This offers a first restriction: we only consider propositional formulas φ .
Second, we noted that a CP-law represents an independent mechanism. To ensure this
independence, we do not consider “disjunctive mechanisms” – meaning a mechanism
that can be triggered by either one of two causes – as primitives of the language.
Instead, we model such behaviour by two separate mechanisms, which taken together
can sometimes behave as a disjunctive mechanism, a topic we will discuss in detail
later. Therefore as a second restriction we exclude all disjunctions from φ .
Concretely, a CP-law takes the general form:
(A1 : α1)∨ . . .∨ (An : αn)← B1∧ . . .∧Bm
Here each B j is either an atom or a negated atom, meaning it represents either an event
or an omission. In practice, every CP-law in all examples discussed in this work will
contain just a single atom A in its head. If the corresponding probability α < 1, then
such a law can be read as stating: if the mechanism is activated, it will either produce
A or will have no effect at all.
It is common in causal modelling to divide all variables into endogenous and exogenous
ones. Exogenous variables are taken to represent the background conditions, or the
context, of the local causal model under consideration, meaning that for any actual story
their values are simply given. The endogenous variables on the other hand represent
the variables whose causal relations we are interested in. Some of these endogenous
variables are determined directly by the context, i.e., by the exogenous variables. The
equivalent of such a variable in CP-logic is a variable appearing in the head of a law
whose body is >. (In such cases we shall simply omit the body.) Concretely, to say
that A is determined directly by the exogenous variables, is translated into CP-logic as
the law (A : α)←.
Assume we are considering a CP-law in isolation. If the body is satisfied, then the
mechanism is triggered, and it produces one of the effects Ai (or has no effect). We
call this process an atomic story, and consider each B j to be an atomic actual cause
of the effect Ai. We take this atomic relation as primitive, not in need of any further
analysis. This means our aim is not to give a reductive account of actual causation,
where actual causation is reduced to some other more primitive relation. Rather, the
aim is to construct a definition of actual causation in complex stories, where multiple
mechanisms interfere with one and other, in terms of actual causes in these atomic
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stories. In this manner we sidestep the controversial metaphysical debate on the ultimate
nature of causation.
We should point out that it is quite common in the counterfactual tradition for an
account of causation to be non-reductive in this sense.1 Consider for example the
influential account by Halpern and Pearl (2005a)[p. 5]:
It may seem strange that we are trying to understand causality using causal
models, which clearly already encode causal relationships. Our reasoning
is not circular. Our aim is not to reduce causation to noncausal concepts,
but to interpret questions about causes of specific events in fully specified
scenarios in terms of generic causal knowledge such as what we obtain
from the equations of physics.
A CP-theory
A CP-theory T is a finite set of CP-laws, and represents a local causal model of the
relevant part of the world under consideration. The stories of interest to us are the
complex stories described by such theories, and actual causation is a relation between
events/omissions in such stories. Informally, an actual story is a sequence of events that
occur (or fail to occur) according to the mechanisms captured by a theory T . A theory
is a general description of reality, in that it allows for a range of different possible
stories. There are two degrees of freedom offered by T . First, a non-deterministic law
allows for different effects, each occurring with the corresponding probability. Second,
the order in which mechanisms are activated can vary.
We illustrate with a variant of an example from (Hall, 2004):
Example 1. Suzy and Billy can both decide to throw a rock at a bottle. When Suzy
does so, her rock shatters the bottle with probability 0.9. Billy’s aim is slightly worse
and he only hits with probability 0.8.
This small causal domain can be expressed by the following CP-theory T :
(Suzy : ∗)← . (2.1)
(Billy : ∗)← . (2.2)
(BS : 0.9)← Suzy. (2.3)
(BS : 0.8)← Billy. (2.4)
Suzy (resp. Billy) represents Suzy (resp. Billy) throwing a rock, and BS represents the
bottle shattering. Laws (2.1) and (2.2) state that Suzy and Billy are determined directly
1See (Paul & Hall, 2013)[Ch. 3] for a detailed discussion of this topic.
12 FORMAL BACKGROUND
by the context. We use the notation ∗ to indicate that the precise value of the probability
is not of interest, except that it is strictly smaller than 1.
Considered by itself, law (2.3) states that, if Suzy throws her rock, it will shatter the
bottle with probability 0.9. Due to the presence of (2.4), this interpretation cannot be
applied here. Instead, the meaning of (2.3) here involves another conditional: if Suzy
throws her rock, and the bottle has not yet shattered when it arrives at the bottle’s
location, it will shatter the bottle with probability 0.9. (Note that both interpretations
are equivalent in the absence of law (2.4).) The same obviously holds for law (2.4), be
it that the probability is 0.8. Thus the fundamental temporal property that causes come
before their effects is built directly into the semantics of a CP-law.
To formalize these ideas, the semantics of CP-logic uses probability trees (Shafer,
1996). The basic idea is that such a tree T represents possible evolutions of the domain
from an initial state into a final state. For this example, one such tree is shown in
Figure 2.1. Here, each node x is mapped to an interpretation of the variables I (x),
which represents the corresponding state of the domain. (The white nodes indicate
interpretations where the effect, BS, is true.) In the initial state of the domain (the root
node), all variables are assigned their default value false: no event has occurred yet. In
this example, the bottle is initially unbroken and the rocks are still in Billy and Suzy’s
hands.
The children of a node x are the result of the activation of a law r, whose body is
satisfied in I (x): each edge (x,y) corresponds to a specific disjunct that was chosen
from the head of r. The fact that a node has different children corresponds to the
first degree of freedom, namely the non-determinism. Each node is labelled with
the law r that is activated, and each edge is labelled with the chosen disjunct and its
corresponding probability. As in the head of a CP-law, we leave implicit the empty
disjunct representing the lack of an effect, since its probability can be derived from the
others: the sum of the labels of all outgoing edges from a non-leaf node must always
be 1.
Of course there may be several candidate laws that could be activated in x. For each
candidate law, there will be a separate probability tree in which it is activated in x. This
corresponds to the second degree of freedom, namely the order of the mechanisms
being active.
When no more laws can be activated, a branch ends. The resulting leaf node represents
the end state of the domain. In this manner each branch of a probability tree represents
a possible story that might take place, according to the laws of the CP-theory. For
example, our theory allows for the following story, which is a classic case of Late
Preemption:
Example 2 (Late Preemption). Suzy and Billy both throw a rock at a bottle. Suzy’s
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◦ ◦ ◦ •
Figure 2.1: Probability tree for Suzy and Billy.
and would have shattered the bottle had it not been preempted by Suzy’s throw.
The formal counterpart of this story is the leftmost branch b of our tree. We denote
the n-th node of a branch b by nb. As always, in the root node all variables are false:
I (1b) = {¬Suzy,¬Billy,¬BS}. Law (2.1) is activated first, so the state of the domain
in 2b, the left child-node of the root node, is obtained by setting Suzy to true, its deviant
value. This is followed by law (2.2), so in I (3b) we have that both Suzy and Billy
are true. Then law (2.3) is activated and the bottle is broken, meaning BS is set to
true. Finally, the last edge represents the fact that Billy’s throw was also accurate, even
though there was no bottle left to break. Hence I (4b) =I (5b) = {Suzy,Billy,BS}.
Each probability tree T defines an obvious probability distribution PT over its
leaves, namely, the probability PT (l) of a leaf l is the product of the probabilities
of all edges that lead to l. Given that each leaf is mapped to an interpretation of
the domain, the probability distribution over leaves of the tree induces an obvious
probability distribution over interpretations (the probability of I is ∑I (l)=I PT (l)) and
over Boolean formulas (the probability of φ is ∑I (l)|=φ PT (l)).
As we noted, there may be several laws that can be activated in a node x, giving rise
to several probability trees. For example, the tree in Figure 2.1 only contains stories
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where Suzy throws or does not throw first. An important property however is that all
trees defined by the same theory result in the same interpretations in the leaf nodes, and
thus also the same probability distribution. This is because if a law can be activated in
some node x, then it can be activated in all subsequent nodes as well. This property is
obvious for CP-laws whose precondition does not contain negation, because subsequent
interpretations only increase in truth, i.e., the only thing that happens is that more and
more variables deviate from their default value. The semantics of CP-logic takes special
measures to ensure that this same property also holds for CP-laws containing negation.
This is done by ensuring that a CP-law whose precondition depends on some variable
V still being in its default state can only be activated once there no longer exists any
way in which V could still be caused to deviate. In other words, it is not enough that
V is false in the current state x, but it must actually be the case that V has already
become impossible. This is formally defined by means of a fixpoint construction that
overestimates everything that is still possible in x. We refer the reader to Vennekens
et al. (2009) for the details of this construction. The bottom-line, however, is that it
produces an interpretation U (x) that assigns true to all variables for which it is still
possible that they could become true in some descendant of x. A law may then only be
activated in x, if its body holds in both I (x) and U (x), since this means that it is not
only true now, but will remain true from now on.
This ensures that, as far as the leaf nodes are concerned, the order in which CP-laws
are activated does not matter. All probability trees T that can be constructed define
precisely the same probability distribution PT . For a CP-theory T , we denote this
unique distribution by PT .
When it comes to actual causation, however, the order does matter. As mentioned, the
different orders in different trees correspond to the different orders in which events can
happen in a causal story. Consider again Late Preemption. Here it is intuitively evident
that Suzy’s throw caused the bottle to shatter, and Billy’s throw did not.
Now imagine the example were slightly different, so that Billy’s rock actually hit the
bottle first. In that case, our judgment would be reversed: Billy’s throw caused the
bottle to shatter, and Suzy’s throw did not. The formal counterpart of the story would
be the leftmost branch of the probability tree depicted in Figure 2.2. (Note that if we
were to reverse the order of the first two edges, then this would represent the story
where Suzy throws before Billy, but Billy throws harder and thus his rock still reaches
the bottle first.) Given that the interpretations in the leaf nodes of the branches for
both stories – the leftmost branch in both Figure 2.1 and 2.2 – are identical, taking into
account the order of the CP-laws is necessary to distinguish the causes in both stories.
(In the next chapter we illustrate this by means of the definition from Section 3.3.)
Probability trees do not allow for simultaneous events: at every moment only one event
can happen. Although this is a realistic assumption when considering a continuous
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Figure 2.2: Another probability tree for Suzy and Billy.
closer to a coarser, discrete division of time. More concretely, we can easily imagine
a variant of the story so that we can’t distinguish which rock hits the bottle first. In
that case it makes perfect sense to assume that for all intents and purposes both rocks
hit the bottle simultaneously, making it a case of Symmetric Overdetermination. To
accommodate this possibility we take such a story to correspond to two branches rather
than one. These branches consist of the same nodes, ordered differently (eg., the
leftmost branches of the trees in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 together represent the story in
which Suzy’s and Billy’s rocks hit the bottle at the same time). We shall say that C
causes E if this holds in either one of the branches considered by themselves.2
2.3.2 Counterfactual Probabilities
In the context of structural equations, Pearl (2000) studies counterfactuals and shows
how they can be evaluated by means of a syntactic transformation. In their study
2We choose to define causation for these cases in this manner because it agrees with the majority verdict
in the literature that both overdetermining events are causes. However one could also define it so that there
has to be causation in both branches. In this case, neither event would be considered a cause. If there are
more than two simultaneous events, we generalize this reasoning in the straightforward way.
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of actual causation and explanations, Halpern and Pearl (2005b, p. 27) also define
counterfactual probabilities (i.e., the probability that some event would have had in a
counterfactual situation). Vennekens, Denecker, and Bruynooghe (2010) present an
equivalent method for evaluating counterfactual probabilities in CP-logic, also making
use of syntactic transformations.
Assume we have a branch b of a probability tree of some theory T . To make T
deterministic in accordance with the choices made in b, we transform T into T b by
replacing the heads of the laws that were applied in b with the disjuncts that were
chosen from those heads in b. For example, if we take as branch b the story from





We will use Pearl’s do()-operator to indicate an intervention (Pearl, 2000). The
intervention on a theory T that ensures variable C remains false, denoted by do(¬C),
removes C from the head of any law in which it occurs, yielding T |do(¬C). For
example, to prevent Suzy from throwing, the resulting theory T |do(¬Suzy) is given by:
← .
(Billy : ∗)← .
(BS : 0.9)← Suzy.
(BS : 0.8)← Billy.
Laws with an empty head are ineffective, and can thus simply be omitted. The
analogous operation do(C) on a theory T corresponds to adding the deterministic
law C←.
With this in hand, we can now evaluate a Pearl-style counterfactual probability “given
that b in fact occurred, the probability that ¬E would have occurred if ¬C had been the
case” as PT b(¬E|do(¬C)).
2.4 Neuron Diagrams, Structural Equations, and
CP-logic
In a standard neuron diagram, a neuron can be in one of two states, the default “off”
state and the deviant “on” state in which the neuron “fires”. An edge represents the
influence of the state of the neuron on the left on the state of the neuron on the right
of the edge. If the edge ends in an arrow, eg., the edge from C to D below, then the
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influence is positive: C firing contributes to D firing as well. Given that there are no
other incoming edges in D, C firing is sufficient and necessary for D’s firing. The
presence of an edge ending in a bullet, as is the case between C and B, represents a
negative influence: the firing of C prevents B from firing, regardless of the state that A
is in. When there are multiple incoming edges with arrows tips, as with E, then each of
the neurons firing is sufficient for E to fire, as long as there is no preventive edge with
a bullet.
Concretely in Figure 2.3, E fires iff at least one of B or D fires, D fires iff C fires, and B
fires iff A fires and C doesn’t fire. Neurons that are “on” are represented by full circles








The diagrams in Figures 2.3 and 2.4 represent the same causal structure, but different
stories: in both cases there are two causal chains leading to E, one starting with C
and another starting with A. But in Figure 2.3 the chain through B is preempted by
C, whereas in Figure 2.4 there is nothing for C to preempt, as A doesn’t even fire.
Therefore the first is an example of what is generally known as Early Preemption,
whereas the second is not.
Although Hall (2007) presents his arguments using neuron diagrams, he formulates
his definition in terms of structural equations that correspond to such diagrams in the
following way: for each endogenous variable there is one equation, which contains a
propositional formula on the right-hand side concisely expressing the dependencies of
the diagram. The left-most neurons, which have no incoming edges, are determined
directly by the exogenous variables U that represent the background conditions. For






We can translate such a structural model into an equivalent CP-logic theory by simply
replacing the “:=” symbol by “←”, and replacing the exogenous variables by non-
determinism in the laws (Vennekens et al., 2009). (Although we have restricted
ourselves to Boolean variables, we point out that – just like structural equations –
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CP-logic can be generalised to allow for multi-valued variables as well, as long as we
stipulate a default value for each variable.)
CP-logic allows representations of causal relations that are more refined than those of
structural models in two ways. First, cyclic causal relations can be represented in a
more correct way than considered in, e.g., Pearl (2000) – for a discussion of this, see
Vennekens et al. (2010)[Section 5].
Second, CP-logic is better suited for representing independent causal mechanisms:
rather than having a single CP-law that combines all direct causes of a variable, CP-
logic splits up independent mechanisms into separate CP-laws (Vennekens et al., 2010).
Halpern and Pearl (2005a)[p. 2] also endorse such a modular approach for structural
equations: “Each equation represents a distinct mechanism (or law) in the world, one
that may be modified (by external actions) without altering the others.” However, due to
the static semantics of structural equations, all mechanisms influencing an endogenous
variable have to be combined into one equation. As a result, a single structural equation
sometimes represents more than one distinct mechanism.
For example, consider the theory from Section 2.3.1. There, law (2.3) represents
the distinct mechanism that connects Suzy’s throw to the bottle shattering ((BS :
0.9)← Suzy), and likewise for law (2.4) and Billy’s throw ((BS : 0.8)← Billy). Using
structural equations, one is forced to represent both mechanisms in a single law, using
a disjunction to separate them: BS := Suzy∨Billy. In this manner one loses the ability
to distinguish between Suzy and Billy in the Late Preemption example we discussed
earlier.3
Therefore we translate a single structural equation into a set of independent causal
mechanisms. Likewise, we translate the influence of B and D on E in Figure 2.3 into
two separate laws. Concretely, the translation of the causal model from Figures 2.3 and
2.4 into CP-logic is given by the following CP-theory – where p and q represent some
probabilities:
(A : p)← .





In general, a CP-theory that is a translation of a neuron diagram contains two types of
laws: those for the endogenous variables that are directly determined by the exogenous
variables (i.e., the neurons with no incoming edges), and those for the downstream
endogenous variables. By removing the exogenous variables and replacing it by non-
determinism, the first type of law takes on the form (Ai : p)← for some atom Ai
3In Part II we discuss how Halpern and Pearl (2005a) try to work around this problem in order to deal
with Late Preemption cases.
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and a probability p. The second type of law is deterministic, and does not have an
empty body: A j← B1∧ . . .∧Bm. Further, neuron diagrams cannot express causation
by omission directly, i.e., they cannot express that the failure of a neuron to fire is
sufficient for another neuron to fire. This means at least one of the literals Bi will be an
atom (as opposed to a negated atom).
The state of the neuron diagram (i.e., which variables fire and which do not) corresponds
to an assignment v of values to the Boolean variables V of the corresponding structural
equations model M, which in turn corresponds to an interpretation for a vocabulary
of the corresponding CP-logic theory. With such a state, we therefore associate a set
of branches of probability trees of the CP-logic theory whose leaf nodes contain this
interpretation. To construct this set, we first need to explain the temporal interpretation
of a neuron diagram.
The direction from left to right in a neuron diagram should be interpreted temporally:
neurons that are aligned vertically all fire or fail to fire at the same time point.
Concretely, the set of all leftmost neurons represents the initial time point 0, and
then each set of vertically aligned neurons to the right of the previous one represents
the next time point. Hence for each neuron there is a single time point at which it can
fire.
For example, in the diagram from Figure 2.3, both A and C fire at time point 0. Then,
at time point 1, D fires. The fact that B does not fire at this time implies that it will
never fire. Finally, E fires at the next time point. For ease of exposition, we denote the
time point for a literal Bi as t(Bi).
Since multiple neurons can fire at the same time, in the context of neuron diagrams
there can be simultaneous events. In CP-logic, in each node only one law is allowed
to be applied. Therefore it is not the case that each node in a branch of a probability
tree corresponds to a separate time point, but rather sets of consecutive nodes – with
variable size – do.
Concretely, a single diagram D corresponds to a set of branches B that all have the
interpretation v in their leaf node. Each branch b ∈ B contains the same edge-node
pairs, but in different orders. The different orders of the application of the laws breaks
down as follows. At each time point t, there may be several laws that are applied
according to the temporal interpretation of the diagram D. (For example, A← and
C←.) If there are more than one, then there is one branch in B for each ordering of
these laws. This reflects the fact that in a neuron diagram, all laws which have the same
effect, symmetrically overdetermine this effect. Hence each branch can be divided into
several subbranches, where each subbranch corresponds to one time point. The order
of the subbranches is fixed, but the order in which laws are applied in each subbranch
is completely open. As will become clear in the next chapter, in many cases the order
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3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we will use CP-logic to formulate a general, parametrised, probabilistic
definition of actual causation. The purpose of doing so is to obtain a simple and
systematic method for comparing and constructing definitions of actual causation.
We show how four existing definitions of actual causation can be reformulated and
generalised as instantiations of our general definition.
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First we present a reformulation of a previous definition developed by ourselves. This
definition was orginally formulated in CP-logic, and already used some of the concepts
defined in this chapter. In fact it can be seen as a precursor to our general definition.
Second we turn to work by Ned Hall. In his influential article “Two Concepts of
Causation” (Hall, 2004), he argues for a view of causation as divided into two concepts
(as the title suggests). The bottomline is that the type of examples in which we attribute
causation is too diverse to be captured by a single concept. We reformulate and
generalise his two concepts as instantiations of our general definition.
Comparing these three reformulated definitions then becomes straightforward. As a
result, we see that our first definition is a compromise between the other two. This is
confirmed by looking at the diverse examples discussed by Hall.
Our fourth definition is based on later work of Hall (2007). Unsatisfied with his earlier
failure to incorporate all intuitive examples of causation into a single concept, he
proposes a new definition as a compromise between the two concepts of causation. We
reformulate and generalise this definition as an instantiation of our definition as well.
In the current chapter the focus lies on the flexibility offered by our general definition
in expressing different definitions, rather than on the search for the right definition of
causation. In the conclusion we briefly compare our general definition to similar work
done in the structural equations literature.
Chapter 4 adds to our general definition an extension that allows it to take into account
considerations of normality. The combination of both aspects, the general definition
and its extension, is what makes up our general framework. In Chapter 5 we come back
to the definitions here developed, and assess both their merits and the problems they
face.
3.2 Defining Actual Causation Using CP-logic
Throughout the following chapters, we assume that we are given a CP-theory T and an
actual story b in which both C and E occurred, and that we are interested in whether or
not C caused E. We hereby limit ourselves to causation between literals C and E, but
our account can be generalised to include complex causes and effects as well. By Con
we denote the quadruple (T,b,C,E), and refer to this as a context.
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3.2.1 Actual Causation in General
For reasons of simplicity, the majority of approaches (including Hall) only consider
actual causation in a deterministic setting. Further, it is taken for granted that the actual
values of all variables are given. In such a context, counterfactual dependence of the
event E on C is expressed by the conditional: if do(¬C) then ¬E, where it is assumed
that all exogenous variables take on their actual values. In our probabilistic setting,
the latter translates into making those laws that were actually applied deterministic,
in accordance with the choices made in the story. However, in many examples, the
story does not specify the actual value of all exogenous variables. Looking back at our
earlier Late Preemption example, if Suzy is prevented from throwing her rock, then
we cannot say what the accuracy would have been had she done so. Hence, in a more
general setting, it is required only that do(¬C) makes ¬E possible. In other words, we
get a probabilistic definition of counterfactual dependence:
Definition 2 (Dependence). E is counterfactually dependent on C in (T,b) if PT b(¬E |
do(¬C))> 0.
As counterfactual dependency lies at the heart of causation for all of the approaches we
are considering, Dependence represents the most straightforward definition of actual
causation.12 It is however too crude and allows for many counterexamples, cases of
preemption being the most famous.
More refined definitions agree with the general structure of the former, but modify the
theory T in more subtle ways than T b does. We identify two different kinds of laws in
T , that should each be treated in a specific way.
The first are the laws that are intrinsic with respect to the given context. These are
laws whose outcome is fixed, in the sense that in any counterfactual story we might
consider, they will always produce the same outcome as they did in the actual story.
Thus, intrinsic laws should be made deterministic in accordance with b.
The second are laws that are irrelevant in the given context. These are laws that played
no part in the causal process that caused E, and that we should therefore not take into
account when trying to find out if C was a cause of E or not. Thus, irrelevant laws
should simply be ignored.
1This definition is similar in spirit to that of a partial explanation given in (Halpern & Pearl, 2005b).
There the probability measures the goodness of the explanation, here it measures the importance of the cause.
2Fenton-Glynn (2015) uses these counterfactual probabilities to extend the definition of causation from
Halpern and Pearl (2005a) to probabilistic structural equations. His focus lies with incorporating the idea
that causes are “probability-raising” with regards to their effect, into a counterfactual account. In this manner,
two traditional approaches to actual causation are combined. This project stands somewhat orthogonal to our
current investigation. In future work it would be interesting to see how his results can be integrated into our
framework.
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Together, the methods of determining which laws are intrinsic and irrelevant,
respectively, will be the parameters of our general definition. Suppose we are given
two functions Int and Irr, which both map each context (T,b,C,E) to a subset of the
theory T . With these, we define actual causation as follows:
Definition 3 (Actual causation given Int and Irr). Given the context Con, we define
that C is an actual cause of E if and only if E is counterfactually dependent on C when
replacing T b with the theory T ∗ that we construct as:
T ∗ = [T \ (Irr(Con)∪ Int(Con))]∪ Int(Con)b.
For instance, the naive approach that identifies actual causation with counterfactual
dependence corresponds to taking Irr as the constant function {} and Int(Con) as
{r ∈ T | r was applied in b}. From now on, we use the following, more legible notation
for a particular instantiation of this definition:
Dependence-Irr. No law r is irrelevant.
Dependence-Intr. A law r is intrinsic if r was applied in b.
The following straightforward theorem expresses that this formulation of dependence
is equivalent to the original in Definition 2.
Theorem 1. Given the context Con, C is an actual cause of E given Dependence-Irr
and Dependence-Intr iff E is counterfactually dependent on C.
If desired, we can order different causes by their respective counterfactual probabilities
PT ∗(¬E | do(¬C)), as this indicates how important the cause was for E. Note however
that Definition 2 reduces to a standard deterministic definition of counterfactual
dependence if all CP-laws are deterministic. In that case, our general Definition
3 becomes deterministic as well.
3.3 Beckers and Vennekens 2012 Definition
A recent proposal for a definition of actual causation was originally formulated in
(Vennekens, 2011), which we have slightly modified in (Beckers & Vennekens, 2012).
Here, we summarize the basic ideas of the latter, and refer to it as BV12. We reformulate
this definition in order to fit into our framework of Definition 3. It is easily verified that
both versions are equivalent.
Because we want to follow the actual story as closely as possible, the condition for
intrinsicness is exactly like before: we force all laws that were applied in b to have the
same effect as they had in b.
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To decide which laws were relevant for causing E in our story, we start from a simple
temporal criterion: every law that was applied after the effect E took place is irrelevant,
and every law that was applied before isn’t. For example, to figure out why the bottle
broke in the Late Preemption example, law (2.4) is considered irrelevant, because the
bottle was already broken by the time Billy’s rock arrived. For laws that were not
applied in b, we distinguish laws that could still be applied when E occurred, from
those that could not. The first are considered irrelevant, whereas the second aren’t.
This ensures that any story b′ that is identical to b up to and including the occurrence
of E provides the same judgements about the causes of E, since any law that is not
applied in b but is applied in b′, must obviously occur after E.
BV12-Irrelevant. A law r is irrelevant if r was not applied before E in b, although it
could have. (I.e., it was not impossible at the time when E occurred.)
BV12-Intrinsic. A law r is intrinsic if r was applied in b.
The following theorem expresses that the current formulation is equivalent to the
original definition.
Theorem 2. Given the context Con, C is an actual cause of E given BV12-Irr and
BV12-Intr iff C is an actual cause of E as defined in (Beckers & Vennekens, 2012).
3.4 Hall 2004 Definitions
Hall (2004) claims that it is impossible to account for the wide variety of examples
in which we intuitively judge there to be actual causation by using a single, all-
encompassing definition. Therefore he defines two different concepts which both
deserve to be called forms of causation but are nonetheless not co-extensive.
3.4.1 Dependence
The first of these is simply Dependence, as stated in Definition 2. As mentioned
earlier, Hall only considers deterministic causal relations, and thus the probabilistic
counterfactual will either be 1 or 0.
3.4.2 Production
The second concept tries to express the idea that to cause something is to bring it
about, or to produce it. The original, rather technical, definition is discussed in the next
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section, but the following informal version suffices to understand how it works: C is a
producer of E if there is a directed path of firing neurons in the diagram from C to E.
In our framework, this translates into the following.
Production-Irr. A law r is irrelevant if r was not applied before E in b, or if its effect
was already true when it was applied.
Production-Intr. A law r is intrinsic if r was applied in b.
Theorem 3. Given a neuron diagram D with corresponding equations M and
assignment to its variables v. Consider the CP-logic theory T , and a story B, that
we get when applying the translation from Section 2.4. C is a producer of E in the
diagram according to Hall (2004) iff C is an actual cause of E given Production-Irr
and Production-Intr.
The CP-logic version of production offers a way to make sense of causation by omission.
That is, just as with all of the definitions in our framework in fact, we can extend it to
allow negative literals such as ¬C to be causes as well.
In order to prove the above theorem, we first need to formulate Hall’s definition of
production.
3.4.3 Proof of Theorem 3
First we need to explain some terminology that Hall uses. On Hall’s account, an event
corresponds to the firing of a neuron, in other words, a variable taking on its deviant
value true. A structure is a temporal sequence of sets of events that unfolds according
to the structural equations of some neuron diagram and according to its temporal
interpretation. A branch, or a sub-branch, would be the corresponding concept in
CP-logic.
Two structures are said to match intrinsically when they are represented in an identical
manner. The reason why Hall uses this term, is because even though we use the same
variable for an event occurring in different circumstances, strictly speaking they are not
the same. This is mainly an ontological issue, which need not detain us for our present
purposes.
A set of events S is said to be sufficient for another event E, if the fact that E occurs
follows from the causal laws, together with the premisse that S occurs at some time
t, and no other events occur at this time. For example, in the diagrams from Figures
2.3 and 2.4, {A,C} is one sufficient set for E, and {B} is another one. The set {A} is
sufficient for both {B} and {E}. A set is minimally sufficient if it is sufficient, and no
proper subset is.
Now we can state the precise definition of production as it occurs in (Hall, 2004, p.25).
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We begin as before, by supposing that E occurs at t ′, and that t is an earlier
time such that at each time between t and t ′, there is a unique minimally
sufficient set for E. But now we add the requirement that whenever t0 and
t1 are two such times (t0 < t1) and S0 and S1 the corresponding minimally
sufficient sets, then
• for each element of S1, there is at t0 a unique minimally sufficient
set; and
• the union of these minimally sufficient sets is S0.
...
Given some event E occurring at time t ′ and given some earlier time t, we
will say that E has a pure causal history back to time t just in case there
is, at every time between t and t ′, a unique minimally sufficient set for E,
and the collection of these sets meets the two foregoing constraints. We
will call the structure consisting of the members of these sets the “pure
causal history” of E, back to time t. We will say that C is a proximate
cause of E just in case C and E belong to some structure of events S for
which there is at least one nomologically possible structure S′ such that (i)
S′ intrinsically matches S; and (ii) S′ consists of an E-duplicate, together
with a pure causal history of this E-duplicate back to some earlier time.
(In easy cases, S will itself be the needed duplicate structure.) Production,
finally, is defined as the ancestral [i.e., the transitive closure] of proximate
causation.
Note that Hall’s definition only applies to events as candidate cause or effect. Hence
we only need to prove equivalence between the two definitions in case both C and E
are positive literals. Our definition is a generalisation to all literals. We should point
out that it judges negative literals not to have any causes, so the only generalisation of
interest is that of the causes.
Proof. Assume we have a neuron diagram D, with assignment v. Say T is the CP-logic
theory that is the translation of the equations of the diagram, and B is the set of branches
representing the story. The different branches in B are all made up of the same edges
and nodes, except that they occur in a different order. Recall that C is an actual cause
of E in a set of branches iff C is an actual cause of E in any of them.
By Production-Intr, regardless of which b ∈ B we use to construct the theory T ∗, it will
consist of the same deterministic laws. Concretely, all its laws are of the form: Vi←, or
Vj← B1∧ . . .∧Bm, where the number of atoms in the conjunction is at least one. (The
presence of at least one atom is due to the fact that a neuron diagram does not allow for
direct causation by omission, as we noted before.)
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Therefore any probability tree for T ∗ consists of a single branch, determining a unique
assignment for all the variables, namely the assignment v that holds in the leaf of each
b∈ B. By Production-Irr, for each variable Vi that is assigned true in v, for each choice
of b ∈ B there is exactly one law in T ∗ which has Vi in its head. For each b ∈ B, we
denote by Posb(Vi) the set of all positive literals that occur in the body of this unique
law.
We will prove the equivalence by induction over t(E).
Base case: t(E) = 0.
This implies that E is determined directly by the exogenous variables. So for each
b ∈ B the only law containing E in its head in T ∗ is E←. Clearly, by both definitions
there are no producers of E in this case.
Induction case:
Assume that the equivalence holds for any effect Vi such that t(Vi) ≤ n. We need to
prove that it holds as well for E if t(E) = n+1.
For each b ∈ B, clearly Posb(E) is a minimally sufficient set for E at time n. If we
consider the structure consisting of Posb(E)∪{E}, then S0 = Posb(E) is a unique
minimally sufficient set for S1 = E at time n. Therefore Posb(E)∪{E} is a pure causal
history of E back to time n. Therefore for each b ∈ B, each Vj ∈ Posb(E) is a proximate
cause of E, and thus also a producer of E according to Hall’s definition. Further, it is
easy to see that for each b ∈ B and Vj ∈ Posb(E), PT ∗(¬E|do(¬Vj)) = 1. Hence it is
also a producer according to our definition.
Now consider a variable Vj that is assigned true by v, and such that for all b ∈ B,
Vj 6∈ Posb(E). Then there is no minimally sufficient set for E that contains Vj, so it
is not a producer of E according to Hall’s definition. Also, it is easy to see that for
each b ∈ B, we have PT ∗(¬E|do(¬Vj)) = 0. Hence it is not a producer according to
our definition either.
Therefore the equivalence holds for all producers of E at time n.
Remains to be shown that it holds for all producers of E at earlier times. We start with
the implication from left to right.
Assume Vj is a producer of E at some time m < n, according to Hall’s definition.
This means there exists a Vk such that t(Vk) = n, Vj is a producer of Vk, and Vk is a
producer of E, according to Hall’s definition. By the above, this implies that there
is at least one bi ∈ B so that Vk ∈ Posbi(E). As above, for any such bi it holds that
PT ∗(¬E|do(¬Vk)) = 0 for the theory T ∗ constructed using bi.
By the induction hypothesis, we get that Vj is also a producer of Vk according to our
definition. Hence there exists a branch b2 ∈ B so that PT ∗(¬Vk|do(¬Vj)) = 0 for the
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theory T ∗ constructed using b2. If Vk ∈ Posb2(E), then as above PT ∗(¬E|do(¬Vk)) = 1.
Assume that for all of the bi above, it holds that Posb2(E) 6= Posbi(E). This means that
in each b∈ B, there are at least two laws such that its effect was E. Denote by r1 the first
law which had as its effect E in b2, and let r2 denote the first law which had as its effect
E in any of the bi. Thus Posb2(E) 6= Posbi(E) only because in b2 law r1 was applied
before r2. Given the different orders that exist in B as explained above, this implies that
there also exists another branch b3 ∈ B so that PT ∗(¬Vk|do(¬Vj)) = 1 for the theory
T ∗ constructed using b3, and also Vk ∈ Posb3(E), implying that PT ∗(¬E|do(¬Vk)) = 0.
To see why, we have a look at the set B.
We have arrived at a branch b3 so that both PT ∗(¬Vk|do(¬Vj))= 1 and PT ∗(¬E|do(¬Vk))=
1. Given the structure of T ∗, namely the fact that it is deterministic, and that for each
true variable Vi in the assignment v there is exactly one law with Vi in the head, it
follows that PT ∗(¬E|do(¬Vj)) = 1. Therefore Vj is a producer of E according to our
definition as well.
Now we prove the reverse implication.
Assume that Vj is a producer of E according to our definition, such that t(Vj) = m < n.
So there is a branch b such that PT ∗(¬E|do(¬Vj)) = 1 for the theory T ∗ constructed
using b. Since we have ¬E in T ∗|do(¬Vj), there must be some Vk ∈ Posb(E) such that
PT ∗(¬Vk|do(¬Vj)) = 1. By the induction hypothesis, Vj is a producer of Vk according
to Hall’s definition. Also, PT ∗(¬E|do(¬Vk)) = 1, and hence by the above equivalence
regarding producers of E at time n, we know that Vk is a producer of E according
to Hall’s definition. Since by Hall’s definition production is transitive, the result
follows.
3.5 Illustration: Double Prevention
To illustrate the application of the three definitions presented so far, we have a look at










(if c hadn’t fired)
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The term Double Prevention refers to the fact that C prevents F from preventing G,
which leads most people to intuitively consider C a cause of G. Hall (2004) presents
this example as a challenge to Production, since as we are about to see, C does not
produce G. There is Dependence between G and C, which illustrates Hall’s point that
one cannot get by with only Production.
For the CP-logic translation of this example we make us of the following theory on
the left and one of its probability trees on the right, where p and q represent some
probabilities. (We leave out the labels indicating which laws are applied, as the edges
already contain that information in this case.)
Theory T
(A : p)← .
B← .
































The Double Prevention example then corresponds to the leftmost branch of the
probability tree. (We focus on a single branch to represent the diagram, rather than a
set of branches, since the outcome will be the same for each branch.) As a first step we
focus on Intrinsicness. All three of Dependence, Production and the BV12 definition,
share the same intrinsicness condition, namely that for a given story b, the theory T
should be updated to the theory T b. Further, we need to apply the intervention do(¬C),













F ← E. (3.4)
G← A∧¬F. (3.5)
Since Dependence considers all laws to be relevant, it takes T b to be the modified theory
T ∗. Applying the definition of actual causation in this case gives PT ∗(¬G|do(¬C)) = 1,
so that Dependence judges C to be a full cause of G. The BV12 definition arrives at
exactly the same conclusion: even though the laws (3.3) and (3.4) did not happen in the
Double Prevention story, they were impossible, and are therefore considered relevant.
For Production, it is a different matter, as it considers the laws (3.3) and (3.4) irrelevant,





In this case PT ∗(¬G|do(¬C)) = 0, meaning that according to the Production account
C wasn’t a cause of G.
3.6 A Compromise between Dependence and Pro-
duction
Hall’s motivation for introducing two concepts of causation is the existence of examples
which exhibit two different types of relations that we both call causation. Therefore any
account of causation in terms of a single concept which also wishes to accommodate
the examples Hall discusses, can be expected to consist in some form of mixture of the
two relations.
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When we compare the previous three definitions, we see that they agree on the
intrinsicness condition. The difference between them is to be found only in the
strength of the irrelevance condition. Production has the weakest condition, dismissing
two types of laws as irrelevant: those that were not active before E, and also those
whose effect was already true. CP-logic only dismisses a subset of the first type: only
those that were not active before E but could have been. Dependence, finally, has the
strongest irrelevance condition, as it does not dismiss any law. The BV12 definition
therefore naturally presents itself as a compromize between Hall’s two definitions.
This perspective is further confirmed when we take a look at the problematic examples
Hall discusses. In Table 3.1 we summarize the verdict of the different definitions
regarding these examples. Not only would a detailed discussion of all of these lead us
too far, it would provide little added value, as the BV12 definition agrees with Hall’s
judgments on all of the examples except for his version of Early Preemption (EP),
which will be discussed in depth in Part II.
The first column states the examples we refer to, where the figure numbers are those
found in (Hall, 2004), with the exception of the last three examples which come from
(Hall, 2007). EP stands for Early Preemption, LP stands for Late Preemption, DP
stands for Double Prevention, Om stands for Omission, N-ET stands for Non-Existent
Threats and S-C stands for Short-Circuit. (For completeness we point out that the
model Hall uses for LP is problematic. Part II contains a detailed discussion on the
problems that arise when trying to model LP using structural equations.)
The last column contains Hall’s intuitions about the examples. (The 1 and 0 stand for
the judgment that in this example there is actual causation regarding the variables under
discussion or not, and a question mark indicates that the judgment is unclear.) The
second column contains the answers given by the most well-known definition of actual
causation, that of Halpern and Pearl (2005a) which we presented in Section 2.2.1. We
add this simply for a quick comparison, without commenting on it. We discuss this
definition in Part II. We have also added Hall’s more recent definition from Hall (2007),
which we will discuss next.
The main lessons to be learned from this table are the following:
• Unsurprisingly, Hall’s 2007 definition accords with his earlier intuitions on all
examples.
• Except for EP, the BV12 definition is also able to analyze all the examples in
accordance with Hall’s intuitions without seeking recourse in two concepts of
causation.
• The examples in Fig 14 and 15 refer to what Hall called his ‘unfinished
business’, because they exhibit a relation of causation which can not be described
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Table 3.1: Comparison of definitions
Example HP Dependence Production BV12 Hall2007 Hall’s intuition
EP 1 0 1 0 1 1
LP 1 0 1 1 1 1
DP 1 1 0 1 1 ?
Fig 5 1 1 0 1 1 1
Om 1 1 0 1 0 ?
Fig 12 1 0 1 0 0 ?
Fig 14 1 0 0 1 1 1
Fig 15 1 1 ? 1 1 1
Switch 1 0 1 0 0 0
N-ET 1 0 0 0 0 0
S-C 1 0 0 0 0 0
appropriately in terms of Dependence and Production. Both BV12 and Hall 2007
are able to handle them.
• The last three examples are presented as counterexamples to the HP-definition,
in that it provides counterintuitive responses for them. Both BV12 and Hall 2007
do not suffer from this. The Switch example will be discussed in Chapter 5 and
Part II.
In the current section our intent was twofold: firstly, to illustrate the usefulness of
expressing Hall’s two concepts of causation in terms of our general definition by
comparing it with BV12, and, secondly, to show that the BV12 definition succeeds in
accepting all but one of Hall’s intuitions regarding examples of causation whilst using
a single concept of causation. In the next section we will discuss Hall’s most recent
definition, which enriches both aspects of the current discussion. First, by expressing
yet another definition in CP-logic – using the same terminology of irrelevance and
intrinsicness – the generality of our approach is further confirmed. Second, as the new
definition also provides an adequate solution to the problems with Hall’s earlier view, a
further comparison between it and the BV12 definition is called for. This comparison
will be the subject matter of Chapter 5.
3.7 Hall 2007
One of the currently most refined concepts of actual causation is that of Hall (2007).
Although Hall uses structural equations as a practical tool, he is of the opinion that
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intuitions about actual causation are best illustrated using neuron diagrams. A key
advantage of these diagrams, which they share with CP-logic, is that they distinguish
between the default and deviant state of a variable.
Defenders of the structural equations approach – as could be expected – have in return
critiziced Hall’s account. Hitchcock (2009) comes up with several examples which
cannot be handled properly by Hall’s definition, which we will discuss in Chapter 5.
But part of his criticism is also focused on Hall’s choice of neuron diagrams as models
for all types of causal mechanisms (Hitchcock, 2009, p. 398):
...neuron diagrams are poor heuristic devices for suggesting possible
causal structures. Neuron diagrams privilege one particular pattern of
counterfactual dependence – a neuron fires if it is stimulated by at least one
other neuron, and inhibited by none. Alternative patterns of dependence
can be represented on an ad hoc basis;... But neuron diagrams do nothing
to actively suggest such alternative patterns of dependence. Structural
equations, by contrast, represent patterns of dependence algebraically or
truth-functionally, which greatly facilitates the enumeration of possible
patterns of dependence. Thus even if Hall is correct that structural equation
models are merely representational tools, I think he underestimates the
importance of having a suitable representation.
A neuron diagram, and thus Hall’s approach as well, is very limited in the kind of
examples it can express. In particular, neuron diagrams can only express deterministic
causal relations, and they lack the ability to directly express causation by omission,
i.e., that the absence of C by itself causes E, as in the law E ←¬C. Hall’s solution
is to argue against causation by omission altogether. By contrast, we will offer an
improvement of Hall’s account that generalizes to a probabilistic context, and can also
handle causation by omission. In short, we propose CP-logic as a way of overcoming
the shortcomings of both structural equations and neuron diagrams.
The idea behind Hall’s definition is to check for counterfactual dependence in situations
which are reductions of the actual situation, where a reduction is understood as “a
variant of this situation in which strictly fewer events occur”. In other words, because
the counterfactual dependence of E on C can be masked by the occurrence of events
which are extrinsic to the actual causal process, we look at all possible scenario’s in
which there are less of these extrinsic events. Hall puts it like this (2007)[p. 129]:
Suppose we have a causal model for some situation. The model consists
of some equations, plus a specification of the actual values of the variables.
Those values tell us how the situation actually unfolds. But the same
system of equations can also represent nomologically possible variants:
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just change the values of one or more exogenous variables, and update
the rest in accordance with the equations. A good model will thus be able
to represent a range of variations on the actual situation. Some of these
variations will be – or more accurately, will be modeled as – reductions of
the actual situation, in that every variable will either have its actual value
or its default value. Suppose the model has variables for events C and E.
Consider the conditional
if C = 0; then E = 0
This conditional may be true; if so, C is a cause of E. Suppose instead
that it is false. Then C is a cause of E iff there is a reduction of the
actual situation according to which C and E still occur, and in which this
conditional is true.
Rather than speaking of fewer events occuring, in this definition Hall characterizes
a reduction in terms of whether or not variables retain their actual value. This is
because in the context of neuron diagrams, an event is the firing of a neuron, which is
represented by a variable taking on its deviant value, i.e., the variable becoming true.
In the dynamic context of CP-logic, this corresponds to the transition in a probability
tree (i.e., the application of a causal law) that makes such a variable true. Therefore we
take a reduction to mean that no law is applied such that it makes a variable true that
did not become true in the actual setting.
To make this more precise, we introduce some new formal terminology. Let d be a
branch of a probability tree of the theory T . Lawsd denotes the set of all laws that
were applied in d. The resulting effect of the application of a law r ∈ Lawsd – i.e., the
disjunct of the head which was chosen – will be denoted by rd , or by 0 if an empty
disjunct was chosen. The set of true variables in the leaf of d will be denoted by Leafd .




A branch d is a reduction of b if ∀r ∈ Lawsd : rd = 0∨∃s ∈ Lawsb : rd = sb. Or,
equivalently, Leafd ⊆ Leafb.
A reduction of b in which both C and E occur – i.e., hold in its leaf – will be called
a (C,E)-reduction. The set of all of these will be denoted by Red(C,E)b . These are
precisely the branches which are relevant for Hall’s definition.
Definition 4 (Hall’s definition in CP-logic). We define that C is an actual cause of E if
(∃d ∈ Red(C,E)b : PT d (¬E|do(¬C))> 0).
Theorem 4 shows the correctness of our translation. We point out that none of the
definitions in this section focus on the order in which laws are applied in a branch.
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Hence we can translate the assignment v of a neuron diagram into a single branch b,
rather than into a set of branches B, without loss of generality.
Theorem 4. Given a neuron diagram D with its corresponding equations M, and an
assignment to its variables v. Consider the CP-logic theory T and story b that we get
when applying the translation from Section 2.4. Then C is an actual cause of E in the
diagram according to Hall’s definition quoted above iff C is an actual cause of E in b
and T according to Definition 4.
To facilitate the proof of this theorem, we introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Given a neuron diagram D with corresponding equations M and assignment
to its variables v, and {C,E} ⊆ v. Consider the CP-logic theory T , and a story b, that
we get when applying the translation from Section 2.4. Then a neuron diagram R is a
reduction of D in which both C and E occur iff its translation d – another branch of T –
is a (C,E)-reduction of b.
Proof. Say u is the context for D, i.e., (M,u) gives the assignment v. A reduction of D
in which both C and E occur is the result of changing some of the exogenous variables
from true to false, changing u into u′, in such a way that (M,u′) gives an assignment
v′ so that the set of true variables in v′ is a subset of the set of true variables in v.
Recall that each ui determines a single endogenous variable, say A, and that the
translation of this into CP-logic is the law (A : ∗)←. A change from ui into ¬ui is thus
translated into selecting the empty disjunct 0 as a child-node, instead of selecting A,
in the node where the law (A : ∗)← is applied. Therefore the change from u into u′
translates simply the change from b into a different branch d of the same probability
tree of T . The same holds in the other direction: changing b into a branch d by
selecting different nodes so that more empty disjuncts are chosen when applying the
non-deterministic laws, translates into changing u into u′ so that some true exongeous
variables become false. Since the equations in M and the CP-theory T determine
identical assignments given a context u, or given its translation into a choice of nodes in
CP-logic, and the assignment fully determines whether or not something is a reduction
containing C and E, the equivalance follows.
Now we prove Theorem 4.
Proof. The conditional C = 0 in the statement “if C = 0; then E = 0”, made relative to
the causal setting (M,u), is to be interpreted as a counterfactual locution, i.e., it means
that (Mdo(¬C),u) |= ¬E. Since for any story d the theory T d is deterministic, this is
equivalent to PT d (¬E|do(¬C)) = 1 for any branch d that is a CP-logic translation
of (M,u). Given the equivalence between (C,E)-reductions in neuron diagrams and
CP-logic from the previous lemma, the result follows.
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At first sight, Definition 4 does not fit into the general framework we introduced earlier,
because of the quantifier over different branches. However, we will now show that for
a significant group of cases it actually suffices to consider just a single T ∗, which can
be described in terms of irrelevant and intrinsic laws.
Rather than looking at all of the reductions separately, we single out a minimal structure
which contains the essence of our story. This structure will be based on the set of
all laws that are necessary for a reduction, in the sense that they are applied in each
reduction and that, moreover, they are always applied in the same way, i.e., with the
same outcome.
Definition 5. A law r is necessary for a story b if
• ∀d ∈ Red(C,E)b : r ∈ Lawsd and
• ∀d,e ∈ Red(C,E)b : rd = re.
We define Nec(b) as the set of all necessary laws for b.
In general it might be that there are two (or more) laws which are unnecessary by
themselves, but at least one of them has to be applied as it was in b. Consider for
example the following CP-theory.




In the story where C causes both A and B, each of those being sufficient for E, neither
the second nor the third law is necessary for E. Yet it is clear that at least one of them
has to be applied to get E. In cases where this complication does not arise, we shall say
that the story is simple.
First, some helpful terminology: an r-variant of a branch b is any branch b′ which
coincides with b up to the application of r, but which then selects a different disjunct
rb′ 6= rb from the head of r. (Where possibly rb = 0 or rb′ = 0.) Note that if r is
deterministic, there are no r-variants.
Definition 6. A story b is simple if the following holds:
∀d ∈ Red(C,E)b , for all non-deterministic r ∈ Lawsd \Nec(b), and for each disjunct rs
of r: ∃e ∈ Red(C,E)b so that e is an r-variant of d with re = rs.
Informally, a story is simple if there are no limitations on the choices made for laws



























We illustrate this concept by looking at a probability tree for the previous example in
Figure 4.1, to show that the previous story is not simple. The left-most branch is a
formal counterpart of this story. Except for the right-most branch in which E is false,
all branches are (C,E)-reductions of b. To see that the second law r is not necessary,
observe that for any branch d in the left-side of the tree, rd = A, whereas for any branch
e in the right-side, re = 0. Similarly, the third law is not necessary either.
Now consider the second branch from the right, d, and the third law, r′, that results in
B in the fourth node: there does not exist a (C,E)-reduction e of b that is identical to d
up to the third node (i.e., up to the application of r′), but different regarding the fourth
node (i.e., B = r′d 6= r′e). Hence, b is not simple.
We are now in a position to formulate a theorem that will allow us to adjust Hall’s
definition into our framework.
Theorem 5. If (∃d ∈Red(C,E)b : PT d (¬E|do(¬C))> 0), then it holds that PT Nec(b)(¬E|do(¬C))>
0. If b is simple, then the reverse implication holds as well.
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Proof. We start by comparing T d and T Nec(b). Both are constructed out of T , by making
some laws deterministic. By definition, any law r ∈ Nec(b) is made deterministic in
both T d and T Nec(b), with the outcome rb. The only difference between both theories is
that there may also be other non-deterministic laws from T that are made deterministic
in T d , contrary to T Nec(b), where these laws remain non-deterministic. Therefore there
are more possible stories, or branches, according to T Nec(b). Specifically, every branch
e that occurs in a probability tree of T d also occurs in a probability tree of T Nec(b). The
only difference between both branches might be the probability by which it occurs, but
obviously in both cases it will be strictly positive. (The latter is simply a property of
any branch in CP-logic.)
With this insight, proving the first implication is easy. Assume we have a d ∈ Red(C,E)b
such that PT d (¬E|do(¬C)) > 0. This implies that there is at least one branch e of a
probability tree of T d |do(¬C) for which ¬E holds in its leaf. By the above explanation,
it follows immediately that there is a branch e′ of a probability tree of T Nec(b)|do(¬C)
with the same property, which is precisely what we had to prove.
Now we prove that if b is simple, the reverse implication holds as well. Assume there
is a branch f of a probability tree of T Nec(b)|do(¬C) for which ¬E holds in its leaf,
and b is simple. We need to proof that there exists a (C,E)-reduction d for which there
exists a branch with the same property.
Let Unn(b) = (T \Nec(b))|do(¬C), i.e., Unn(b) are the non-deterministic laws in
T Nec(b)|do(¬C) . (The “Unnecessary” laws, so to speak.) Clearly, the difference
between any T d |do(¬C) and T Nec(b)|do(¬C) can consist only in the fact that some of
the laws in Unn(b) are deterministic in the former.
Let d be any (C,E)-reduction of b. Say n is the first node in f so that a law r is applied
for which we cannot find a branch f ′ in a probability tree of T d |do(¬C) such that
r′f = r f . We need to show that there is another (C,E)-reduction of b such that it does
allow for a branch identical to f up until n+1. If we do that, then by induction this
applies to the entire branch f and we have the desired result.
Clearly, r ∈Unn(b). First, consider the possibility that r 6∈ Lawsd . This means that r
appears in T d in its original non-deterministic form, just as it does in T Nec(b). Hence it
takes on the same form in both T Nec(b)|do(¬C) and T d |do(¬C). But this means that
the choice r f must be available in f ′ as well, contradicting our assumption. Hence it
must be the case that r ∈ Lawsd .
Together with the fact that r ∈Unn(b), we get that r ∈ Lawsd \Nec(b). Since b is
simple, this implies that ∃e ∈ Red(C,E)b so that e is an r-variant of d, with re = r f .
Therefore e has the desired property that it allows for a branch identical to f up until
n+1. This concludes the proof.
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Although the reverse implication is limited to simple stories, we do not consider this
a severe restriction: all of the examples Hall discusses are simple, as are all of the
classical examples discussed in the literature, such as Early and Late Preemption,
Symmetric Overdetermination, Switches, etc.
As a result of this theorem, rather than having to look at all (C,E)-reductions and
calculate their associated probabilities, we need only find all the necessary laws and
calculate a single probability. If the story b is simple, then this probability represents an
extension of Hall’s definition, since they are equivalent if one ignores the value of the
probability but for it being 0 or not. To obtain a workable definition of actual causation,
we present a more constructive description of necessary laws.
Theorem 6. If b is simple, then a law r that was applied in b is necessary iff none of
the r-variants of b is a (C,E)-reduction.
Proof. We denote the node in b in which r is applied by n. Thus n+1 is the child of
n representing the selection of rb, and the r-variants of b are all branches not passing
through n+1.
We start with the implication from left to right, so we assume r is necessary. Assume
rb = A, then there is no d ∈ Red(C,E)b for which rd 6= A, hence there is no (C,E)-
reduction which does not pass through n+1.
Remains the implication from right to left. Assume we have a law r such that all
(C,E)-reductions of b in the tree to which b belongs pass through n+1. We proceed
with a reductio ad absurdum, so we assume r is not necessary.
Trivially, b is a (C,E)-reduction of itself. Also, r ∈ Lawsb \Nec(b). Hence, by b’s
simplicity, there is a (C,E)-reduction e which is identical to b up to the application of
r, but for which re 6= rb. Thus e does not pass through n+1, contradicting our earlier
assumption. This concludes the proof.
With this result, we can finally formulate our version of Hall’s definition, which we
will refer to as Hall07.
Hall07-Irrelevant. No law r is irrelevant.
Hall07-Intrinsic. A law r is intrinsic if r was applied in b, and none of the r-variants
d of b is such that {C,E} ⊆ Leafd ⊆ Leafb.
3.8 Comparison
Table 3.2 presents a schematic overview of the four definitions we have discussed.
The columns and rows give the criteria for a law r of T to be considered intrinsic,
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respectively irrelevant, in relation to a story b, and an event E. By r ≤b E, we denote
that r was applied in b before E occurred.
Table 3.2: Spectrum of definitions
Irrelevant Intrinsic
r ∈ Lawsb r ∈ Nec(b)
/0 Dependence Hall07
∃d : (d = b up to E)∧ r ≥d E BV12
r ≮b E ∨ rb <b r Production
Looking at this table, we can informally characterise the different definitions by
describing which events are allowed to happen in the counterfactual worlds they take
into consideration to judge causation:
• Production: Only those events – i.e., applications of laws making a variable true
– which happened before E, and not differently – i.e., with the same outcome as
in the actual story.
• BV12: Those events which happened before E, and not differently, and also
those events which were prevented from happening by these.
• Hall07: All events, as long as those events that were necessary to E do not
happen differently.
• Dependence: All events, as long as those events that did actually happen do not
happen differently.
In order to illustrate the working of the definitions and their differences, we present an
example:
Example 3. Assassin decides to poison the meal of a victim, who subsequently Dies
right before dessert. However, Murderer decided to murder the victim as well, so he
poisoned the dessert. If Assassin had failed to do his job, then Backup probably would
have done so all the same.
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The causal laws that form the background to this story are give by the following theory:
(Assassin : p)← . (3.6)
(Murderer : q)← . (3.7)




In this story, did Assassin cause Dies?
In order to apply the Hall07 definition, we first show that the story is simple, in the
sense of Definition 7. Here C = Assassin, E = Dies and b is the actual story. We
denote law (3.6) by 1 and law (3.7) by r2. Note that Hall07 does not refer to the order
of a story at any point, nor do any of the other concepts which we defined in Section
3.7. Hence we may consider all stories in which all laws have the same outcome to be
identical, regardless of the order in which the laws were applied.
Assassin has to be true in any (C,E)-reduction, which implies that r1 will have
Assassin as its chosen disjunct, i.e., ∀d ∈ Red(C,E) : r1b = Assassin. By definition
5, this means that r1 is necessary for our story. Since by law (3.9) Assassin guarantees
Dies, it is easy to see that r2 is not necessary for our story. Therefore, ignoring the
order, there is only one (C,E)-reduction aside from the actual story itself: the story s
for which r1 = Assassin, and r2s = 0. Since the stories b and s are r
2-variants of each
other, the criterion for simplicity is met.
We leave it to the reader to verify that in this case the left intrinsicness condition from
the table applies to laws (3.6) and (3.7), whereas the right one only applies to (3.6).
(Note that there is no use in checking whether the laws (3.9) to (3.11) are intrinsic or
not, since these are already deterministic and hence it does not matter.) The second
irrelevance condition only applies to law (3.11), whereas the third one applies to laws
(3.8), (3.10) and (3.11). This results in the following probabilities representing the
causal status of Assassin:
Production BV12 Hall07 Dependence
1 1− r (1− r)∗ (1−q) 0
Hence Assassin is a full cause according to Production, not a cause at all according to
Dependence, and somewhere in between these two extremes according to the other two
definitions.
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Intuitively, most people would judge Assassin to be fully responsible for causing
victim’s death. Hence this particular example seems to speak in favour of Production.
However, note that this example is clearly set in a normative context, since murdering
people is – in almost all cases – judged to be wrong. One can easily come up
with morally neutral examples using these CP-laws and the same story such that
our intuitions would be different, for instance the following story:
Example 4. Billy has set the alarm for six o’clock, at which time it goes off, so that he
and Suzy make it in time to school. However, Suzy had put her alarm for five past six,
which would have also left ample amount of time. If Billy had failed to put his alarm,
then Mother probably would have done so all the same.
In this story, it sounds quite reasonable to say that Billy is not a full cause of Billy
and Suzy making it to school on time. We deliberately first chose an example that
contains normative elements, because it is a general feature of all existing definitions
of causation that they fail to do justice to such context-dependency. The next chapter
extends our general definition of actual causation so that it can incorporate judgments
of what is considered normal in a particular context.
3.9 Conclusion and Related Work
In this chapter we have used the formal language of CP-logic to formulate a general
definition of actual causation, which we used to express four specific definitions: a
previous proposal of our own, and three definitions based on the work of Hall. By
moving from the deterministic context of neuron diagrams to the non-deterministic
context of CP-logic, the latter definitions improve on the original ones in two ways:
they can deal with a wider class of examples, and they allow for a graded judgment of
actual causation in the form of a conditional probability. Also, comparison between the
definitions is facilitated by presenting them as various ways of filling in two central
concepts.
As a result, we found that both the BV12 and Hall07 definitions can be viewed as a
compromise between two distinct and important concepts, Production and Dependence.
Both of these concepts capture fundamental intuitions regarding causation, which will
return in Part II.
Many other definitions exist in the counterfactual tradition. Rather than arguing for or
against a particular definition, our aim in the current chapter was to develop a general
parametrised definition as a tool for constructing, comparing, and modifying different
definitions in a systematic way. We briefly discuss some other definitions in order to
understand the relation of our work to that of others. A more detailed discussion of
these definitions appears in Part II.
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The most influential definition of actual causation to date is the HP definition of
Halpern and Pearl (2005a). This definition is expressed using structural equations as
they are developed by Pearl (2000). Despite – or because of – its popularity, it has
been subjected to much criticism. Restricting ourselves to authors working within the
counterfactual tradition in the spirit of Lewis (1973), we can divide the criticism into
two types.
The first type criticises not just the HP definition itself, but also its formulation in terms
of structural equations. We already mentioned Hall (2007) as a prominent example.
In previous work we have also criticised the HP definition and structural equations in
general (Beckers & Vennekens, 2012; Vennekens, 2011). The current chapter is a
continuation of both lines of work. While structural equations are useful for a variety
of purposes, we feel they lack certain key features when it comes to actual causation,
which are present in CP-logic: true non-determinism in the endogenous part of the
model, the distinction between default and deviant values, and a temporal semantics. It
is possible to extend the language of structural models in various ways to incorporate
such features (see, e.g., (Fenton-Glynn, 2015; Halpern & Pearl, 2005a; Hitchcock,
2007)), or to change the representation of specific examples in such a way that the need
for them is avoided. Nevertheless, we feel that the fact that all of these features are
integrated into CP-logic in a natural way makes the latter a suitable language for the
study of actual causation.
In this chapter we have exploited this fact by developing a general framework for
actual causation in the context of CP-logic. The essence of this framework lies in the
concepts of Intrinsicness and Irrelevance on the one hand, and the extension to actual
causation presented in the next chapter on the other (Definitions 3 and 15). While
similar concepts could be defined in the context of structural models, their definition is
much more straightforward in the temporal, non-deterministic semantics of CP-logic.
The second type of criticism claims that although the HP definition is on the right track,
it requires some adjustments in order to handle certain convincing counterexamples.
As a result, several authors have proposed definitions using structural equations that are
variants of the HP definition (Halpern, 2015a; Hitchcock, 2001, 2007; Weslake, 2015;
Woodward, 2003). Weslake (2015) offers an insightful comparison of several of these
variants, concluding that none of them succeed in dealing with all counterexamples in
a satisfactory manner.
The basic idea behind the HP definition and its variants formulated using structural
equations is very similar to the idea behind our general definition formulated using
CP-logic: construct variations of the causal model using information from the actual
story, and check if there is counterfactual dependence of the effect on the candidate
cause in one of these variations. Besides the use of different formal languages, the
difference between both approaches is twofold. First, we use probabilities to quantify
the importance of causes. As we will see in the next chapter, this proves particularly
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helpful in our discussion of an extension to actual causation. The second, more
fundamental, difference lies in the methodology of constructing variations of a causal
model.
The HP-like definitions construct variations using so-called structural contingencies.
A structural contingency is some set of interventions on a structural model. Different
approaches differ in which structural contingencies they allow. Typically, no principled
account is given of why certain structural contingencies should be allowed or not.
Instead, this is decided in an ad hoc manner, based on whether allowing them provides
the right answer for certain problematic examples. Comparisons between different
approach are therefore typically also reduced to a tally of (in-)correctly handled
examples.
As we have seen, in our approach on the other hand, the construction of variations
is determined by the Intrinsicness and Irrelevance functions. Therefore different
instantiations of our general definition can be compared directly, and can be defended
by means of principled arguments in favour of particular definitions for these functions.
Given the overwhelming amount of problematic examples and the conflicting intuitions
that come with them, we believe a systematic approach to defining actual causation is
the right way forward.
In the next chapter we turn to the second goal of our first part: to incorporate the
influence of the context into judgments of actual causation.
Chapter 4
The Halpern and Hitchcock
Extension to Actual
Causation
Parts of this chapter were previously published as:
Beckers, S., and Vennekens, J. (2015a). Combining probabilistic, causal, and normative
reasoning in cp-logic. In 12th international symposium on logical formalizations of
commonsense reasoning (pp. 32–38).
4.1 Introduction
In their forthcoming article Graded Causation and Defaults, Halpern and Hitchcock
– HH – quite rightly observe that not only is there a vast amount of disagreement
regarding actual causation in the literature, but there is also a growing number of
empirical studies which show that people’s intuitions are influenced to a large degree
by contextual factors which up to now have been ignored when dealing with causation.
For example, our judgments on two similarly modelled cases may differ depending on
whether it takes place in a moral context or a purely mechanical one, or on what we take
to be the default setting, or on whether we take something to be a background condition
or not, etc.(Hitchcock & Knobe, 2009; Knobe & Fraser, 2008; Moore, 2009). This
has led HH to develop a flexible framework that allows room for incorporating different
judgments on actual causation. More specifically, in their view the difference between
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cases that are modelled using similar structural models depends on which worlds we
take to be more normal than others in the different contexts. Therefore their solution is
to extend structural models with a normality ranking on worlds, and use it to adapt and
order our judgments of actual causation in a manner suited for the particular context.
We sympathize with many of their observations, and we agree that normality
considerations do influence our causal judgments. However, we find their representation
of normality lacking for three reasons. First, although they emphasize the importance
of distinguishing between statistical and normative normality, they use a single ranking
for both. Second, they refrain from using probabilities to represent statistical normality,
and instead work with a partial preorder over worlds. Third, although they stress the
generality of their approach, they develop it solely for the HP-definition of actual
causation (Halpern & Pearl, 2005a).
In the previous chapter we developed a general, parametrized definition of actual
causation. In this chapter we use that definition to improve upon the extension to
actual causation offered by HH. Using CP-logic, we are able to represent statistical
normality in the usual way, i.e., by means of probabilities. As we will show, such a
quantitative representation of statistical normality avoids a number of problems that
HH’s ordinal representation runs into. To cope with normative normality, we introduce
a separate notion of norms. The result will be a more generally applicable and yet
simpler approach.
The next section presents the extension to actual causation by HH. We translate
their work into the CP-logic framework in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 contains a first
improvement to this translation, followed by some examples and our final extension to
actual causation in Section 4.5.
4.2 The original HH Extension to Actual Causation
In this section we succinctly present the graded, context-dependent approach to actual
causation from (Halpern & Hitchcock, 2015). We will use the following story from
(Knobe & Fraser, 2008) as our running example, as it illustrates the influence normative
considerations can have on our causal attributions:
Example 5. The receptionist in the philosophy department keeps her desk stocked
with pens. The administrative assistants are allowed to take pens, but faculty members
are supposed to buy their own. The administrative assistants typically do take the
pens. Unfortunately, so do the faculty members. The receptionist repeatedly e-mailed
them reminders that only administrators are allowed to take the pens. On Monday
morning, one of the administrative assistants encounters professor Smith walking past
THE ORIGINAL HH EXTENSION TO ACTUAL CAUSATION 49
the receptionist’s desk. Both take pens. Later, that day, the receptionist needs to take
an important message...but she has a problem. There are no pens left on her desk.
Although the problem the receptionist faces is counterfactually dependent on both the
actions of the assistant and that of the professor, it turns out that people are far more
inclined to judge the professor’s action to be a cause than the action of the assistant.
We formally represent the relevant events on the Monday morning from our running
example using CP-logic. The domain consists of the variables Pro f and Assistant,
which stand for the professor respectively the assistant taking a pen, and NoPens, which
is true when there are no pens left. The causal structure can be represented by the
following CP-theory T :
(Pro f : 0.7)← . (4.1)
(Assistant : 0.8)← . (4.2)
NoPens← Pro f ∧Assistant. (4.3)
The given theory summarizes all possible stories that can take place in this model. One
of those is what in fact did happen that Monday morning: both the professor and the
assistant take a pen, leaving the receptionist faced with no pens. The other stories
consist in only the professor taking a pen, only the assistant doing so, or neither, as
can be seen in the probability tree in Figure 4.1. The leftmost branch is the formal
counterpart of the above story.
Like much work on actual causation, HH frame their ideas using structural equation
modelling. As discussed in Section 2.2, such a model consists of a set of equations,
one for each endogenous variable, that express the functional dependencies of the
endogenous variables on others. As we did before, HH restrict attention to models
containing two types of (Boolean) endogenous variables: the ones that deterministically
depend on other endogenous variables, and those that depend directly on exogenous
variables.
For example, the above CP-theory is expressed using structural equations as follows:
Pro f :=U1 (4.4)
Assistant :=U2 (4.5)
NoPens := Pro f ∧Assistant. (4.6)
HH take a world to be an assignment to all endogenous variables. Given a
structural model, each assignment u to the exogenous variables determines a unique
























Figure 4.1: Probability tree for the Pen-vignette.
world, denoted by su. The story from our example corresponds to the world
{Pro f ,Assistant,NoPens}.
An extended structural model (M,) consists of a structural model M together with a
normality ranking  over worlds. This ranking is a partial pre-order informed by our –
possibly subjective – judgments about what we take to be normal in this context. It is
derived by considering the typicality of the values of the variables in each world. A
world s is more normal than s′ if there is at least one variable that takes a more typical
value in s than it does in s′, and no variable takes a less typical value. For the variables
that depend only on other endogenous variables, things are straightforward: it is typical
that these variables take the value dictated by their deterministic equation. For the other
variables, i.e., those that depend only on the exogenous variables, a typicality ranking
over their possible values has to be provided by the modeller.
For example, since assistants typically do take pens, the actual world {Pro f ,Assistant,NoPens}
is more normal than {Pro f ,¬Assistant,¬NoPens}. The latter is still more normal than
{Pro f ,¬Assistant,NoPens}, because here NoPens violates its equation.
Typicality and normality are meant to encompass both statistical and normative
judgments. Although HH make no syntactic distinction between the two kinds
of normality, in the examples discussed they do differentiate between them
informally. Concretely, normative judgments trump statistical judgments. For
example, although professors typically do take pens, they shouldn’t, and therefore
{¬Pro f ,Assistant,¬NoPens} is more normal than {Pro f ,Assistant,NoPens}. By
contrast, we will make a formal distinction between the two forms of normality,
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because in this manner we can incorporate information regarding both.
Say we have a story, i.e., an assignment to all variables, such that C and E happen in
it. In order to establish whether C is a cause of E, any definition in the counterfactual
tradition restricts itself to some particular set of counterfactual worlds in which ¬C
holds and checks whether also ¬E holds in these worlds. If this set contains a world
which serves to justify that C is indeed a cause of E (i.e., one in which E is false), then
HH call such a world a witness of this. HH adapt a given definition of actual causation
using the normality ranking to disallow worlds that are less normal than the actual
world, in order to reflect the influence of normality on possible causes.
Definition 7. [HH-extension of actual causation.] Given are an extended structural
model (M,) and exogenous assignment u, such that both C and E hold in su. C is
an HH-actual cause of E in (M,,u) if C is an actual cause of E in (M,u) when we
consider only witnesses w such that w su.
Since we have a ranking on the normality of worlds, this definition straightforwardly
leads to an ordering between different causes indicating the strength of the causal
relationship by looking at the highest ranked witness for a cause, which is called its
best witness.
As mentioned, in case of our example, we have
{¬Pro f ,Assistant,¬NoPens}{Pro f ,Assistant,NoPens}{Pro f ,¬Assistant,¬NoPens}
Since the actual world is in the middle, the first world can serve as a witness for Pro f
being a cause, but the last world may not be used to judge Assistant to be a cause.
Hence using a normality ranking HH are able to distinguish between the actions of the
professor and that of the assistant, in line with the observations made by Knobe and
Fraser (2008).
4.3 The HH Extension in CP-logic
We proceed with translating the HH-extension of actual causation into CP-logic. To
get there, we will translate one by one all of the required concepts.
HH use the HP-definition (Halpern & Pearl, 2005a) (presented in Section 2.2.1) as
a working definition to illustrate their extension to actual causation. However, they
stress the generality of their approach, and mention that one could for example apply it
to Hall’s definition (2007), which we reformulated as an instantation of our general
definition in Section 3.7. To keep things simple, we will use Dependence (Definition
2) as our definition of actual causation throughout the examples, and thus take T ∗ to
52 THE HALPERN AND HITCHCOCK EXTENSION TO ACTUAL CAUSATION
simply be T b. Note however that our approach can be applied to any instantiation of
our general definition.
As explained in Section 2.4, a structural model M in the HH-setting corresponds
to a CP-theory T : a direct dependency on the exogenous variables results in a non-
deterministic, vacuous law (such as (4.1) and (4.2)), while a dependency on only
endogenous variables results in a deterministic law (such as (4.3)).
A world s described by M then corresponds to a branch b – or to be more precise, the
leaf of a branch – of a probability tree of T . In Definition 7, HH restrict attention to
those worlds that are at least as normal as the actual world. The CP-logic equivalent of
this will be the normal refinement of T according to b, which is a theory that describes
those stories which are at least as normal as b.
First we introduce two operations on CP-laws, corresponding to the two different
interpretations of normality. Assume at some point a CP-law r was applied in b,
choosing the disjunct rb that occurs in its head.
On a probabilistic reading, an alternative application of r is at least as normal as
the actual one if a disjunct is chosen which is at least as likely as rb. Therefore
the probabilistically normalized refinement of r according to b – denoted by rPN(b) –
consists in r without all disjuncts that have a strictly smaller probability than rb. Remain
the laws that were not applied in b. In line with the understanding of normality from
HH, we choose to handle these such that they cannot have effects which result in a world
less normal than the actual world. Thus we remove those disjuncts that are false in the
leaf of b and have a probability lower than 0.5. Further, say the total probability of the
removed disjuncts in some law is p, then we renormalize the remaining probabilities
by dividing by 1− p. (Unless p = 1, then we simply remove the law.)
Definition 8. Given a theory T , and a story b, we define the probabilistically
normalized refinement of T according to b as T PN(b) := {rPN(b)|r ∈ T}.
In case of our example, T PN(b) = T b, shown earlier.
A second reading of normality considers not what did or could happen, but what ought
to happen. To allow such considerations, we extend CP-logic with norms. Everything
that can possibly happen is described by the CP-laws of a theory, hence we choose to
introduce prescriptive norms in addition to descriptive CP-laws. These take the form of
alternative probabilities for the disjuncts in the head of a law, which represent how the
law should behave. (A more general approach could be imagined, but for the present
purpose this extension will suffice.) These probabilities will be enclosed in curly braces,
and have no influence on the actual behaviour of a theory. However, if we wish to look
at how the world should behave, we can enforce the norms by replacing the original
probabilities of a theory T with the normative ones. For example, extending law (4.1)
with the norm that the professor shouldn’t take pens, even though he often does, gives
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(Pro f : 0.7{0})←. The normatively normalized refinement – denoted by rNN(b) – is
then given by the CP-law (Pro f : 0)←. To properly capture the HH definition, our
normalized theory should allow all worlds that are at least as normal as b, including of
course b itself. For this reason, we here restrict attention to norms with a probability
p so that 0 < p < 1, because a norm p = 0 or p = 1 could make the actual world
b impossible. This restriction is lifted in our own proposal in Section 4.5.1. In the
meanwhile we shall use (Pro f : 0.7{p})←, where p is some small probability, e.g.,
0.01.
Definition 9. Given an extended theory T , i.e., a theory also containing norms, we
define the normatively normalized refinement of T as T NN := {rNN |r ∈ T}.
We can combine both senses of normality, as follows:
Definition 10. Given an extended theory T , and a story b, we define the normal
refinement of T according to b as T Normal(b) := (T NN)PN(b).
The fact that we first take the normative normalization, before taking the probabilistic
one, corresponds to the implicit assumption made by HH that normative judgments
trump probabilistic ones. To see the difference, imagine a story in which the professor
did not take a pen. As we have now defined it, (Pro f : 0.7{p})← then normalises to
←, i.e., Pro f becomes impossible. If we were to reverse the order of normalization, it
would normalise to (Pro f : p)←.
The normal refinement according to b is constructed out of T by eliminating all the
disjuncts with values of variables that are less normal than the values from b, and
thus it allows precisely those stories which are at least as normal as b, in the sense of
Definitions 8 and 9. In case of our example, T Normal(b) is given by:
(Pro f : p)← . (4.7)
Assistant← . (4.8)
NoPens← Pro f ∧Assistant. (4.9)
To be able to prove that this is indeed the CP-logic equivalent of Definition 7, we still
need to explain how we get from a given extended structural model to an extended
CP-theory. The normality ranking is derived by considering what is typical for those
variables depending directly on the exogenous variables, i.e., those that we represent
by X : p←. HH use statements that take the form: “it is typical for the variable X to
be true”, or “it is typical for it to be false”. In CP-logic this becomes: p > 0.5, and
p < 0.5 respectively. A statement of the form: “it is more typical for X to be true
than for Y to be true” translates in an ordering on the respective probabilities. If the
typicality statement is of the normative kind, then it is best represented by norms in
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CP-logic. Thus if there is a norm regarding X then the law will take the extended form
X : p{q}←.
In Definition 7, we have that a world is an acceptable witness only if it belongs to the
set of worlds allowed by the definition of actual causation that is being used, and it is
at least as normal as the actual world. Similarly, we need to limit the stories allowed
by Definition 3 – which are described by T ∗|do(¬C) – to those stories which are at
least as normal as b. We would like to do this in exactly the same manner as we did
for T , i.e., by looking at (T ∗|do(¬C))Normal(b). However, by applying the intervention
do(¬C), which removes C from the head of any law in T in which it appears, we lose
all information on the (ab)normality of ¬C. As this information should be taken into
account as well, we have to incorporate it somehow.
One solution to do so is by simply factoring in PT Normal(b)(¬C). In Section 4.4 we
present an argument in favour of this solution. Since HH do not quantify normality,
this solution is not available to them. Instead, they use the normal refinement of those
laws instead. Concretely, denote by R(C) those laws from T which have C in their
head. We denote by T ∗∗(C) the theory that is identical to T ∗|do(¬C) regarding all laws
that are not in R(C), and containing the normal refinements of all laws in R(C). This
complication disappears further on, when we consider the first solution mentioned.
Definition 11. Given an extended theory T , a story b such that C and E hold in
its leaf, and the theory T ∗ = [T \ (Irr(Con)∪ Int(Con))]∪ Int(Con)b, as described
in Definition 3. We define the normal refinement of T ∗ according to b and C as
T Normal(b)∗(C) := (T ∗∗(C))Normal(b).
This leads us to the following formulation of the HH-approach in CP-logic.
Definition 12. [HH-CP-logic-extension of actual causation] Given an extended theory
T , and a branch b such that both C and E hold in its leaf. We define that C is an
HH-CP-logic-actual cause of E in (T,b) if PT Normal(b)∗(C)(¬E ∧¬C)> 0.
For example, if we are considering whether Assistant caused NoPens in our story, the
theory T Normal(b)∗(Assistant) is given by T b. (Recall that we take Dependence as our
working definition.)
Pro f ← . (4.10)
Assistant← . (4.11)
NoPens← Pro f ∧Assistant. (4.12)
This gives P(¬NoPens∧¬Assistant) = 0.
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On the other hand, the theory T Normal(b)∗(Pro f ) is given by:
(Pro f : p)← . (4.13)
Assistant← . (4.14)
NoPens← Pro f ∧Assistant. (4.15)
This gives P(¬NoPens∧¬Pro f ) = 1− p.
Thus Pro f is judged to be a strong cause of NoPens, whereas Assistant isn’t a cause
at all, in line with the empirical results from (Knobe & Fraser, 2008). Note that it is
only by using the normative probabilities rather than the statistical ones that we get the
correct response for Pro f .
In Section 3.2.1 we gave a general definition of actual causation in terms of CP-logic.
In order to finish the translation from extended structural models to extended CP-logic,
we assume that the definition of actual causation being used is such that just as the
three definitions from Hall discussed in Section 3.7 and 3.4, it can be translated from
structural models into the framework of our general definition. We now show that
Definition 12 is indeed the correct translation of the HH approach from structural
models to CP-logic.
Theorem 7. C is an HH-actual cause of E in an extended model and exogenous
assignment (M,,u) iff C is an HH-CP-logic-actual cause of E in (T,b), where (T,b)
is derived from (M,,u) in the sense described above.
To facilitate the proof of Theorem 7, we introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Given an extended model and exogenous assignment (M,,u), and a
theory and branch (T,b) that are derived from (M,,u) in the sense described in
Section 4.3. Then for any world w, and a branch d of a probability tree from T that
corresponds to it, it holds that w su iff d occurs in a probability tree of T Normal(b).
Proof. We know that b is a branch in a probability tree from T such that Lea fb has the
same assignment as su. Recall that T consists of two categories of laws. First there are
those corresponding to the equations for the endogenous variables which depend on
other endogenous variables, which are deterministic and thus re-appear in T Normal(b)
unchanged. Second there are those corresponding to the endogenous variables which
directly depend on the exogenous variables, which take the form X : p{q}←, where
the second probability need not be present.
Assume we have a world w such that w su. Any world that satisfies the equations
of M follows deterministically from an assignment to all exogenous variables. As
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su is a world that satisfies the equations, and w is at least as normal, it also satisfies
the equations. Hence there is an exogenous assignment u′ which determines w. In
CP-logic, such an assignment corresponds to choosing particular disjuncts in the heads
of all laws from the second category.
Concretely, this means that for each law/equation of the second category, the value of
the corresponding variable X is at least as typical in w = su′ as it is in su. Denote by
Xw and Xs the values X takes in the worlds w and su respectively. By construction of
T Normal(b), the disjuncts which are at least as typical as Xs – in the normative sense
where applicable, in the statistical sense elsewhere – still appear in the law for X in
T Normal(b), and hence can be chosen when this law is applied. Therefore the branches
corresponding to w from the probability trees of T also appear in the probability trees
of T Normal(b), be it that the values of the probabilities may have changed.
Now assume we have a branch d corresponding to a world w, that occurs in a probability
tree of T Normal(b). We can simply reverse the correspondence between the choices of
disjuncts and an exogenous assignment, to obtain that w su.
Now we prove Theorem 7.
Proof. We begin with the implication from left to right. So assume we have an extended
model and exogenous assignment (M,,u), such that C and E hold in su, and there is
at least one witness w of C being an actual cause of E in (M,u) such that w su.
Recall that we assume the definition of actual causation at hand can be translated from
structural models into an instantiation of our general definition. So we get that C is an
actual cause of E in (T,b), and more specifically that any branch d that corresponds to
w is a witness of this. Thus d appears in a probability tree of T ∗|do(¬C).
By Lemma 2, we know that such a branch d also appears in a probability tree of
T Normal(b).
We look separately at the two options regarding R(C). First we assume that C is
determined directly by the exogenous variables, meaning that R(C) consists of a single
non-deterministic law, say r(C). Since d occurs in a tree of T Normal(b), and ¬C holds in
it, the empty disjunct remains present in the normal refinement of r(C). By definition,
T ∗∗(C) is simply T ∗|do(¬C) with the normal refinement of r(C). Therefore d also
occurs in a tree of T ∗∗(C).
Second, assume the laws in R(C) are deterministic. Since d occurs in a tree of
T Normal(b), which obviously contains C in the head of any law r(C) ∈ R(C), the body
for r(C) cannot be satisfied in d. Thus all laws R(C) are irrelevant to d. Since T ∗∗(C)
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and T ∗|do(¬C) are identical but for R(C), we can again conclude that d also occurs in
a tree of T ∗∗(C).
So in all cases we have that d occurs both in a tree of T Normal(b), and in a tree of
T ∗∗(C). This implies that the disjuncts chosen in the laws applied in d occur in the
versions these laws take in both of these theories, with possibly different but strictly
positive probabilities. Note that every law from T Normal(b)∗(C) either takes the form
it has in T ∗∗(C) or it takes the form it has in T Normal(b). Therefore d also appears in
T Normal(b)∗(C). It being a witness, ¬C and ¬E hold in it, and thus the stated probability
is strictly positive.
Now we continue with the reverse implication. Assume we have an extended theory T ,
a story b such that C and E hold in it, and PT Normal(b)∗(C)(¬E ∧¬C)> 0. This implies
the existence of a branch d in T Normal(b)∗(C) such that both ¬C and ¬E holds.
Say r is a law from T Normal(b)∗(C). If r is intrinsic and r 6∈ R(C), it is deterministic,
containing the single (possibly empty) disjunct rd with associated probability 1. As rd
was the actual choice from b, by construction rd also appears in the normal refinement
of r, although the probability may be different. However, as long as we do not have
strict norms, i.e., norms where p or q is 1, this probability will be strictly positive. A
strict norm means that a violation of it is considered entirely abnormal, analogous to
the occurrence of an event with zero probability. Since HH treat norms identical to
statistical normality, and since the actual world was possible, it follows that the actual
world is not entirely abnormal. Hence even if rd was a violation of a norm, it will
not have been a strict norm. (Our final definition from Section 4.5.1 does allow for
strict norms.) Thus, we conclude that rd occurs in the head of the versions of the law
r we find in both T ∗ and T Normal(b). Because r 6∈ R(C), we can say the same about
T ∗|do(¬C).
If r is not intrinsic and r 6∈ R(C), it contains all of its original disjuncts when it occurs in
T ∗. Therefore it takes the same form in T Normal(b)∗(C) as it does in T Normal(b). Again
we conclude that rd occurs in the head of the versions of the law r we find in each of
T ∗, T Normal(b) and T ∗|do(¬C).
This leaves us to consider the laws in R(C). By definition, T Normal(b)∗(C) contains the
same version of these laws as T Normal(b). From this and the previous paragraphs we
can already conclude that any branch occuring in a tree of T Normal(b)∗(C) also occurs
in a tree of T Normal(b). More specifically this holds for d. Thus by Lemma 2, it holds
for the corresponding world w that w su.
If the body for each r ∈ R(C) is false in d, then the precise form of the head of r is
irrelevant for d. As the head of each r ∈ R(C) is the only difference between T ∗∗(C)
and T ∗|do(¬C), we can again conclude that d also occurs in T ∗|do(¬C).
Leaves us to consider the case that there is some r ∈ R(C) for which the body is true in
58 THE HALPERN AND HITCHCOCK EXTENSION TO ACTUAL CAUSATION
d. From the fact that d – in which ¬C holds – occurs in T Normal(b), we can infer that r
is a non-deterministic law, and thus the only member of R(C). Taken together with the
knowledge that the disjunct containing C was chosen in b, it follows that the normal
refinement of r contains both C and the empty disjunct in its head. Furthermore, in
d the empty disjunct was chosen. These observations taken together imply that the
disjunct of r chosen in d occurs in the head of the versions of r we find in both T ∗∗(C)
and T ∗|do(¬C). Once more we conclude that d also occurs in T ∗|do(¬C).
Thus d is a witness for C being an actual cause of E in (T,b). Therefore the world w
corresponding to d is a witness for C being an actual cause of E in (M,u). Together
with the fact that w su, the conclusion follows.
4.4 The Importance of Counterfactuals
We mentioned earlier that one criterion for a story to be normal was that it respects the
laws/equations. On the other hand definitions of actual causation look at counterfactual
stories resulting from an intervention, namely do(¬C), which violates the laws.
Following HH, Definition 12 tries to circumvent the use of this intervention by only
allowing witnesses in which ¬C happens to hold. However, it may be the case
that this condition actually eliminates all potential witnesses. When this happens,
counterintuitive results may follow. We illustrate what goes wrong by using the
following theory:




Consider the story where first A occurs, followed by C and E. Intuitively, C is a
strong cause of E, because it is an atypical phenomenon (P(C) = 0.1) without which E






Applying the definition, we get that PT Normal(b)∗(C)(¬E ∧¬C) = 0, giving the absurd
result that C is not a cause of E at all. The problem lies in the fact that in its current
form we only allow stories containing ¬C in the usual, lawful way, rather than stories
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which contain ¬C as a result of the intervention do(¬C). The problem remains if we
use the HP-definition – as HH does – instead of our working definition.
We pointed out above that there is another solution to take into account the normality
of ¬C. As a first step, we look instead at PT Normal(b)∗(C)(¬E|do(¬C)), so that we re-
establish the counterfactual nature of our definition. (As T ∗∗(C)|do(¬C) = T ∗|do(¬C),
this is equivalent to P(T ∗)Normal(b)(¬E|do(¬C)), which no longer mentions the artificial
theory T ∗∗(C).) However, by making this move we no longer take into account the
(ab)normality of C itself, whereas research shows extensively that causal judgments
regarding an event are often influenced by how normal it was (Hitchcock & Knobe,
2009; Kahneman, 1986; Knobe & Fraser, 2008). (This effect is not limited to
normative contexts. For example, the lighting of a match is usually judged a cause of a
fire, whereas the presence of oxygen is considered so normal that it isn’t.) Hence as a
second step we factor in this normality, which is expressed by PT Normal(b)(¬C).
Definition 13. [First refinement of Definition 12] Given an extended theory T , and a
branch b such that both C and E hold in its leaf. We define that C is an actual cause of
E in (T,b) if P(T ∗)Normal(b)(¬E|do(¬C))∗PT Normal(b)(¬C)> 0.
As the following theorem shows, our new choice only makes a difference in a limited
set of cases.
Theorem 8. If R(C) contains a non-deterministic law or PT Normal(b)(¬C) = 0, then
PT Normal(b)∗(C)(¬E ∧¬C) = P(T ∗)Normal(b)(¬E|do(¬C))∗PT Normal(b)(¬C)
Proof. First we examine the case where PT Normal(b)(¬C) = 0. This implies that the
right-hand side of the equation is 0. Also, any branch from a tree T Normal(b)∗ occurs as
well in a tree of T Normal(b), so PT Normal(b)∗(¬C) = 0 and the left-hand side is also equal
to 0.
This leaves us to consider the case where PT Normal(b)(¬C)> 0 and the unique r(C) ∈
R(C) is non-deterministic.
In this case PT Normal(b)∗(¬C) = PT Normal(b)(¬C), so we have:
PT Normal(b)∗(¬E ∧ ¬C) = PT Normal(b)∗(¬E ∧ ¬C) ∗ PT Normal(b)(¬C)/PT Normal(b)∗(¬C) =
PT Normal(b)∗(¬E|¬C)∗PT Normal(b)(¬C)
Further, conditioning on ¬C when C only occurs in a vacuous non-deterministic law, is
identical to looking at the intervention do(¬C), thus the list of equalities continues:
=PT Normal(b)∗(¬E|do(¬C))∗PT Normal(b)(¬C). Also, T Normal(b)∗|do(¬C)= (T ∗)Normal(b)∗|do(¬C),
which brings us to the desired conclusion.
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If there is a deterministic r ∈ R(C) and PT Normal(b)(¬C)> 0, as in the example shown,
then contrary to the left-hand side of the equation, the proposed adjustment on the
right-hand side of the equation gives the desired result 1∗0.9 = 0.9.
4.5 The Importance of Probabilities
Because the HH-approach lacks the quantification of normality offered by probabilities,
they dismiss entirely all witnesses that are less normal than the actual world. A direct
consequence is that any typical event – i.e., P > 0.5 – is never a cause, which is
quite radical. By using probabilities, this qualitative criterion is no longer necessary:
less normal witnesses simply influence our causal judgment less. Further, HH order
causes solely by looking at the best witnesses. We now present an example which
illustrates the benefit of both abandoning their criterion, and aggregating the normality
of witnesses to order causes, without sacrificing the influence of normality.
Imagine you enter a contest. If a 10-sided die lands 1, you win a car. If
not, you get a 100 more throws. If all of them land higher than 1, then you
also win the car. The first throw lands 1, and you win the car.
It’s hard to imagine anyone objecting to the judgment that the first throw is a cause of
you winning the car. Yet that is exactly what we get when applying either Definition
12 or the improved Definition 13. The following theory T describes the set-up of the
contest, where T hrow(i, j) means that the i-th throw landed j or smaller.
(T hrow(1,1) : 0.1)← .
(T hrow(2,1) : 0.1)←¬T hrow(1,1).
(T hrow(3,1) : 0.1)←¬T hrow(1,1)∧¬T hrow(2,1).
...
WinCar← T hrow(1,1).
WinCar←¬T hrow(2,1)∧ ...∧¬T hrow(100,1).
The normal refinement of T according to the story is given by:
(T hrow(1,1) : 0.1)← .
WinCar← T hrow(1,1).
WinCar←¬T hrow(2,1)∧ ...∧¬T hrow(100,1).
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We get that P(T ∗)Normal(b)(¬WinCar|do(¬T hrows(1,1))) = 0, and thus T hrows(1,1) is
not a cause of WinCar. In terms of HH: although ¬T hrow(1,1)∧¬T hrow(2,1)∧
...∧¬T hrow(100,1)∧WinCar, is very unlikely, it is the only candidate witness. To
see why, recall that a witness needs to have ¬T hrows(1,1), and should be at least as
normal as the actual world. In every other world with ¬T hrows(1,1), at least one of
the T hrows(i,1) is true, and hence it is less normal. But in a witness it should hold that
¬WinCar, so there is no witness for T hrows(1,1) being a cause of WinCar.
We can fix this problem by considering the theory (T ∗)NN instead of (T ∗)Normal(b).
This leads us to another refinement of our original definition:
Definition 14. [Second refinement of Definition 12] Given an extended theory T , and
a branch b such that both C and E hold in its leaf. We define that C is an actual cause
of E in (T,b) if P(T ∗)NN (¬E|do(¬C))∗PT Normal(b)(¬C)> 0.
The theory (T ∗)NN in this case is simply equal to T , but for the first law being
T hrow(1,1)←. Hence the probability of not winning the car given that the first throw
does not land 1 is pretty much 1, and the value in the equation becomes approximately
0.9, indicating T hrow(1,1) to be a very strong cause of WinCar.
Note that we only obtain this high value because the probability P(T ∗)NN aggregates the
probabilities of all witnesses. If we would instead follow HH in considering only the
best witness (in this case the story with ¬T hrow(1,1)∧T hrow(2,1)∧¬T hrow(3,1)∧
...∧¬T hrow(100,1)), we would obtain the much lower and less intuitive probability
of 0.09.
Now imagine the same story, with a slight variation to the rules of the contest: you win
the car on the first throw if the die lands anything under 7. Hence the first head changes
to T hrow(1,6) : 0.6, making it a typical outcome. Therefore the first law becomes
deterministic in T PN(b), giving that PT Normal(b)(¬T hrow(1,6)) = 0, which again results
in the counterintuitive judgment that the first throw in no way caused you to win the
car.
We therefore suggest to use T NN in the second factor of the inequality rather than
T Normal(b), making use of the gradual measurement offered by probabilities. Applying
this idea to the example, we get the result that T hrow(1,6) has causal strength 0.4.
This value is smaller than before, because the cause is now less atypical.
4.5.1 The final definition
This brings us to our final extension to a definition of actual causation.
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Definition 15 (Extension of actual causation). Given an extended theory T , and a
branch b such that both C and E hold in its leaf. We define that C is an actual cause of
E in (T,b) if and only if P(T ∗)NN (¬E|do(¬C))∗PT NN (¬C)> 0.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we showed how our general definition lends itself to an extension of
actual causation that continues upon the work of Halpern and Hitchcock (2015). It
incorporates the main points raised by Halpern and Hitchcock: (1) it allows normative
considerations and (2) is able to factor in the normality of the cause given the context.
This extension is useful in normative disciplines, such as law and ethics, and takes into
account the context sensitivity of causal judgements suggested by recent findings in
experimental psychology (Hitchcock & Knobe, 2009; Knobe & Fraser, 2008; Moore,
2009). Our account improves on the HH account in several ways:
• By using CP-logic our account can also be applied to non-deterministic examples.
• Separating normative from statistical normality allows for a more accurate
description of the domain.
• Since we no longer refer to the actual world in the second factor, we can use
strict norms.
• The reader may verify that our approach is able to deal with all of the examples
given by Halpern and Hitchcock (2015) equally well as Definition 12.
• It can also properly handle the examples from Sections 4.4 and 4.5, as opposed
to Definition 12.
Chapter 5
Problems with BV12 and
Hall07
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter we conclude the first part of this work by presenting several problems
facing the Hall07 and BV12 definitions. First we focus on a flaw in the Hall07 definition
that makes it sensitive to irrelevant details of a story. Second, we present two problems
for the BV12 definition, the first of which affects the Hall07 definition as well.
5.2 Problems with Hall07
5.2.1 Early Preemption
Anyone familiar with the literature on actual causation knows that cases of Early
Preemption figure prominently in it, hence it forms the first challenge for any definition
to overcome. We present three examples, only the first of which is a case of Early
Preemption proper, and the other two are variations.
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We already saw the first two diagrams in Chapter 2, to illustrate the workings of neuron
diagrams. There we pointed out that the first is a case of Early Preemption, because the
chain from A to E is preempted from running to completion. In the second diagram, A
is in its default state, and hence there is nothing to preempt. Variant 2 is identical to
EP, except that we added a variable F which depends on A and some new variable G.
Intuitively, this change does not affect the causal relation between C and E in any way.
As we will see, Hall07 (and thus also Hall’s original definition) violate this intuition.
Theory for EP and Variant 1
(A : p)← .


































On the left we show the CP-theory for EP and Variant 1, and on the right is one of its
probability trees. EP corresponds to the leftmost branch, whereas Variant 1 corresponds
to the third branch from the left. We apply the BV12 and Hall07 definitions to these
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examples, Variant 2 can be treated in a similar manner. First we modify the original
theories to take into account the actual story.
Hall07 EP T ∗|do(¬C)

















To these theories correspond the following probability trees, where we have added the
probabilities for ending up in each leaf node:























Our general definition of actual causation tells us that C caused E iff PT ∗(¬E|do(¬C))>
0. The values of the respective probabilities are shown in Table 5.1.
Both definitions judge C to be a full cause of E in Variant 1, as both of them hold fixed
the fact that A takes on its default value. Likewise, both definitions hold A fixed at
its actual value in Variant 2 and therefore judge C not to be a cause of E. The BV12
definition applies the same reasoning to Early Preemption, namely it fixes the variable
A to its actual value, and checks for counterfactual dependency of E on C.
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Table 5.1: PT ∗(¬E|do(¬C))
Story Hall07 BV12
EP 1− p 0
Variant 1 1 1
Variant 2 0 0
The Hall07 definition on the other hand is more tolerant for Early Preemption than it
is for Variant 2, ignoring A’s actual value when considering counterfactual scenario’s
for the former. Yet Variant 2 represents exactly the same causal structure and story
as in Early Preemption, except for the addition of the extra variables G and F , the
latter of which depends on A not firing. Intuitively these additional variables are of
no importance regarding the causal relation between C and E, so one should judge it
identical in both examples, contrary to Hall07. It speaks in BV12’s favour that it does
not make this mistake.
Cases of Early Preemption are typically considered to exhibit causation, contrary
to the verdict of the BV12 definition. We will defend our verdict at length in
Section 6.6, by invoking the distinction between deterministic and non-deterministic
counterfactual dependence. (Concretely, the distinction between examples where the
backup mechanism from B to E is expressed using a deterministic or a non-deterministic
law.)
5.2.2 Switch
The fact that the Hall07 definition is very sensitive to the addition of extra variables and
dependencies, even when intuitively these variables do not influence the actual story
in any way, is not limited to the case of Early Preemption. Hitchcock (2009) present
six counterexamples to Hall’s definition, most of which are based on this sensitivity.
Before providing an illustration we first introduce an example of a so-called Switch,
which is similar to Early Preemption, and yet also quite different. (The double circle in
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Cases of switching causation are described in (Hall, 2000, 2007; Halpern & Pearl,
2005a), amongst others. The idea is that a common cause A can activate two causal
chains, or mechanisms, which both lead to an outcome E, and that the switch C
determines the unique mechanism which in fact does so. The fact that D also depends
on A, is the only difference between Early Preemption and Switch, which translates
into the following almost identical CP-theories:
Theory for EP
(A : p)← .






(A : p)← .





We leave it to the reader to verify that the BV12 definition treats both Early Preemption
and Switch identically, judging that C is not a cause of E in either. The Hall07 definiton
on the other hand does distinguish between both, only calling C a cause in the first.
The motivation for Hall to get this answer is that usually in the literature informal
examples labelled Early Preemption are such that intuitively C is a cause of E, whereas
in examples labelled Switch intuitively C does not cause E.
We will explore the relation between these two examples in detail in Part II. We present
them here merely to explain why the Hall07 definition gets into trouble: it wants to
distinguish between the very similar diagrams for Early Preemption and Switch, and
therefore has to focus on distinctions which turn out to be inessential. Our Variant 2 of
Early Preemption was a first illustration, Hitchcock (2009) offers several others. One
of those is a variation on Switch.
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Variant of Switch: Reduc-
tion
The variation considered by Hitchcock is the result of taking the diagram for Switch,
and adding some further dependencies, indicated by F and G. We could imagine these
to represent some details which were left implicit in the original diagram. Intuitively,
as with our variant of Early Preemption, “This extra detail does nothing to change our
causal judgment” (Hitchcock, 2009, p. 395). Yet if we apply Hall’s definition, we see
that contrary to Switch, here there is a reduction of the actual situation in which there
is a counterfactual dependence of E on C, making C a cause of E. Since the causal
structure is simple in the sense defined in Chapter 3, the same holds for the Hall07
definition.
5.3 Problems with BV12
We now present two problematic examples for the BV12 definition.
5.3.1 Symmetric Overdetermination by Omission
Besides the example from the previous section, Hitchcock (2009) also gives some
alleged counterexamples to Hall’s definition involving causation by omission, i.e.,
examples where a variable remaining in its default state is a candidate cause. In these
examples, intuitively ¬C is a cause of E, yet applying Hall’s definition does not give
this result.
Looking back at Hall’s definition from Section 3.7, one sees that his definition does
not allow for causation by omission: the candidate cause has to be an event, meaning a
variable taking on its deviant value. Therefore strictly speaking Hitchcock’s argument
is not valid, as Hall’s orginal definition cannot be applied here. However Hitchcock
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also presents variations of these examples where the candidate cause is an event, hence
this is of minor importance. In fact, the example can be taken to offer an argument in






This diagram can be labelled a case of Symmetric Overdetermination by Omission,
meaning that the absences of two events are equally responsible for an effect. Given
that the omissions play exactly the same causal role as positive events do in cases of
normal, positive, symmetric overdetermination, intuitively both omissions ¬C and ¬D
should be judged as being causes of the effect E. Neither the Hall07 definition nor the
BV12 definition respect this intuition.
Hitchcock (2009) gives the following informal story that could be modelled by this
diagram.
Example 6. A patient will die unless he receives two doses of medicine, which are
currently in the custody of doctors C and D. Both doctors withhold the medicine, and
the patient dies.
Intuitively, most people agree that each doctor witholding his dose of medicine is a
cause of the patient’s death.
5.3.2 The Sufficiency of Counterfactual Dependence
All definitions of causation considered in this work belong to the counterfactual
tradition, which was initiated by Lewis (1973) (and even before that by Hume (1748)).
Despite their differences, definitions in this tradition share the assumption that if E is
counterfactually dependent on C then C is a cause of E. Given that most approaches only
explicitly consider deterministic examples, we here take counterfactual dependence
to be deterministic. (In other words, Definition 2 when restricted to cases where T b
is a deterministic theory.) Unfortunately one can construct examples to show that the
BV12 definition violates this assumption.1
1Most authors that consider non-determinism still endorse the assumption even when dependence is
generalised to non-deterministic dependence, but as the example shows we do not need this stronger
assumption to make our point.
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Consider the following theory, and one of its probability trees:
(A : p)← . (5.1)






































Now consider the story represented by the leftmost branch, where we have {C,A,B,E},
and – according to the BV12 definition – it is C that causes B by means of law (5.4).
As in the Late Preemption example, the last edge represents the fact that A would have
caused B, if B had not occurred yet. Looking at the relevant theories below, it is easy to
verify that although E is counterfactually dependent on C, the BV12 definition does
not judge C to be a cause of E.
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BV12 reaches this mistaken verdict because it considers the law B← A irrelevant: the
effect (B) had already occurred by the time it was applied. Recall from Section 3.3 that
dismissing laws that were applied after the effect as irrelevant proved essential in order
for the BV12 definition to handle Late Preemption. Unfortunately this means there is
no easy way the BV12 definition can be adapted in order to avoid this problem. (Note
though that the example here presented is somewhat artificial. Specifically, it is not
easy to come up with real-life situations in which the combination of laws (5.5) and
(5.6) occurs.)
5.4 Conclusion
We have discussed several problems regarding the two main definitions of actual
causation developed in Chapter 3.
First, the Hall07 definition turns out to be sensitive to details of the story which do
nothing to change our intuitions about them. This sensitivity is an unwelcome side-
effect of the fact that this definition distinguishes between cases of Early Preemption
and cases like Switch without making explicit use of non-determinism. Since BV12
was designed from the outset using the non-deterministic language of CP-logic, it does
not suffer from this problem.
Second, both definitions are unable to properly handle cases of Symmetric
Overdetermination by Omission. The BV12 definition handles ordinary cases
of Symmetric Overdetermination, i.e., cases where the causes are events, by
exploiting the fact that both overdetermining causes are represented in separate laws.
Overdetermination cases involving an omission lack this feature, which is why the
BV12 definition fails.
Third, the BV12 definition fails to satisfy a basic assumption regarding causation,
namely that counterfactual dependence is sufficient for causation. The reason for this
failure lies in the method of handling Late Preemption: to capture the principle that
causes come before effects, laws which were applied after the effect are dismissed
entirely as irrelevant.
In Part II we develop a definition of causation using both a different language and
a different methodology than we used in Part I. Instead of using CP-logic and a
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general definition that builds on counterfactual dependency, we use structural equations
extended with a timing and build up the definition by considering basic principles
which it should satisfy.
As a result, the definition of actual causation from Part II is able to avoid all of the
problems from this chapter. First, it distinguishes between Early Preemption and Switch
using non-determinism. Second, events and omissions are treated more symmetrically
than here (but still a little different, notably regarding their temporal properties). Third,
rather than dismissing entire causal mechanisms which were temporally preempted, it
keeps track of the timing of all events (and omissions).
Part II




A Principled Approach to
Defining Actual Causation
This chapter was previously published as:
Beckers, S., and Vennekens, J. (2016b). A principled approach to defining actual
causation. Synthese, forthcoming.
In this chapter we present a new proposal for defining actual causation. We do so
within the popular counterfactual tradition initiated by Lewis, which is characterised
by attributing a fundamental role to counterfactual dependence. Unlike the currently
prominent definitions, our approach proceeds from the ground up: we start from
basic principles, and construct a definition of causation that satisfies them. We
define the concepts of counterfactual dependence and production, and put forward
principles such that dependence is an unnecessary but sufficient condition for causation,
whereas production is an insufficient but necessary condition. The resulting definition
of causation is a suitable compromise between dependence and production. Every
principle is introduced by means of a paradigmatic example of causation. We illustrate
some of the benefits of our approach with two examples that have spelled trouble for
other accounts. We make all of this formally precise using structural equations, which
we extend with a timing over all events.
6.1 Introduction
Although progress on the problem of actual causation has been made over the last
decade, not a single definition on offer goes uncontested. In this chapter we develop
a new proposal for defining actual causation. In comparison to the large number of
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proposals out there, our approach offers the important benefit that it starts from basic
principles. Indeed, many existing definitions lack proper foundations. Even when
a detailed justification is given, it mostly consists of informal guidelines rather than
precise formal conditions. By contrast we aim to make explicit what principles we take
to be fundamental to causation, and show their consequences on particular examples.
In this manner even those who disagree with the verdicts of our definition are guided to
the principles from which they follow.
As a starting point, we delineate the borders of the search space we wish to explore.
This implies formulating a sufficient and a necessary condition. The former serves as a
lower bound, in the sense that its extension is a subset of all cases of actual causation,
whereas the latter forms an upper bound. These conditions thus form the boundaries of
a spectrum of concepts that contains actual causation somewhere in between. The task
before us is to provide principles which point towards a single concept in this spectrum.
The literature on actual causation abounds in convoluted examples that discredit or
confirm definitions of causation. To make matters worse, these definitions themselves
often turn out to be quite hard to understand. To avoid these pitfalls we illustrate every
principle by a very simple example, and indicate how the intuition behind it can be
made formally precise using structural equations. To obtain maximal clarity, all but
one of these examples are made up of the same ingredients, namely two protagonists
named Billy and Suzy, each holding a rock in their hand, and a bottle that is standing
a bit further waiting to be shattered. Hall and Paul (2003) introduced these types of
examples, which are now widespread in the literature. Small changes to the details
of the scenario suffice to highlight what we take to be the fundamental issues of the
debate. Although we view it as a benefit of our approach that it can be developed using
the simplest of examples, we also show how it handles two examples that have spelled
trouble for other accounts.
In Part I we discussed a graded, probabilistic notion of causation, but here we restrict
ourselves to a binary concept, i.e., we are purely interested in the question whether or
not something is a cause. Further, for the most part we limit ourselves to deterministic
examples. Also, we set aside the interesting recent research regarding the influence that
norms and expectations have on our causal judgments that resulted in an extension to
actual causation in Chapter 4. In the current part the focus is solely on the core problem
of deciding whether or not something is an actual cause.
In the next section we present dependence as a sufficient condition for causation,
followed by a necessary condition in Section 6.3. Sections 6.4 and 6.5 then present
production as a necessary but insufficient condition lying in between the previous
ones. Section 6.6 addresses important issues arising from non-determinism, including a
comparison between the HP approach and ours. In Section 6.7 we refine our conditions
by having a more detailed look at dependence, which narrows down the search space
to a single option by discussing another example in Section 6.8. Section 6.9 interprets
the resulting definition as a compromise between the concepts of counterfactual
dependence and production. To conclude, Section 6.10 discusses two examples which
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other definitions are unable to handle.
As we have done in Part I as well, throughout we take C and E to be endogenous
literals, where C is a candidate cause for the effect E.
6.2 Counterfactual Dependence
Consider the first of our rock-throwing stories:
Example 7. Suzy throws a rock at a bottle, while Billy idly stands by with a rock in
his hand, having no intention to throw it. Suzy’s rock hits the bottle, at which point it
shatters.
We need three endogenous variables to formally represent this story: BS represents the
event that the bottle shatters, Suzy and Billy that Suzy, respectively Billy, throw a rock.
We do not model the causes of them throwing, and just take this to be determined by
the background conditions, i.e., the context. Thus an appropriate causal model M for
this example consists of the single equation BS := Billy∨Suzy.
This example is then represented by the context such that only Suzy throws her rock,
resulting in the assignment {Suzy,¬Billy,BS}. Without hesitation everyone would
agree that Suzy throwing her rock caused the bottle to shatter. This judgement can
be justified by a straightforward counterfactual observation: if Suzy had not thrown
her rock, then the bottle would not have shattered. To formalise this, we present the
structural equations version of the Dependence definition from Section . For the time
being, we restrict attention to deterministic theories. Hence we get:
Definition 16. Given a causal setting (M,~u) such that (M,~u) |= C ∧ E, E is
counterfactually dependent on C if (Mdo(¬C),~u) |= ¬E.
In words, E is counterfactually dependent on C if intervening on the value of C, while
holding the context fixed, results in ¬E. In the example it is easy to see that indeed BS
counterfactually depends on Suzy, but not on ¬Billy.
This simple example, and the way we treat it, accounts for the majority of our everyday
causal attributions. Hence it should come as no surprise that Hume (1748) defined
actual causation – causation, for short – as counterfactual dependence – dependence,
for short.1 Following him, dependence is taken by many to be an important intuition
underlying causation (Hall, 2007; Halpern, 2015a; Halpern & Pearl, 2005a;
Hitchcock, 2001; Lewis, 1973; Pearl, 2000; Weslake, 2015; Woodward, 2003). In
fact, all of these authors agree, as do we, that dependence is sufficient for causation.2
Therefore this assumption serves as our starting point.
1Surprisingly in the same breath he formulated a different definition as well, known as the regularity
account, which is also still influential.
2Halpern (2015a) discusses this for all of the HP-approaches, and Weslake (2015) does so regarding most
of the others.
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Principle 1 (Dependence). If E is dependent on C in a causal setting (M,~u), then C
is a cause of E w.r.t. (M,~u).
6.3 Contributing Cause
While dependence is sufficient for causation, it is well-known not to be necessary.
Indeed, Symmetric Overdetermination (SO) and Preemption – both Late (LP) and Early
(EP) – are notorious counterexamples. In this section we compare Example 7 to SO,
postponing LP and EP until later.
Example 8. [Symmetric Overdetermination] Suzy and Billy both throw a rock at a
bottle. Both rocks hit the bottle simultaneously, upon which it shatters. Either rock by
itself would have sufficed to shatter the bottle.
In terms of our causal model, this story represents the context in which both Suzy
and Billy throw. Intuitively, most people judge each throw to be a cause of the bottle
shattering. However it is easy to see that it is dependent on neither (although it is
dependent on at least one rock being thrown, i.e., Mdo(¬Billy),¬Suzy),~u) |= ¬BS). Despite
the lack of dependence, there still is a sense in which we can legitimately say that each
throw contributed to the shattering of the bottle.
To clarify this notion of contributing, let us zoom out for a second and consider the
general causal model, rather than this specific story. At the general level, i.e., in absence
of any information regarding the context ~U , all we can say is that both Suzy and Billy
could contribute to BS. Formally, we introduce the concept of a contributing cause to
express this, which is also defined by Weslake (2015) and Woodward (2003).3 First,
we define the following helpful concept.
Definition 17. We define that a consistent set of literals L is sufficient for a literal Li
w.r.t. M if
∧
L⇒ φLi and Li is positive, or
∧
L⇒¬φLi and Li is negative. Here,
∧
L
denotes the conjunction of all elements of L.)
Recall that M consists of a set of equations of the form Vi := φVi , where φVi is a
propositional formula. Then, according to Definition 17, L is sufficient for Li w.r.t. M
just in case the conjunction of literals in L logically entails the propositional formula
φVi (when Li ≡Vi), or the propositional formula ¬φVi (when Li ≡ ¬Vi).
For example, in our rock-throwing model, {Suzy} is sufficient for BS because Suzy⇒
Suzy∨Billy is a logically valid implication, and {¬Suzy,¬Billy} is sufficient for ¬BS
because ¬Suzy∧¬Billy⇒¬(Suzy∨Billy) is trivially valid.
Definition 18. Given M, we define that C is a direct possible contributing cause of E if
there exists a set of literals L containing C, such that L is sufficient for E, but L\{C}
is not. We call L a witness for C w.r.t. E.
3Our formulation and the ensuing principle are not entirely identical to theirs, but the difference is
negligible.
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Note that this definition is context-independent, and that only literals which appear in
the equation for E can ever be direct possible contributing causes. To illustrate, both
Suzy and Billy are direct possible contributing causes of BS, with witnesses {Suzy}
and {Billy} respectively: {Suzy} and {Billy} are both sufficient for BS, and /0 is not
(since > 6⇒ Suzy∨Billy).
More generally, the connection between two literals need not be direct:
Definition 19. Given M, we define that C is a possible contributing cause of E if there
exist literals C = L1, . . . ,Ln = E so that each Li is a direct possible contributing cause
of Li+1.
Besides the sufficiency of dependence, all authors mentioned earlier also agree on the
principle that if C is an actual cause of E, then C has to be a possible contributing
cause of E.4 Indeed, if C is not a possible contributing cause of E, then under no
circumstances does it affect the truth of E.
A natural step is to zoom in again, and refine this concept and its corresponding
principle to the level of an actual storym by plugging a specific context~u into the model
M.
Definition 20. Given (M,~u) |=C∧E, we define that C is a direct actual contributing
cause of E if C is a direct possible contributing cause of E with a witness L such that
(M,~u) |= L.
Using this notion allows us to differentiate between the role of Billy in the contexts of
Example 7 and Example 21. For Example 7, we have that (M,~u) 6|= Billy, and hence
there is no witness for Billy being a direct actual contributing cause of BS. For Example
21, on the other hand, we have that (M,~u) |= Billy, and hence {Billy} is a witness to
the fact that Billy is a direct actual contributing cause of BS. Again we can generalize
this concept by considering a chain of direct contributing causes.
Definition 21. Given (M,~u) |=C∧E, we define that C is an actual contributing cause of
E if there exist literals C = L1, . . . ,Ln = E so that each Li is a direct actual contributing
cause of Li+1.
From now on we speak simply of C contributing to E, rather than saying that C is an
actual contributing cause of E. We now formulate our second principle, which provides
a necessary condition for actual causation and therefore delineates the upper border of
our spectrum.
Principle 2 (Contributing). If C is a cause of E in a causal setting (M,~u), then C
contributes to E w.r.t. (M,~u).
Informally, what this principle states is that all actual causes of E are literals that
contributed to satisfying/falsifying a formula φVi for some variable Vi, which in
4For details regarding most of the approaches, again see (Weslake, 2015).
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turn contributed to satisfying/falsifying another formula φWi , etc., which in the end
contributed to satisfying/falsifying φE .
The only difference between this principle and the one mentioned after definition 19, is
that we have filled in an actual context. Weslake’s definition (2015) has this principle
directly built into it, as his (STRAND) condition. The reader may verify that all the
other definitions mentioned above also satisfy the principle proposed here, as long as
one takes into account the restriction to Boolean endogenous variables made earlier.
Although this restriction is of no importance for the overwhelming majority of cases,
there is one exception. In models that represent “trumping causation” by means of a
three-valued variable, some of these definitions do call an event a cause even though it
fails to contribute to the effect. However, the majority of authors agree that this is the
wrong answer.5 Hence if anything, this speaks in favour of Contributing.
Applying this principle allows us to exclude certain literals that clearly are not causes,
such as ¬Billy in Example 7. We thus now distinguish three relations between C and
E:
• E is dependent on C. (Suzy in Example 7)
• C does not contribute to E. (¬Billy in Example 7)
• E is not dependent on C, but C does contribute to E. (Suzy and Billy in Example
21)
By Dependence and Contributing we know that there is causation in the first, and
not in the second, of these cases. (That the cases are mutually exclusive, and thus the
conjunction of our principles consistent, follows from Theorem 9 in Section 6.4.) Since
Suzy and Billy are causes in Example 21, we might hope that besides being necessary,
contributing is also sufficient for causation. In the following two sections we present
two counterexamples to the sufficiency of contributing, and develop two principles
which explain what may prevent contributing literals from being causes.
6.4 Production
The following story is paradigmatic in the literature for what has come to be known as
Late Preemption (LP).
Example 9 (Late Preemption). Suzy and Billy both throw a rock at a bottle. Suzy’s
rock gets there first, shattering the bottle. However Billy’s throw was also accurate,
and would have shattered the bottle had it not been preempted by Suzy’s throw.
In this story, the process of Billy throwing a rock and shattering the bottle is preempted
by the process involving Suzy, and this happens after the effect has occurred, i.e., after
5See (Weslake, 2015)[p.17] for a discussion.
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the bottle has shattered. This is in contrast to Early Preemption (EP), in which a process
is preempted before the effect occurs.6 (See Section 6.6.)
As in SO, the bottle shattering is overdetermined by both throws, and again the bottle’s
state is not dependent on either throw. The difference here is the asymmetry that Suzy’s
rock hits the bottle, while Billy’s does not. Our causal judgments reflect this asymmetry,
as people unanimously judge Suzy’s throw to be the sole cause.
How should we formally represent this example? If we continue using the three-variable
causal model BS := Suzy∨Billy, then we end up with the same causal setting as in
SO. Since Billy is a cause in SO, but not in LP, we need to refine our representation to
take into account the difference between them. More specifically, we need to represent
precisely that difference which justifies the shift in causal status of Billy when going
from SO to LP.
As noted, the difference between SO and LP is whether or not Billy’s rock hits the
bottle. Hence, one might distinguish between the two cases by adding variables SH
and BH to the model, which represent Suzy’s, respectively Billy’s, rock hitting the
bottle. Using such a model allows one to make the following observation: if we hold
fixed BH at its actual value, then BS is dependent on Suzy in case of LP, but not so
in case of SO. This approach is taken by Halpern and Pearl (2005a) whose work on
actual causation has set the benchmark for others to compare with. Their definition –
in its many versions – takes full advantage of holding fixed variables at specific values
regardless of their equations, given that certain structural criteria are fulfilled. (See
Section 2.2.1 for the details. Recall that they refer to these non-standard causal settings
as structural contingencies.)
We discuss the HP approach in Section 6.6.1, for now suffice it to say that we believe
this approach is flawed, for it does not take into account the reason why Billy’s rock
did not hit the bottle, despite him throwing it. Yet that reason is obvious: Billy’s rock
arrived at the bottle too late. Or, in the words of Hall (2004)[p. 8]:
Once the bottle has shattered, however, it cannot do so again; thus the
shattering of the bottle prevents the process initiated by Billy’s throw from
itself resulting in a shattering.
If there is any principle regarding causation which is accepted across the board, then it is
the fact that causes come before – or at most simultaneous with – effects. Our approach
to handle LP consists in combining said principle with the temporal information
regarding Billy’s rock.
In order to formally represent this idea, it is necessary to represent the completion of
each of the competing processes. The most obvious way to do so is by adding one
variable for each process: SA represents Suzy’s rock arriving at the bottle’s location, and
analogously for BA and Billy’s rock. Our new causal model consists of the equations
BS := SA∨BA, SA := Suzy, and BA := Billy.
6These examples and this manner of distinguishing between them are due to Lewis (1986).
PRODUCTION 81
As with the original model, Suzy and Billy are possible contributing causes of BS. All
we have done by adding the intermediate variables SA and BA is make explicit that
the contributions of both Suzy and Billy to BS are mediated entirely through SA and
BA, i.e., a thrown rock can only cause a bottle to shatter by flying through the bottle’s
location with sufficient momentum. Hence the question as to why Billy is not a cause
of BS in LP is shifted to the same question regarding BA. The answer follows from a
straightforward application of the accepted principle that causes come before effects,
since the bottle had already shattered by the time Billy’s rock arrived.
We will say of prevented processes and the associated literals, like Billy and BA,
that they have been preempted for the effect. Literals that represent a process which
completed succesfully, like Suzy and SA, will be referred to as producers of the effect.
Given the essential role of temporal information, we choose to represent it separately
from the variables. In this manner our approach is not dependent on there being suitable
variables that capture the consequences of temporal asymmetry, like the variables SH
and BH mentioned above. This representational clarity proves useful when dealing with
cases of late preemption involving an omission, where such variables are unavailable
and other approaches fail, as in Example 16 further on.
Definition 22 (Timing). A timing τ for a causal setting (M,~u) is a function from L(M,~u)
to N. (Recall that L(M,~u) is the set of all literals Li such that (M,~u) |= Li.)
Informally, a timing can be interpreted as follows. An atom, like Billy, represents
the fact that some event occurs in our story. Hence, if Li is an atom, τ(Li) simply
represents the moment at which the event Li happens, e.g., the moment that Billy throws
his rock. If, on the other hand, Li is a negated atom, like ¬Billy, then it represents an
omission, i.e., it represents that some event does not occur. Since there is little sense
in asking when an event does not occur, we take the pragmatic view that in this case
τ(Li) represents the moment at which the last event occurred that prevents ¬Li from
happening, in the sense that the outcome of this event – together with the outcomes
of all previous events – falsifies the formula φLi .7 Hence, the timing of omissions is
derived from that of events.
We want to point out that aside from this temporal difference, we treat negated atoms
and atoms symmetrically throughout this work, although some authors object to such a
view.8 This issue will pop up further on in the discussion of Example 20.
Also, by always interpreting atoms as events and negated atoms as omissions, the
temporal asymmetry here introduced can be viewed as an implicit distinction between
a default and a deviant value of a variable: only variables taking on their deviant value
true have an independent timing, whereas the timing of variables remaining in their
default value false is determined by the timing of the former. This perspective proves
helpful when considering Example 16 further on. (We point out though that our version
7Here we are using the informal term “prevent” to get across the general idea. The precise interpretation
of a timing is given in Definition 25.
8Halpern and Hitchcock (2015) provide some of the different views regarding this matter.
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of the default/deviant distinction is rather minimal in comparison to other versions,
such as for example that of Hitchcock (2007).)
If τ(Li) < τ(L j), then this means that Li happened/was prevented before L j in the
actual story. If τ(Li) = τ(L j), then this means that both happened simultaneously,
at least in the sense that the granularity of the story does not allow us to say which
happened first.
Because not every story provides – or requires – complete temporal information, we
also introduce the following concept.
Definition 23 (Partial timing). A partial timing τ for a causal setting (M,~u) is a partial
function from L(M,~u) to N.
Now that we have extended a story (M,~u) to include a timing, we can do the same for a
counterfactual story (Mdo(¬C),~u): before ¬C, everything remains as it was in the actual
story, after ¬C the timing remains open.
Definition 24. Given (M,~u,τ) |= C, we define τdo(¬C) as the partial timing that is
identical to τ up until τ(C)−1, has τdo(¬C)(¬C) = τ(C), and is not defined elsewhere.
Because the structural equations represent causal relationships and causes must always
precede their effects, the structure of the equations imposes restrictions on the timings
that are possible. In particular, whenever Vi/¬Vi was caused at some time t, the causes
that enabled/disabled φVi must have already been present at this time. Further, as
mentioned, an omission is caused at the same time as the last event which enabled it.
Definition 25. Given (M,~u,τ), for every n, we denote by Ln(M,~u) the set {Li ∈ L(M,~u) |
τ(Li)≤ n}. For each endogenous variable Vi and the literal Li containing Vi such that
(M,~u) |= Li, we define τ to be valid for Vi if
• Li =Vi and τ(Li)≥min
k∈N
{Lk(M,~u) is sufficient for Li}; or
• Li = ¬Vi and τ(Li) = min
k∈N
{Lk(M,~u) is sufficient for Li}.
A timing is valid for (M,~u) if it is valid for all variables.
For example, in our rock-throwing story where both Billy and Suzy throw, we require
that τ(BS) ≥ τ(SA)∨ τ(BS) ≥ τ(BA). In case Billy does not throw, we require that
τ(¬BA) = τ(¬Billy) = τ(Ui), where Ui represents the exogenous event which prevents
Billy from throwing. We can generalize the idea of validity to include partial timings.
Definition 26. A partial timing τ is possible w.r.t. (M,~u) if there exists a timing τ ′
that extends τ (i.e., τ ′(Li) = τ(Li) whenever τ(Li) is defined) such that τ ′ is valid
w.r.t. (M,~u).
Using the timing, we can formalize the notion of production.
PRODUCTION 83
Definition 27. Given (M,~u,τ) |=C∧E with τ a valid timing for (M,~u), we define C
to be a direct producer of E if C is a direct actual contributing cause of E w.r.t. (M,~u),
with a witness L such that for each Li ∈ L, τ(Li)≤ τ(E).
More generally we define production in terms of a chain of direct producers.
Definition 28. Given (M,~u,τ) with τ a valid timing for (M,~u), we define C to be a
producer of E if there exist literals C = L1, . . . ,Ln = E so that each Li is a direct
producer of Li+1. For a partial timing τ ′, we define that C is a producer of E
w.r.t. (M,~u,τ ′) if there exists at least one valid timing τ that extends τ ′ such that
C is a producer of E w.r.t. (M,~u,τ).
6.4.1 Comparison to Hall’s Production
Our definition of production is inspired by that of Hall (2004), which we discussed
in Section 3.4. There we expressed his definition in CP-logic as an instantiation of
our general definition of causation, so that it could also incorporate negative literals
as candidate causes. Still, our CP-logic version shares with Hall’s original version the
property that beyond the candidate cause C, all literals occurring in a chain of direct
producers C = L1, . . . ,Ln = E will be positive.
The current definition of production includes all cases of production covered by
these versions, but also allows the literals in a chain to be negative. For example,
in Section 3.5 we presented Double Prevention as a paradigmatic case to illustrate how
counterfactual dependence and production diverge: although there is dependence of
G on C, according to the previous versions C does not produce G. We leave it to the
reader to verify that according to the current definition of production C in fact does
produce G. Examples 10 and 16 further on present two more illustrations.
As will become clear later, our more tolerant notion of production paves the way to
a natural compromise between dependence and production into a single concept. We
leave it to the reader to verify that, unlike the other two compromises from Part I, it
does not suffer from any of the problems from Chapter 5.
Hall identified a problem with his definition of production, namely that it is context-
sensitive. He illustrates this with the following example (Hall, 2004)[p. 31].
Example 10. First imagine a scenario where we have E :=C∧D, and both C and D
are true. Then we zoom in on the details, and learn that the situation also involves an
intermediate variable B, such that: E :=C∧¬B, and B :=C∧¬D.
In both versions, E is dependent on both C and D, so according to our definition
they are both causes of E, and thus also producers. According to Hall’s definition of
production, D is a producer of E in the first version only. Yet all the second version
does is to make explicit some details that before were left implicit. In terms of the
three original variables, the two models behave identically, namely E holds only if both
of C and D do. In the second version, D prevents B, which would have prevented E,
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making it a case of “double prevention”. Because the chain from D to E contains an
omission, it cannot fall under Hall’s definition of production. From this he concludes
that production must be context-sensitive, i.e., it depends on the level of detail that we
use. Our definition of production, on the other hand, applies equally to both versions of
the example. It therefore avoids Hall’s relativistic conclusion.
6.4.2 Preempted Contributors
Producers are literals whose contribution helped bring about the effect. The following
definition on the other hand generalizes the failure of Billy’s contribution to do so.
Definition 29. Given (M,~u,τ) |= C ∧ E, we define C to be preempted for E if C
contributes to E w.r.t. (M,~u) and it is not a producer of E w.r.t. (M,~u,τ).
The difference between the role of Billy’s throw in SO compared to LP, can now
be expressed by saying that it changes from being a producer to being preempted.
Concretely, any appropriate timing τ for LP will have τ(BA)> τ(BS), whereas for SO,
τ(BA) = τ(SA)≤ τ(BS). This allows us to exclude Billy from being a cause of BS in
LP, by applying the formal counterpart of the aforementioned principle.
Principle 3 (Preemption). If C is a cause of E w.r.t. (M,~u,τ), then C is not preempted
for E w.r.t. (M,~u,τ).
Combining Contributing and Preemption results in a stronger necessary condition
for causation than Contributing:
Corollary 1 (Producing). If C is a cause of E w.r.t. (M,~u,τ), then C is a producer of
E w.r.t. (M,~u,τ).
Extending the language of structural equations with explicit timings forms a substantial
departure from existing structural equations approaches. However, one should not
overestimate the role of a timing either. Looking at Preemption and Definition 29,
we learn that the influence of a timing is limited to the timing of preempted events.
Hence in practice it suffices to just give a partial timing over the literals that represent
competing processes and their effect, such as BA, SA and BS in case of LP.
In all of the examples we have seen so far, producers were always causes. The next
section shows that this is not necessarily the case.
6.5 Switches
Examples involving a switch make up another popular category to gauge intuitions
on causation. In Section 5.2.2 we already discussed such an example in the form of a
neuron diagram. The following is a story that usually accompanies that diagram (Hall,
2000, 2007; Halpern & Pearl, 2005a).
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Example 11 (Switch). An engineer is standing by a switch in the railroad tracks. A
train approaches in the distance. She flips the switch, so that the train travels down the
left-hand track, instead of the right. Since the tracks reconverge up ahead, the train
arrives at its destination all the same.
The following is an appropriate model for this story, where RT (LT ) means that the
train goes down the right-hand (left-hand) track, Dest means that the train arrives at its
destination, and the context is such that Switch holds, i.e., the engineer flips the switch.
Dest := LT ∨RT.
LT := Switch.
RT := ¬Switch.
Intuitively most people agree that flipping the switch is not a cause for the train’s arrival.
But obviously it is a cause of the train going down the left-hand track, and this in turn
is a cause of the train’s arrival. Hence this is a counterexample to the transitivity of
causation. Given that production is, by definition, transitive, it is also a counterexample
to the sufficiency of production.
Part of the reason why we judge there to be no causation here is that the train would
have arrived at its destination either way, i.e., there is no dependence. However we
already know that dependence is not necessary for causation, so this is not the whole
story. The further justification for our judgment is that the actual and the counterfactual
story are too symmetrical in regards to the function of the switch. Flipping the switch
contributes to a process that results in the train arriving. Not flipping the switch
contributes to a different process, but one that has the exact same result. Therefore
Switch and ¬Switch perform the same causal role in both stories, that of contributing
to a process which results in Dest.
A fundamental property of causation, which underlies Dependence as well, is that
causes are difference makers. Dependence expresses the strongest form of making
a difference: to make a difference as to whether or not the effect takes place. What
the switch example illustrates is that there is a weaker form of making a difference
that is a necessary condition for causation, namely that the absence of a cause fulfills
a different role than the cause itself. We formalize this property by means of the
following principle.
Principle 4 (Asymmetry). If C is a cause of E w.r.t. (M,~u,τ), then ¬C is not a cause
of E w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C),~u,τdo(¬C)).
This principle and the importance of difference making is defended as well by Sartorio
(2005). Also Weslake (2015) incorporates a very similar principle into his definition of
causation. However his formulation falls prey to a counterexample that we will discuss
in Section 6.10.
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Given the extreme symmetry between the actual story in Example 20 and the
counterfactual story where the switch is not flipped, most definitions of causation
will either judge both Switch and ¬Switch to be causes in their respective stories, or
neither. Accepting Asymmetry delivers the intuitive verdict that neither is a cause.
Note though that both Switch and ¬Switch are producers in their respective stories.
The qualification “most definitions” we made in the previous paragraph arises from
the fact that some authors claim only events (and not omissions) can be causes, and
therefore Asymmetry would be trivially satisfied for them. Recall that contrary to this
view, we treat true and false symmetrically.
Before we move on, we need to address a possible objection. Some readers may not
share our intuitions on the Switch example, on grounds that it is not at all certain the
train will arrive either way. For instance, who is to say the right track would not break
down? This is an important point, which can be made more vividly by using another
famous counterexample to the necessity of dependence, namley Early Preemption. We
direct our attention to this example, in order to show that we can do justice to these
intuitions without dropping Asymmetry.
6.6 Non-determinism
Imagine yet another variant of our story:
Example 12. [Early Preemption] Suzy throws a rock at a bottle. The rock hits it, and
the bottle breaks. However Billy was watching Suzy, and would have thrown a rock
just in case Suzy did not throw.
This is an example of Early Preemption, because the causal mechanism connecting
Billy’s throw to the bottle shattering is preempted by Suzy already before the effect of
the bottle shattering occurs. We can re-use the model from Example 9, except that the
equation for Billy becomes Billy := ¬Suzy.
Only Suzy is directly dependent on the context~u, which is such that Suzy throws. Most
authors consider examples of early preemption on a par with late preemption, and
hence judge Suzy to be a cause of BS in this case as well. Yet if we compare this
example to Switch, then we see that they are remarkably similar. Suzy plays the same
role here as Switch does, namely it determines which of two processes occurs, where
each process by itself is sufficient for the effect to take place.
Everything we just said about Switch, also holds for EP: in both cases the candidate
cause – Suzy or Switch – is a producer of the effect (just as with SO and LP), and in
the counterfactual situation the negation of the candidate cause is also a producer of
the effect (contrary to SO and LP). In fact, the structural models and assignments to
variables are almost completely identical in both cases.
But then how do we explain the prevalent intuition that Suzy is a cause of BS in EP?
Here it becomes useful to consider the possibility that the effect will not occur either
way. According to our current model, it is certain that if Suzy does not throw then the
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bottle will shatter nonetheless. Surely that does not sound very realistic, as who is to
say that Billy will not miss? All of our rock-throwing equations so far have assumed
that Suzy or Billy throwing always results in the bottle’s shattering. This assumption
was a harmless simplification in the previous examples, because in each of them the
actual story contained information on Billy’s accuracy (with the exception of Example
7, where it was irrelevant). Because this is no longer the case here (since in the actual
story Billy did not even throw), a proper analysis of EP requires incorporating this
uncertainty. Hence we extend our model with variables SAcc and BAcc, representing





Allowing for the throws to be inaccurate changes the example significantly. In this
chapter we have limited ourselves to deterministic examples, meaning we assumed that
for each variable there was a definite truth-value in the actual story. The underlying
motivation for this limitation is that as a result there is an unambiguous interpretation
of the counterfactual story (Mdo(¬C),~u), because that story corresponds to precisely
one assignment of truth-values to all variables. To tackle Early Preemption we need
to take a little excursion into the more general realm of non-deterministic examples,
where there might be several counterfactual stories. Since there is no sense in which
BAcc has a value in the actual story where Billy does not throw, we have to consider
both the counterfactual story where Billy’s rock hits the bottle and it shatters, and that
in which he throws and misses.
Our approach can easily be generalised to allow for non-deterministic cases, by
extending the context ~U with exogenous variables ~W whose values are undetermined
in the actual story (eg., BAcc in EP).
Definition 30. Given a causal model M over endogenous variables ~V and exogenous
variables ~U, we define a partial context as an assignment ~u′ of values to variables so
that ~U ′ ⊆ ~U, and refer to (M,~u′) as a partial causal setting.We call an assignment ~w to
the remaining exogenous variables W =U \U ′ a completion of u′.
Dependence is then defined as follows:
Definition 31. Given a partial causal setting (M,~u′) such that for all completions ~w of
~u′ we have: (M,~u′∪~w) |=C∧E, E is counterfactually dependent on C if there exists a
completion ~w such that: (Mdo(¬C),~u′∪~w) |= ¬E.
All other definitions can be similarly generalised to partial causal settings. As before,
actual causation is relative to a story. Up until now such stories have been represented
88 A PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO DEFINING ACTUAL CAUSATION
formally as a causal setting (M,~u). In the current more general setting, a story takes
the form of a partial causal setting extended with a timing: (M,~u′,τ).
Our original Principle 4 is then replaced with:
Principle 4 (Asymmetry version 2). If C is a cause of E w.r.t. (M,~u′,τ), then there
exists a completion ~w of ~u′ so that ¬C is not a cause of E w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C),~u′∪~w,τdo(¬C)).
As a consequence, by adding the appropriate variables allowing for several
counterfactual stories, we are able to do justice to our intuitions in both Switch and EP.
If it is realistic to assume that train tracks do not malfunction, then the train will arrive
either way and flipping the switch is not a cause. If on the other hand our intuitions do
not support this assumption, then possibly the train would not arrive but for flipping
the switch, and hence flipping it is a cause.
In the EP example, the counterpart of the malfunctioning track is Billy missing the
bottle. Since it is quite plausible to take the accuracy of a boy throwing a rock to be
much more uncertain than a sturdy track breaking, it is to be expected that intuitions for
Suzy’s throw being a cause are more common than those for flipping the switch. Hence
an appropriate model for EP should contain a variable representing the uncertainty
of the counterfactual story, contrary to a model for Switch. The more general non-
deterministic version of Asymmetry then gives the right answer in both cases.
The lesson to be learned here is that structurally there is no difference between examples
labelled “switches” and those commonly taken to exhibit early preemption. The
difference lies in the reliability of the background process which might produce the
effect in the absence of the actual process. Having expounded the importance of
non-determinism in these examples, to keep things simple from here onwards we focus
again on the deterministic version of Asymmetry.
6.6.1 Comparison to HP
As mentioned, for reasons of simplicity most structural equations approaches stick to
deterministic models. Still, all of them claim to provide an adequate analysis of both
Early Preemption and Switch. In Chapter 5 we already discussed the problems Hall’s
account faces in trying to distinguish between the two examples in a deterministic
context. The BV12 definition, on the other hand, avoided these problems by using
the non-deterministic solution here presented. To further justify our use of non-
determinism, we again have a look at the HP approach. Halpern and Pearl (2005a)
apply the same reasoning to Switch as we have:
Is flipping the switch a legitimate cause of the train’s arrival? Not in ideal
situations, where all mechanisms work as specified. But this is not what
causality (and causal modeling) are all about. Causal models earn their
value in abnormal circumstances, created by structural contingencies, such
as the possibility of a malfunctioning track. It is this possibility that should
enter our mind whenever we decide to designate each track as a separate
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mechanism (i.e., equation) in the model and, keeping this contingency in
mind, it should not be too odd to name the switch position a cause of the
train arrival (or non-arrival).
Note that they explicitly refer to “the possibility of a malfunctioning track” as a
structural contingency. On the face of it this suggests that the motivation behind their
approach for dealing with Early Preemption/Switch is very similar to ours: if it is
considered a significant possibility that the backup mechanism fails, then this possibility
should be taken into account to assess causation. Concretely, in that case we should
take into account the counterfactual story where the candidate cause does not occur,
and the backup mechanism fails. Which factors determine whether or not the failure of
the backup mechanism – be it a train track or a person throwing a rock – is a significant
possibility is mostly an empirical matter, and should be decided on a case by case basis.
We find further confirmation of our interpretation by considering another example of
Early Preemption, discussed by Halpern and Pearl (2005a)[p. 30]. We present here the
original formulation by McDermott (1995).
Example 13. [Early Preemption 2] Suppose I reach out and catch a passing cricket
ball. The next thing along in the ball’s direction of motion was a solid brick wall.
Beyond that was a window.
Is catching the ball a cause of the window being safe? Even without giving a structural
model to go along with this story, the similarity to Example 12 and Switch is obvious.
Again, the answer depends on whether or not we consider the possibility that the backup
mechanism – the wall blocking the window – will fail. Intuitively, most people judge
this example to be more similar to Switch than to Early Preemption, meaning they do
not judge catching the ball to be a cause. This is consistent with our approach: as with
the failure of train tracks, people generally do not consider it a significant possibility
that a solid brick wall will fail to stop a cricket ball. Halpern and Pearl (2005a) also
treat this example similar to Switch:
If we make both the wall and the fielder endogenous variables, then the
fielder’s catch is a cause of the window being safe, under the assumption
that the fielder not catching the ball and the wall not being there is
considered a reasonable scenario. On the other hand, if we take it [sic]
for granted the wall’s presence (either by making the wall an exogenous
variable, not including it in the model, or not allowing situations where
it doesn’t block the ball if the fielder doesn’t catch it), then the fielder’s
catch is not a cause of the window being safe. It would remain safe no
matter what the fielder did, in any structural contingency.
The difference between their approach and ours lies in the method used to represent the
failure of the backup mechanism.9 We choose to do so in a very straightforward fashion:
9This difference is not limited to Halpern and Pearl. Collins (2000) and Hitchcock (2001) use the same
terminology when discussing which counterfactual scenarios ought to be considered. For example, confronted
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all possible stories are modelled as some partial causal setting (M,~u,τ). Hence we
interpret the deterministic model for Early Preemption as stating that it is impossible
for Billy to miss when he throws. If this statement is considered inappropriate, then
one should use the non-deterministic model given above, i.e., one should add a variable
that represents Billy’s accuracy and consider the possibility that he misses.
Since Halpern and Pearl restrict themselves to deterministic models, the choice between
these two models is not available to them. This explains why they seek recourse in
structural contingencies, as they need some other method to consider stories beyond
the ones allowed by a structural model.
One could take this to imply that the difference here is merely a matter of taste,
depending on one’s preferred method to represent uncertainty. This is far from the
truth. Halpern and Pearl use structural contingencies in a wide variety of cases, and
these go well beyond examples resembling Early Preemption.
The criteria for deciding if a structural contingency may be used, conditions 1 and
2 in Definition 1, are not founded on underlying principles or heuristics that guide
their application. As a result, they allow for a plethora of situations for which it
is hard to see why we should consider them at all.10 Indeed, Halpern and Pearl
(2005a)[p.24] concede that in some cases their definition offers acceptable answers
only if one explicitly stipulates which situations are “allowable settings”. Therefore the
interpretation of structural contingencies we have just given only applies to a limited
number of cases.
To illustrate, we briefly return to Late Preemption. HP use the following model for





We first have a look at whether or not this model is appropriate to capture the causal
structure behind Late Preemption.
A first problem with this model is that the asymmetry between Suzy’s throw and that
of Billy is built right into the model: it does not allow for the story in which Billy
throws faster than Suzy, or the story in which they both throw equally fast, as in
with Example 13, Collins (2000)[p. 8] says that “It is more far-fetched, on the other hand, to suppose that the
brick wall be absent, or that the ball would miraculously pass straight through it.” Considering an example
involving a boulder – Example 18 given in the next chapter – Hitchcock (2001)[p. 298] says of the failure of
the backup mechanism that “This possibility is just too far-fetched.” Hall and Paul (2003)[p. 26] criticise
Hitchcock by pointing out the arbitrariness in his use of this terminology.
10For details on these situations and the counterexamples they allow, see for example (Hall, 2007;
Weslake, 2015). Halpern (2015a) has recently proposed a new definition which is more restrictive, avoiding
some of these pitfalls, but not all. Further, it allows for new counterexamples, eg., it fails to judge each of
Suzy and Billy a cause in case of SO.
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Symmetric Overdetermination. There is nothing in the informal story in Example 9 to
suggest that the difference in speed is a general, structural property. On the contrary, it
sounds natural to assume that this difference is a contingent property of the actual story.
However, as pointed out by Halpern (2015a), this problem can be set straight by also
including BH into the equation for SH, and adding an exogenous variable to represent
the order by which the rocks arrive. Hence this problem is of little consequence.
A second, more fundamental, problem, is the presence of SH in the equation for
BH. Recall that a structural equation represents a causal mechanism, in this case the
mechanism connecting Billy’s throw to Billy’s rock hitting the bottle. That mechanism
does not involve SH, since Suzy and her rock form an entirely different and independent
mechanism. Therefore, it seems conceptually wrong to include SH in the equation for
BH. A consequence of this conceptual error is that if we consider the context where
only Billy throws, then ¬Suzy is actually a producer (according to our definition) of
BS. This is a very counterintuitive result.
The role played by ¬SH in the equation for BH is not that of a contributor to BH, but
rather that of a constraint: it is supposed to capture the property that a bottle cannot
shatter if it has already done so. This confirms that one cannot adequately deal with
Late Preemption without making vital use of temporal information, as we argued in
Section 6.4. Since HP stick to structural equations proper, they are forced to build this
temporal information into the model itself. More specifically, the presence of ¬SH in
the equation for BH compensates for the fact that they do not use a timing. Given these
counterintuitive consequences, we prefer to use our symmetric model, containing the
variables SA and BA.
Here it is useful to point out that for every approach using structural equations, the
verdict given by a definition of causation is to a large degree dependent on the particular
model being used. Since in many cases there is room for debate as to which model is
appropriate for a given informal story, this means one can often counteract undesired
outcomes of applying a definition by calling into question the model being used.
(See (Halpern & Hitchcock, 2010) for a discussion of this issue.) However because
our approach ultimately relies on basic principles, rather than on the intutiveness of
examples, we believe it is less affected by this issue. If one accepts our principles, then
one can make judgments about a causal model regardless of which informal story it
is supposed to capture. In this manner, the problem of model appropriateness can to
some extent be separated from the problem of defining actual causation.
Setting aside our disagreement regarding the choice of model for Late Preemption,
we now turn to the HP approach and how it applies given their preferred model. It
considers the structural contingency that Billy throws and yet fails to hit the bottle,
even though Suzy does not throw. Contrary to the interpretation used for Switch, this
structural contingency cannot be interpreted simply as the possibility that the backup
mechanism fails to function properly, because the actual story explicitly stipulates that
it does not: “Billy’s throw was also accurate, and would have shattered the bottle had it
not been preempted by Suzy’s throw.” This stipulation is not just a detail occurring in
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our version of the example, but forms an essential part of Late Preemption cases.
One might object that there is also another possible interpretation, consistent with
what has been said: namely that a structural contingency represents what is generally
possible, rather than what is possible given the actual story. On this reading, the actual
information that Billy was accurate is of no interest, all that matters is whether or not
in general it is possible that he is not accurate. But going down this road leads to a
slippery slope, for it blurs the distinction between general and actual causation. More
specifically, if one can ignore the actual state of Billy’s accuracy, then why not ignore
other aspects of the actual story as well? For example, why not then consider the story
in which Suzy throws but misses and Billy does not throw, and use it to conclude that
Billy’s throw also caused the bottle to shatter in Late Preemption?
Obviously according to the HP definition it is not the case that anything goes. Only
those structural contingencies satisfying the conditions from Definition 1 may be
considered. But what should be clear by now, is that it is not easy to come up with
a consistent and systematic interpretation of what these structural contingencies are
supposed to represent. Therefore we prefer to stay far away from them, and instead
simply use a non-deterministic model to represent aspects of the story which are not
actually determined, and use a timing to exclude those events which happened too late.
6.7 Dependence Revisited
So far, we have established that dependence is sufficient for causation but not necessary,
while production is necessary but not sufficient. Therefore causation must lie in
between these two concepts. To pinpoint its location, we present a theorem that relates
dependence to production.
Theorem 9. Given a valid timing τ , E is dependent on C w.r.t. (M,~u) if and only if
both of the following conditions hold:
• [Condition 1]: C is a producer of E w.r.t. (M,~u,τ).
• [Condition 2]: ¬C is a producer of ¬E w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C),~u,τdo(¬C)).
Proof. The implication from right to left is trivial, hence we only need to prove the
implication from left to right.
Assume E is dependent on C w.r.t. (M,~u), or in other words, (M,~u) |= C∧E and
(Mdo(¬C),~u) |= ¬E.
Take τ to be any valid timing w.r.t. (M,~u), n = τ(E), and m =
min
k∈N
{Lk(M,~u) is sufficient for E}. We first prove that C is a producer of E w.r.t. (M,~u,τ).
Take L1 ⊆ Lm(M,~u) to be minimally sufficient for E, i.e., L1 is sufficient for E, and for any
Li ∈ L1, L1 \{Li} is not sufficient for E. (Such a set can be constructed by removing
elements from Lm(M,~u) one by one.) By construction, all literals in L
1 are direct actual
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contributors to E. Moreover, since m ≤ n, these literals are direct producers of E as
well.
Since ~U = ~u ⊂ L(Mdo(¬C),~u), it follows that if (L1 \ ~U = ~u) ⊆ L(Mdo(¬C),~u), then E ∈
L(Mdo(¬C),~u), i.e., (Mdo(¬C),~u) |= E. Therefore there exists at least one endogenous
literal D ∈ L1 such that D 6∈ L(Mdo(¬C),~u). By the previous paragraph, D is a direct
producer of E.
If D =C, then we are finished with this part of the proof. So assume D 6=C. We can
apply the exact same reasoning as we did for E, to find a direct producer F of D such
that F 6∈ L(Mdo(¬C),~u). Since production is transitive, F is a producer of E as well. Given
that there are only a finite number of endogenous literals, and that M is assumed to be
acyclical, continuing this reasoning will eventually end up with finding C as a producer
of E. Therefore we conclude that C is a producer of E w.r.t. (M,~u,τ).
We can apply the exact same reasoning to prove that also ¬C is a producer of ¬E
w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C),~u,τdo(¬C)), which concludes the proof.
Because this theorem indiscriminately applies to all valid timings, the first conclusion
we can draw from it is that all information contained in a particular timing is lost
when we consider dependence. Since we introduced the notion of a timing precisely
to distinguish between cases where dependence was too crude a tool, this should not
come as a surprise. On the contrary, the lesson learned from comparing examples
such as Symmetric Overdetermination and Late Preemption was that the actual timing
should be taken into account in order to judge actual causation. This theorem shows
that without loss of generality, we can restrict our attention to one particular timing
when comparing dependence and production. We now consider how the conjunction of
Conditions 1 and 2 can be weakened, so that we shift from dependence to causation.
By Producing, we know Condition 1 should stay. Yet as the Switch example has shown,
production does not satisfy Asymmetry: both Switch and ¬Switch are producers of
Dest in their respective stories. Therefore a straightforward and natural suggestion is
to combine production (Condition 1) with the constraint that Asymmetry should be
satisfied. In other words, Condition 2 should be replaced with Condition 2’: ¬C is not
a producer of E w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C),~u,τdo(¬C)).
Since Switch was the only example discussed which required us to look beyond
production, it is easy to see that defining causation as the conjunction of Conditions
1 and 2’ agrees with our judgments on all examples discussed so far. Note however
that temporal information plays no role in judging Switch: the model is such that each
story only allows one valid timing, and hence in this case the notions of producing
and contributing are equivalent. Therefore we cannot rule out a slightly stronger
alternative to Condition 2, let us call it Condition 2”, where producing is replaced with
contributing: ¬C does not contribute to E w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C),~u).
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To decide between these two conditions, we now present an example in favour of
adopting Condition 2’, instead of Condition 2”. In the next chapter (in Section 7.5.3)
we offer a more principled argument in defence of Condition 2’.
6.8 Not Contributing vs. Not Producing
In this section we present a counterexample to the necessity of Condition 2”, resulting
in the acceptance of Condition 2’. However the example is rather exotic, since it is hard
to even find examples for which these two options disagree. (We have not found any in
the literature.) Hence we do not put much weight on our preference of Condition 2’
over Condition 2”, as in practice this will hardly ever matter.
Example 14. In general, Billy throws rocks at bottles either if Suzy does not, or if
he just feels like it. Today, Billy throws a rock at a bottle because he feels like it.
Immediately afterwards Suzy throws a rock as well. Suzy’s rock was thrown harder, and
gets there first, shattering the bottle. However Billy’s throw was also accurate, and
would have shattered the bottle had it not been for Suzy.
To model this variant of the rock-throwing story, which combines elements of early





Here Feels means that Billy just feels like throwing, regardless of what Suzy does.
Hence the context is such that Feels and Suzy hold. An appropriate timing τ is such that
τ(Feels)≤ τ(Billy)< τ(Suzy)≤ τ(SA)≤ τ(BS)< τ(BA). The question is whether or
not Suzy is a cause of BS.
Given that Suzy’s throw preempted Billy’s throw from shattering the bottle, the example
looks similar to LP, which suggests that Suzy is a cause. On the other hand, in the
counterfactual story do(¬Suzy), Suzy’s not throwing contributes to the process that
would have Billy’s rock shattering the bottle, just as with EP. Even more, we know
that Billy was accurate, so there is no counterfactual story in which the bottle does
not shatter, contrary to EP. Therefore the example is also similar to a switch, which
suggests that Suzy is not a cause.
We believe the first similarity, to LP, to be the more fundamental one: even though
it may hold in general that ¬Suzy can produce Billy, in this story we already know
that Suzy threw after Billy did. So in this case, Suzy throwing or not throwing was
completely irrelevant to Billy’s throw, which was instead produced by the fact that he
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felt like throwing. Therefore when considering what would have happened if Suzy had
not thrown, the right answer is that ¬Suzy would not have produced anything (except
for ¬SA), and just as with LP Suzy should be judged a cause of BS.
Now we compare how Condition 2” and 2’ deal with this example. It is clear that Suzy
produced BS in the actual story. In the counterfactual story, ¬Suzy contributes to BS.
Therefore this is a counterexample to the necessity of Condition 2”.
The partial timing τdo(¬Suzy) has τdo(¬Suzy)(Feels) ≤ τdo(¬Suzy)(Billy) <
τdo(¬Suzy)(¬Suzy). Therefore ¬Suzy does not produce Billy
w.r.t. (Mdo(¬Suzy),u,τdo(¬Suzy)), which implies it does not produce BS either.
This is in agreement with the necessity of Condition 2’. We conclude from this that the
right choice to make is to take the conjunction of Conditions 1 and 2’ as a sufficient
and necessary condition for causation.
6.9 Discussion and Results
Our principles have led us to propose the following definition of actual causation.
Definition 32. [Actual Causation] Given (M,~u,τ) |=C∧E, we define C to be an actual
cause of E w.r.t. (M,~u,τ) if C produces E w.r.t. (M,~u,τ) and ¬C does not produce E
w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C),~u,τdo(¬C)).
The precise formulation of this definition is dependent on the fact that we defined
production over a partial timing as being a producer in at least one valid timing that
extends it (as opposed to being a producer in all of them). This boils down to assuming
that the default is for actual contribution to imply production, which is in line with our
earlier observation regarding the limited influence of a timing: unless we know that a
contributing process was preempted, it is a producer. As with the difference discussed
in the previous section however, there are very few examples where this distinction
matters.
Our definition of actual causation is built up entirely out of production, a concept which
has so far received too little attention in the literature. A key property of production is
that it focusses solely on the actual world: unsatisfied literals are entirely irrelevant. It
tells us whether some event brought forth another as things actually happened.11
Causation shares production’s interest in the actual world, but extends it with a contrast
to a counterfactual world: did some event bring forth another as things actually
happened, and if so, would the absence of said event not have brought forth the
other? In the overwhelming majority of cases, if the first question is answered in the
affirmative, so is the second; only examples exhibiting switching behaviour form an
exception. This seems to suggest that the intense focus on the counterfactual nature
of causation that we have observed in recent years is somewhat misguided. However
11In this respect it is similar to the notion of responsibility as it figures in ethics: ethical judgments concern
(for the most part at least) what did happen, not what could have happened. We intend to examine this
similarity in more detail in future work.
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when we take into consideration Theorem 9, the picture becomes more nuanced, since
dependence and production are tightly connected as well.
The main distinguishing feature of dependence is that it cares only about end results: it
considers only whether C and E hold in the actual and counterfactual story, without
looking at the temporal details – i.e., the timings – of how this came about. The
importance of dependence therefore lies in its simplicity: one can forget about the
intricacies of timing and preemption, and still end up with an answer that does the job
most of the time.
We can express the difference between production, dependence, and causation in a
nutshell by saying that production answers the “How?” question, dependence answers
the “What if?” question, and causation answers the “Why?” question. The first is
usually associated with understanding, the second concerns a form of a posteriori
prediction, and the third is fundamental to explanation.
Although we have built up our definition using formal principles and theoretical
examples, there has been empirical validation recently that points in a very similar
direction. The idea that causation is a combination of dependence and production
has been confirmed experimentally on a set of physical test-cases by Gerstenberg,
Goodman, Lagnado, and Tenenbaum (2015), although their notion of production is
less formal and somewhat different from ours. They too stress the importance of
distinguishing between different ways a cause can make a difference to the effect
(Gerstenberg et al., 2015)[p. 1]:
We argue that the core notion that underlies people’s causal judgments
is that of difference-making. However, there are several ways in which
a cause can make a difference to the effect. It can make a difference to
whether the effect occurred, and it can make a difference to how the effect
occurred.
We now have a look at our definition in practice by confronting it with some troublesome
examples.
6.10 Some Examples
Weslake (2015) gives an overview of the most prominent definitions of actual causation
in the structural equations framework. After presenting counterexamples to all of them,
he proposes a definition that succeeds in getting the right answer for these examples.
We leave it to the reader to verify that our definition delivers the correct verdict in these
cases as well.12 More interesting are his “non-structural counterexamples”. These
exhibit structural patterns that are identical to cases of symmetric overdetermination
and early preemption, yet seem to give rise to different intuitions. He leaves it as an
12One should take into account our discussion of early preemption from Section 6.6 though: Weslake uses
the deterministic model for EP and still judges there to be causation, whereas we claim there is causation
only when using the non-deterministic model.
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unsolved problem how to deal with these examples correctly as well.13 Therefore we
consider them as suitable test-cases for our approach.
The first example, named “Careful Poisoning”, has the same structure as early
preemption (Weslake, 2015)[p. 22].
Example 15. Assistant Bodyguard puts a harmless antidote in Victim’s coffee (A).
Buddy then poisons the coffee (B), using a poison that is normally lethal, but which is
countered by the antidote. Buddy would not have poisoned the coffee if Assistant had
not administered the antidote first. Victim drinks the coffee and survives (¬D).
Intuitively, most people – but not all – agree that adding the antidote is not a cause of
Victim’s survival. Rather, it seems as if Assistant Bodyguard and Buddy are playing a
trick on Victim: “we might suppose that Assistant Bodyguard is up for a promotion ...
and wants to make it look as though he has foiled an assassination attempt. Buddy is
helping him.” (Hitchcock, 2007)[p. 520]. The model for this example is D := ¬A∧B,
B := A, and the context is such that A holds. It is easy to see that A produces ¬D in
the actual story, and that ¬A would likewise produce ¬D in the counterfactual story.
This example is thus nothing but a switch, and hence our definition does not consider
A a cause of ¬D. Looking back at our discussion in Section 6.6, it is revealing that
Weslake – and others with him – judges this example to be similar to Early Preemption,
but fails to note the similarity to Switch. We can accommodate for the observation
that some people have different intuitions here in the same manner as we did for those
examples by pointing out that the backup process is assumed to be completely reliable,
which might strike some as unrealistic.
The second example, named “Careful Antidote”, is similar in structure to Examples 21
and 9 (Weslake, 2015)[p. 20].14
Example 16. Assassin is in possession of a lethal poison, but has a last-minute change
of heart and refrains from putting it in Victim’s coffee (¬A). Bodyguard puts antidote
in the coffee (B), which would have neutralized the poison. Victim drinks the coffee
and survives (¬D).
As with the previous example, adding the antidote intuitively is not a cause of Victim’s
survival. Once more this spells trouble for many definitions, given the resemblance to
symmetric overdetermination, where our intuitions are reversed. We are able to look
beyond this resemblance and handle this example as a case of Late Preemption, in the
13 As a notable exception, Hall’s account (2007) is able to deal with all of these examples succesfully.
(Although he would have to add an extra variable to the model for the Backup example, and he disagrees
with Weslake on the trumping causation example). Unfortunately it falls victim to other counterexamples,
the most well-known being those from Hitchcock (2009). Again we leave it to the reader to verify that our
definition does deliver the right verdict in all of the examples discussed there as well.
14An almost identical example is given by Hall (2007), named “back-up threat canceller”. He uses it as an
example that escapes his earlier dual-concept view of causation as being either dependence or production,
and motivated him to develop his later definition. As the analysis will show, our more tolerant notion of
production does capture this example. Thus it serves as a good illustration of how our notion of production
extends his.
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same manner as we distinguished between LP and SO, namely by using the timing.
Recall that other approaches avoid having an explicit timing by adding additional
variables, such as SH and BH in LP. Here, there are no obvious candidates for such
variables, which explains why they struggle with this example.
Weslake uses the single equation model D := A∧¬B. While our approach also gives
the correct result for this model, we will explain our reasoning with the following
more detailed one: D := Dr∧L represents the fact that Victim dies if he drinks a lethal
coffee, and L := A∧¬B represents the fact that the coffee is lethal if Assassin poisons
it and Bodyguard does not add an antidote. The context is such that Dr, ¬A and B hold.
As ¬D is dependent on ¬L, it is clear that ¬L causes ¬D. Note also that any causal
status of either Assassin or Bodyguard is mediated entirely through L. Since Assassin
comes first, from the moment he refrains from putting poison in the coffee, it is not
lethal. (Or to be precise, the coffee is no longer potentially lethal, as of course it was not
lethal to start with.) Concretely, τ(¬L) = τ(¬A)< τ(B). Hence whatever Bodyguard’s
action might be, it is too late and is not a cause of ¬D, in agreement with our intuition.
On the other hand if we change the story so that the order of Assassin and Bodyguard is
reversed, then our definition would judge B a cause. Indeed, as soon as B happens, i.e.,
the antidote is added, the coffee has become poison-proof, i.e., no longer potentially
lethal. Given that Assassin’s omitting the poison happens afterwards, we see that B
must be the cause of ¬L. Hence it is a cause of ¬D as well.
Lastly, in case we are unable to tell which happened first, ¬A or B, we call both of
them causes, just as we did for SO.
To some calling B a cause, even when it happens first, may initially sound
counterintuitive (while others may not have any clear intuitions here at all). Given
the structural similarities between examples with conflicting, or simply confusing,
intuitions, it is too much to expect of any definition that it will align perfectly with
intuition in all cases. However an important benefit of our principled account, is
that precisely by pointing out the similarities we can show how the same principles
are at work in intuitively different examples, and possibly transform people’s initial
unreflective intuitions into informed judgments.
For example, it could be objected that according to our definition, even if in the end
Victim changes his mind, and does not drink the coffee, B would nonetheless be a cause
of ¬D.15 There is no escaping the fact that initially this sounds counterintuitive. We
believe the problem lies with the vagueness surrounding the nature of omissions, and
their connection to time.16 In this example, the omission is the statement “Victim does
not die”, or perhaps better, “Victim does not die from drinking poisonous coffee”. At
the start of the example Victim’s death had not yet been prevented, and at the end it
has. Hence there must be some particular event that happened in between such that
Victim’s death was prevented precisely at the moment this event occurred. The question
15For a very similar example, see “non-existent threats” (Hall, 2007).
16Hitchcock (2007) analyses these types of examples using a default/deviant distinction As we mentioned
in Section 6.4, the temporal asymmetry between events and omissions in our notion of a timing can also be
interpreted as invoking such a distinction.
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is which event? Intuitions seem to be at a loss here, as there is no obvious candidate
which presents itself. Certainly refusing to drink a perfectly fine coffee cannot be a
cause of Victim’s failing to die. We suggest that the way out is by using our principled
approach, which generalizes the lessons learned from other examples about which we
do have firm intuitions. Therefore the first event which prevented victim’s death should
be judged its cause.
We come back to the original story to illustrate the vagueness regarding omissions
and their timing. The story states the omission that Assassin does not put the poison
in Victim’s coffee, and that he does not do so because he has a last-minute change
of heart. The fact that the statement regarding Bodyguard follows the one regarding
Assassin, indicates a temporal order: first, Assassin refrains from putting in poison,
then, Bodyguard adds antidote. But intuitively it is not at all clear what it means for
Assassin’s omission to occur first, precisely because it is not clear what event occurs
(and when it does so) such that Assassin’s mental state shifts from “intending to put
poison in Victim’s coffee” to “no longer intending to put poison in Victim’s coffee”.
This is confirmed if we adapt the example so that we focus only on the timings of
events, as with Late Preemption and Symmetric Overdetermination. Imagine that we
start out with a coffee that is already poisonous, and both Assassin and Bodyguard add
an effective antidote. In that case our intuitions would simply follow the temporal order
by which the antidotes were added: if Assassin adds his first, then Bodyguard adding
the antidote is not a cause, and vice versa. We claim that, by analogy, it makes sense to
call Assassin’s refusal to poison the coffee a cause, as long as he makes up his mind
before the antidote is put in.
6.11 Conclusion
Our goal in this chapter has been to construct a definition of actual causation from the
ground up. We have formulated several principles which we take to be fundamental
properties of causation, and illustrated each of them by way of a simple example. As
a result we derived a definition that is a compromise between the pull of two distinct
concepts, namely dependence and production. Given that all three concepts agree on a
large number of examples, it is not surprising that the distinction between them is often
neglected or misunderstood.
We have applied our definition successfully on a number of paradigmatic examples:
symmetric overdetermination, late/early preemption, switching, careful poisoning, and
careful antidote. In addition, we have also checked our definition against all examples
found in (Hall, 2000, 2004, 2007; Halpern, 2015a; Halpern & Pearl, 2005a;
Hitchcock, 2001, 2007, 2009; Weslake, 2015) and many more. Our definition can
be applied to all of them along the same lines as we have applied it to the examples
mentioned.
We hope our principled approach proves useful as well to those who contest our
resulting definition, by clarifying formally how causal judgments depend on accepting
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or rejecting the underlying principles. Further, we believe the interplay between the
three concepts here described offers a fruitful perspective for understanding different
aspects and interests present in causal stories. In future work we intend to apply this
insight by comparing the role of causation in different domains, such as the positive
sciences, history, and ethics.
Lastly, our principled definition makes it easier to argue for or against specific causal
judgments regarding complex examples. Despite the fact that our definition agrees with
intuition in simple paradigmatic cases, we are not forced to seek recourse in intuitions
to justify our answers in all cases. Given the diversity of intuitions and their mutual
inconsistency, it is essential to have a principled method to settle causal judgments one





The counterfactual tradition to defining actual causation has come a long way since
Lewis started it off. However there are still important open problems that need to be
solved. One of them is the (in)transitivity of causation. Endorsing transitivity was
a major source of trouble for the approach taken by Lewis, which is why currently
most approaches reject it. But transitivity has never lost its appeal, and there is a
large literature devoted to understanding why this is so. Starting from a survey of this
work, we will develop a formal analysis of transitivity and the problems it poses for
causation. This analysis provides us with a sufficient condition for causation to be
transitive, a sufficient condition for dependence to be necessary for causation, and
several characterisations of the transitivity of dependence. Finally, we show how
this analysis leads naturally to several conditions a definition of causation should
satisfy. Our own definition developed in the previous chapter does indeed satisfy these
conditions, hence this chapter offers further support for it.
7.1 Introduction
As we saw in the previous chapter, all approaches under consideration take as their
starting point the assumption that counterfactual dependence is sufficient for causation,
but not necessary (Hall, 2004, 2007; Halpern, 2015a; Halpern & Pearl, 2005a;
Hitchcock, 2001; Lewis, 1973; Weslake, 2015; Woodward, 2003). That dependence
is sufficient is usually accepted simply as a fundamental principle underlying causation.
That it is not necessary, on the other hand, is usually defended by pointing to intuitively
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strong counterexamples. Lewis (1973) forms an important exception to this rule, as he
defends the lack of necessity by invoking a principle as well, namely that causation is
transitive: causation is transitive, dependence is not, therefore there can be causation
without dependence.
The first strategy, that of offering counterexamples, has proven most successful. There
are two reasons for this. First, almost everyone besides Lewis rejects the transitivity
of causation. Second, there are counterexamples to the necessity of dependence that
have nothing to do with transitivity. Despite its success, this strategy has to date
not offered a general insight into precisely when or why the transitivity of causation
breaks down. Although a substantial number of authors have addressed the problem
of transitivity, none of them offers a generally sufficient condition for causation to be
transitive (Hall, 2000, 2004; Halpern, 2015b; Halpern & Pearl, 2005a; Hitchcock,
2001; McDermott, 1995; Paul & Hall, 2013; Sartorio, 2005). A recent discussion
by Halpern (2015b) does formulate several sufficient and necessary conditions for
transitivity, however those apply only to cases where there is dependence.
The main contribution of this chapter is to offer a principled explanation of why
transitivity should be rejected as a general condition, while also offering conditions
under which it should be satisfied. Specifically, we will explain both why the
transitivity of causation has a strong appeal, and why there are nevertheless convincing
counterexamples to accepting it. We do so by an appeal to the principle that causation
is asymmetrical: an event is a cause only if its absence would not have been a cause.
Accepting this principle leads the way to an analysis of causation as a transitive relation
compromised by asymmetry. This analysis provides us with a sufficient condition for
causation to be transitive, a sufficient condition for dependence to be necessary, and
several sufficient and necessary conditions for dependence to be transitive. Finally, we
show how this analysis leads naturally to several conditions a definition of causation
should satisfy. It is then easy to verify that our own definition developed in the previous
chapter satisfies these conditions. As a result, our analysis of the transitivity of causation
lends additional support to the principles adopted in the previous chapter. The starting
point for our analysis consists of a detailed overview of the literature on this topic.
Initially we shall ignore the temporal aspects of causation, which proved essential
for cases of Late Preemption. This caveat will not undermine the current discussion,
because it stands orthogonal to the issue of transitivity. Therefore after our discussion
of transitivity, we integrate our discussion on production into our analysis, to show that
our definition of actual causation from the previous chapter satisfies both the current
analysis and both Preemption and Actual Timing.
Sections 7.2 offers the relevant background, and presents a survey of the literature on
transitivity. This leads us to suggest a first condition any definition of causation should
satisfy, in Section 7.3. Section 7.4 presents a sufficient condition for the transitivity of
causation. We come back to the asymmetry of causation in Section 7.5 and show how




In Section 6.2 we presented the sufficiency of counterfactual dependence as the starting
point for all approaches under consideration: (Hall, 2004, 2007; Halpern, 2015a;
Halpern & Pearl, 2005a; Hitchcock, 2001; Lewis, 1973; Weslake, 2015; Woodward,
2003). We also presented three basic types of examples which are commonly used to
defend the claim that dependence is not necessary, namely Early Preemption, Late
Preemption, and Symmetric Overdetermination. Of course there exist many more
counterexamples to the necessity of dependence, but in essence they can all be reduced
to these paradigmatic cases, or combinations thereof. To illustrate, we present another
case of Early Preemption from Hitchcock (2001)[p. 276]:
Example 17 (Backup). An assassin-in-training is on his first mission. Trainee is an
excellent shot: if he shoots his gun, the bullet will fell Victim. Supervisor is also present,
in case Trainee has a last minute loss of nerve (a common affliction among student
assassins) and fails to pull the trigger. If Trainee does not shoot, Supervisor will shoot
Victim herself. In fact, Trainee performs admirably, firing his gun and killing Victim.
The following is the standard model used in the literature for this story, where the
context is such that Trainee is true.
Victim := Trainee∨Supervisor.
Supervisor := ¬Trainee.
Intuitively it is clear that Trainee is a cause of Victim, yet using this model we see that
Victim is not dependent on Trainee. The starting point for any definition of causation in
the counterfactual tradition is to provide a way of handling cases of Early Preemption.
Lewis (1973) does so by invoking another appealing principle of causation: that it is a
transitive relation.
Principle 5 (Transitivity). If C is a cause of D and D is a cause of E w.r.t. (M,~u),
then C is a cause of E w.r.t. (M,~u).
Lewis (1973) takes Dependence and Transitivity at face value, and defines causation
as the transitive closure of dependence. This definition is able to handle cases of
Early Preemption by focussing on an intermediate event in between Trainee’s shot and
Victim getting hit, for example the event of the bullet flying through the air. By adding
a variable to the model representing this event, say Bullet, Lewis gets the desired
result: Victim is dependent on Bullet, Bullet is dependent on Trainee, and thus by
Transitivity, Trainee causes Victim.
Elegant as it may be, McDermott (1995) demonstrated that there are two major
problems with this definition: it is neither a necessary condition for causation,
nor a sufficient one. For the former: cases of Late Preemption and Symmetric
Overdetermination do not contain a chain of dependencies, and still intuitively exhibit
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causation. For the latter: there are intuitively convincing counterexamples to the
transitivity of causation. The first problem is generally taken to be a decisive blow
to Lewis’ definition. The second problem, however, has more general repercussions:
giving up Transitivity is not taken lightly. To understand why this is the case, we give
an overview of the literature on this problem.
7.2.1 Counterexamples to Transitivity
Many authors have tackled the issue of transitivity, and their analysis always contains
the following two properties: the transitivity of causation sounds intuitively appealing,
but unfortunately there are convincing counterexamples (Hall, 2000, 2004; Halpern,
2015b; Halpern & Pearl, 2005a; Hitchcock, 2001; McDermott, 1995; Paul &
Hall, 2013; Sartorio, 2005). Halpern (2015b) is the most recent to take up this view,
summarising the importance of transitivity in the counterfactual tradition as follows [p.
2]:
Paul and Hall (2013)[p. 215] suggest that “preserving transitivity is a basic
desideratum for an adequate analysis of causation”. Hall (2000) is even
more insistent, saying “That causation is, necessarily, a transitive relation
on events seems to many a bedrock datum, one of the few indisputable a
priori insights we have into the workings of the concept.” Lewis (1986,
2000) imposes transitivity in his influential definition of causality, by
taking causality to be the transitive closure (“ancestral”, in his terminology)
of a one-step causal dependence relation.
Although Halpern (2015b) agrees that transitivity should be preserved as much as
possible, he acknowledges that there are convincing counterexamples, as do all of the
other authors mentioned. To illustrate, we present a few of them here.
The first is by Hitchcock (2001), but Hall (2000) gives an almost identical example.
Example 18 (Boulder). A boulder is dislodged, and begins rolling ominously toward
Hiker. Before it reaches him, Hiker sees the boulder and ducks. The boulder sails
harmlessly over his head with nary a centimeter to spare. Hiker survives his ordeal.




We see that Hiker surviving (¬Dies) is dependent on Duck, and Duck in turn is
dependent on Boulder. Hence by Dependence, Boulder causes Duck and Duck causes
¬Dies. However it would be absurd to conclude from this that the boulder coming down
is a cause of hiker’s survival. Thus this example presents a violation of Transitivity.
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The next example is originally due to McDermott (1995)[p. 531], but is also discussed
by others (Hall, 2000; Halpern, 2015b; Hitchcock, 2001).
Example 19 (Dog Bite). Terrorist, who is right-handed, must push a detonator button
at noon to set off a bomb. Shortly before noon, he is bitten by a dog on his right hand.
Unable to use his right hand, he pushes the detonator with his left hand at noon. The
bomb duly explodes.
We model this as follows, where the context is such that DogBite is true.
Bomb := LH ∨RH.
LH := DogBite.
RH := ¬DogBite.
Just as with Boulder, it would be absurd to consider the dog bite to be a cause of the
explosion, as implied by Dependence and Transitivity.
We already presented the Switch example in Section 6.5, which is structurally identical
to the previous one.
Example 20 (Switch). An engineer is standing by a switch in the railroad tracks. A
train approaches in the distance. She flips the switch, so that the train travels down the
left-hand track, instead of the right. Since the tracks reconverge up ahead, the train
arrives at its destination all the same.
Intuitively, flipping the switch is not a cause of the train’s arrival, again going against
the combined claims of Dependence and Transitivity.
Many more counterexamples are given in the literature, but their structures are very
similar to the examples here presented. Given the existence of these intuitively
convincing counterexamples, all of the authors mentioned agree that Transitivity
should be abandoned.1
Although this means we are sacrificing an intuitive property of causation, we
should be careful not to sacrifice too much: even if some cases provide convincing
counterexamples to transitivity, there is no reason to abandon it altogether. Again we
take our cue from Halpern (2015b)[p. 2]:
In light of the examples, should we just give up on these intuitions? Paul
and Hall (2013) suggest that “What’s needed is a more developed story,
according to which the inference from “C causes D” and “D causes E” to
“C causes E” is safe provided such-and-such conditions obtain – where
these conditions can typically be assumed to obtain, except perhaps in
odd cases.” The goal of this paper is to provide sufficient conditions for
causality to be transitive.
1Originally Hall did try to hold on to Transitivity, by sacrificing Dependence. Later, he rejected this
view Hall (2000, 2007).
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Halpern (2015b) only discusses such conditions in case of dependence. By contrast,
we provide several necessary and sufficient conditions for dependence to be transitive,
and derive from this a sufficient condition for causation to be transitive in general.
7.3 The (In)transitivity of Dependence
By Dependence we know already that whenever dependence is transitive, causation
will be transitive as well. In all of the papers mentioned, it holds for all of the
counterexamples there discussed, that they have one essential thing in common: they
are also counterexamples to the transitivity of dependence.2 This leads to the suggestion
that likewise, whenever dependence violates transitivity, so does causation. Taken
together this amounts to the following Condition:
Condition 1. If E depends on D and D depends on C w.r.t. (M,~u), then it holds that:
C causes E w.r.t. (M,~u) iff E depends on C w.r.t. (M,~u).
Any definition which satisfies this condition has the desirable property that it violates
transitivity in all of the counterexamples discussed in the literature, while also
respecting transitivity in ordinary cases where dependence does so as well.
Recall that dependence is not necessary for causation in general, due to problem cases
exhibiting Early Preemption, Late Preemption, or Symmetric Overdetermination. The
above condition states that in case we have a chain of dependencies, dependence does
become a necessary condition. To bring these two observations in agreement requires
showing that those problem cases do not occur in case there is a chain of dependencies
from C to D to E, but no dependence of E on C.
Regarding Late Preemption and Symmetric Overdetermination, we shall be brief: there
is no example in the literature we know of that is considered a case of either of those,
and for which Condition 1 is violated. To illustrate, we come back to our classic
example of Symmetric Overdetermination:
Example 21. [Symmetric Overdetermination] Suzy and Billy both throw a rock at a
bottle. Both rocks hit the bottle simultaneously, upon which it shatters. Either rock by
itself would have sufficed to shatter the bottle.
We modelled this story using the single equation BS := ST ∨BT , and the context
such that both ST and BT are true. Intuitively both ST and BT are causes of BS, yet
BS is not dependent on either of them. It is clear that in this example the failure of
dependence has nothing to do with issues of transitivity. Rather, the problem is that
there are two completely independent processes which suffice to bring about E, and
both of them actually occur, overdetermining E. Adding more detail by inserting
variables in between ST and BS, so that there is a chain of causes leading from ST to
2This is in line with Hitchcock (2001)[p. 276], who defines ordinary cases of causation as those where
the transitivity of dependence is respected.
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BS, does nothing to change the fact that there will never be a chain of dependencies
from ST to BS.
7.3.1 Early Preemption
Cases of Early Preemption provide the other reason why dependence is not necessary
for causation. Therefore we need to show that such cases do not occur when there is a
chain of dependencies, and no dependence from the end of the chain on its start, so
that Condition 1 can be accepted.
There is one basic causal setting that is considered by most to be the prototypical case
of Early Preemption: it is the setting used for Backup introduced in Section 7.2. The
model was the following, where the context is such that C holds:
E := C∨F.
F := ¬C.
Since there is no chain of dependencies, Condition 1 does not apply and there is no
problem.
Recall from our discussion of Early Preemption from Section 6.6, that we noted
the similarity between models for Switch and models for Early Preemption. This is
confirmed here by the observation that the above model is quite similar to that used for
Dog Bite and Switch, two of the counterexamples to the transitivity of causation we




As we mentioned in Section 7.2, the account of Lewis exploits this similarity to deal
with Early Preemption. Since our aim is to avoid the conclusion that examples like
Dog Bite and Switch are causes, we need to show that there is an alternative way to
handle cases of Early Preemption, like Backup. We briefly go over several strategies
to do so. Note though that at present our goal is not to find the best way to deal with
Early Preemption as such, but simply to safeguard Condition 1 while leaving room for
a proper analysis of Early Preemption. Concretely, we want to make sure that such an
analysis need not conflict with modelling Switches in the manner above. (By calling
an example a Switch, we simply mean that it is an example where intuitively there is
no causation, as opposed to Early Preemption.)
Our preferred strategy to handle Early Preemption is to use a non-deterministic model,
as we showed in Section 6.6. For example, when considering the Backup example, we
make the plausible assumption that even Supervisors are not always accurate, or may
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also have a loss of nerve. The following is an appropriate non-deterministic model for
the Backup example:
Victim := Trainee∨ (Supervisor∧Accurate).
Supervisor := ¬Trainee∧¬Nerves.
Here we have added variables to represent the accuracy of Supervisor’s shot, and
the possibility that he has a loss of nerve. The actual story only gives us the partial
context such that Trainee holds, leaving unspecified the values of Accurate and Nerves.
Applying Definition ??, we get that Victim is dependent on Trainee.
Using a non-deterministic model allows for a counterfactual story in which Victim is
not killed in case Trainee does not shoot, implying that Victim is dependent on Trainee.
(If desired, different causes can be ranked by distinguishing between different levels of
dependence. For example, one could add a probability distribution over the exogenous
variables.) Whether the model contains an intermediate variable in between C and E
or not is immaterial to this strategy.3 (As an illustration, note that the model for the
Early Preemption example from Section 6.6 does contain an intermediate variable,
contrary to the model for Backup.) Cases of Early Preemption are distinguished from
Switches on a one-by-one basis: is the actual story such that the relevant counterfactual
story, in which we have both ¬C and ¬E, should be part of the model, i.e., is there
any reason to doubt that the backup process will function properly? If yes, then there
is dependence and we consider it a case of Early Preemption. If no, then the backup
process – Supervisor shooting, the functioning of the right hand track, Terrorist using
his right hand – is taken to be reliable and it is a Switch. Obviously this distinction
involves a certain amount of subjectivity, but given the divergence of intuitions between
people regarding the same story we take this to be a benefit of our approach.
Hall (2007) uses a strategy that is similar to ours, but not quite the same. As we saw in
Section 5.2.2, he models both Early Preemption and Switches using an intermediate
variable, but that is merely a consequence of his use of neuron diagrams. As with our
strategy, he agrees that the distinction between the two cases comes down to whether or
not the backup process can fail. The difference is that on his view of Early Preemption,
even if we somehow have evidence that in the actual story the backup process was
reliable and would not have failed, (A is in its deviant state in the diagrams in Section
5.2.2), we may still consider the counterfactual story in which it does fail. But, as we
showed in Chapter 5, in this view it becomes quite hard – if not impossible – to express
the difference between Early Preemption and Switch. For every backup process there
is some relevant property on which its reliability depends: Supervisor being accurate
or not losing his nerves, Terrorist’s ability to use his right hand, the right hand track
not being broken, etc. All it takes on his account to change a Switch into a case of
Early Preemption is to add a variable representing this property. Then, even if we have
3Menzies (2004) also argues that the intermediate variable does not matter, and likewise claims that C is
not a cause in either of the two deterministic models.
THE (IN)TRANSITIVITY OF DEPENDENCE 109
evidence that the relevant property is present, we may still consider the counterfactual
story in which it is not. Because of this undesirable consequence, we do not find this
strategy convincing.
Hitchcock (2001) and Halpern and Pearl (2005a) offer a third strategy: although they
agree that there is no causation in Switching stories such as Dog Bite and Switch, they
argue that the second model is not appropriate for them. They are forced to take up this
position, because their solution to get C to come out as a cause in the first model applies
just as well to the second one. In response to the common practice of using the second
model for Switches, they argue case by case why on closer inspection that model is not
appropriate for a particular story, or why that story should indeed be considered a case
of Early Preemption. Let us examine both replies.
Hitchcock (2001) argues against using the model for Dog Bite. However, that argument
only applies to accounts that make use of so-called “ENF counterfactuals”, which are a
particular form of interventions on a structural model that we will not go into.4 Halpern
and Hitchcock (2010)[p. 16] argue against using this model for Switch, on the basis
that the variables LT and RT are logically related: “the train cannot be on both tracks
at once”. First of all, we disagree that the relation between these variables is logical: it
is a matter of physics, not logic, that a train can only occupy a single track at any given
moment. Second of all, this argument does not apply to Dog Bite, as one can push a
detonator using two hands. In light of this, and in absence of a general argument as to
why such models should never be used to model Switches, this reply is not convincing.
As mentioned in Section 6.6.1, Halpern and Pearl (2005a)[p. 27] claim that the
second model can be appropriate for the Switch example, but only if we consider the
possibility that the right hand track will fail as relevant. Pearl (2000) makes the same
claim regarding a Switch made up of two lamps. The motivation behind this strategy
and ours is the same: if we take the failure of the backup process to be a relevant
possibility, then we should consider the counterfactual story in which it does. The
difference is that we do not seek recourse in structural contingencies (such as ENF
counterfactuals) to represent such counterfactual stories, but use a partial context and
generalise dependence to include non-deterministic models. It is important to point out
that this agreement is limited to the distinction between Switches and Early Preemption,
and should not be generalised. Halpern and Pearl (2005a) use structural contingencies
to consider vastly different counterfactual stories as well, which have nothing to do
with the issue at hand.
Weslake (2015) uses a different strategy altogether. According to him, the models are
not similar at all, and only the first should be used to model Early Preemption. He
agrees that the second model is a Switch, and therefore C does not cause E.
We have now discussed four of the most important strategies to handling Early
Preemption, and presented a number of arguments against adopting the second or
the third strategy. What matters for the current investigation, however, is that the first
4See Paul and Hall (2013)[ch. 5] for a detailed discussion of the problems these ENF counterfactuals
pose to dealing properly with the counterexamples to Transitivity.
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and fourth strategies are both viable options for handling Early Preemption properly
without running into conflict with Condition 1.
To sum up, because of the fact that the counterexamples to Transitivity are without
exception also counterexamples to the transitivity of dependence, and in light of the
lack of opposition from problem cases like Overdetermination and Early Preemption,
we claim that Condition 1 should be accepted.
7.4 Transitivity in General
7.4.1 Contributing
A proper understanding of the intransitivity of causation requires looking further than
dependence. In the previous chapter we saw that Dependence stands at one end of a
spectrum, as a strong but intransitive relation that is sufficient for causation. At the
other end there is the concept of contributing, which is a weak and transitive relation
that is necessary for causation.
The following is an interesting connection between dependence and contributing, that
will prove useful for interpreting subsequent results.
Theorem 10. E depends on C w.r.t. (M,~u) iff C contributes to E w.r.t. (M,~u) and ¬C
contributes to ¬E w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C),~u).
Proof. The implication from right to left is trivial, and the implication from left to right
is a direct consequence of Theorem 2 in Chapter 6.
7.4.2 A Sufficient Condition for Transitivity
Condition 1 states that causation and dependence are equally transitive in case we have
a chain of dependencies.
The next step is to look at transitivity in case there is a chain of causes simpliciter,
but not necessarily a chain of dependencies. More specifically, we want to find a
good sufficient condition for the transitivity of causation in general. Since Condition
1 suffices to respect all counterexamples to Transitivity from the literature, a naive
suggestion would be to simply demand that causation is always transitive when there
is no chain of dependencies. To understand why this would not work, we show how
the counterexamples can easily be modified so that there no longer is a chain of
dependencies, yet intuition would still find that causation is intransitive. All we need to
do is add a little Symmetric Overdetermination into the mix.
Example 22 (Dog Bite with Backup). Imagine the story of the Terrorist from Dog Bite,
but with a little twist: there are two detonators that can be pushed, either of which will
set off the bomb. To make sure nothing goes wrong, Backup pushes the other detonator
at the same moment as Terrorist does.
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We can re-use our old model, except that we add Backup’s action.
Bomb := LH ∨RH ∨Backup
LH := DogBite.
RH := ¬DogBite.
Just as in the original example, Dependence implies that DogBite is a cause of LH.
However, Bomb is now no longer dependent on LH, so there is no chain of dependencies
from DogBite to Bomb and Condition 1 does not apply. Because Bomb is symmetrically
overdetermined by both LH and Backup, we also have that LH should still be a cause
of Bomb. Nevertheless DogBite should still not be considered a cause of Bomb.
The lesson learned is that the focus should not be on the presence of a chain
of dependencies as such, but rather on the conditions that decide whether or not
dependence is transitive. Therefore we now present three different characterisations of
the transitivity of dependence.
Theorem 11. If E depends on D and D depends on C w.r.t. (M,~u), then the following
statements are all equivalent:
1. E depends on C w.r.t. (M,~u).
2. ¬E depends on ¬C w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C),~u).
3. ¬C contributes to ¬E w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C),~u).
4. ¬C does not contribute to E w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C),~u).
Proof. Assume E depends on D and D depends on C w.r.t. (M,~u). First, note that by
Theorem 10, this implies that C contributes to D and D contributes to E w.r.t. (M,~u).
Since contributing is transitive by construction, this implies that C contributes to E
w.r.t. (M,~u).
1⇔ 2
We start with assuming that E depends on C w.r.t. (M,~u). It follows directly from the
definitions that this is equivalent to: ¬E depends on ¬C w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C),~u).
2⇔ 3
Now assume we know that ¬E depends on ¬C w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C),~u). Given that we
already know that C contributes to E w.r.t. (M,~u), by Theorem 10 we see that this is
equivalent to ¬C contributes to ¬E w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C),~u).
3⇔ 4
Lastly, assume that ¬C contributes to ¬E w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C),~u). It follows directly that ¬C
does not contribute to E w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C),~u). Remains the reverse implication. It suffices
to show that if ¬C does not contribute to E w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C),~u), then (Mdo(¬C),~u) |= ¬E.
We proceed by a reductio: assume that ¬C does not contribute to E w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C),~u)
and (Mdo(¬C),~u) |= E.
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D depends on C w.r.t. (M,~u), and thus (Mdo(¬C),~u) |= ¬D. Together with the
fact that (Mdo(¬C),~u) |= E, this implies that (Mdo(¬C,¬D),~u) |= E. Also, since E
depends on D w.r.t. (M,~u), we have (Mdo(¬D),~u) |= ¬E. Therefore ¬E depends
on C w.r.t. (Mdo(¬D),~u). By Theorem 1, this implies that ¬C contributes to E
w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C,¬D),~u), and thus also ¬C contributes to E w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C),~u), which
concludes the proof.
Note that in general, i.e., without the restriction to chains of dependencies, the
statements in this theorem are not all equivalent. Rather we have that 1⇔ 2, and
2⇒ 3⇒ 4, but also 4 6⇒ 3 6⇒ 2.
This theorem shows that to satisfy Condition 1, it suffices to take any of the three last
conditions as a sufficient condition for the transitivity of causation. Since Transitivity
is intuitively appealing, we want to restrict Transitivity as little as possible. Given that
the last condition from Theorem 11 is clearly weaker than the other three (in general),
this naturally leads to the following condition:
Condition 2. [Sufficient Condition for Transitivity] If C causes D and D causes E
w.r.t. (M,~u), then the following holds:
If ¬C does not contribute to E w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C),~u) then C causes E w.r.t. (M,~u).
In light of Theorem 11 and Dependence, we can interpret Condition 2 informally as
stating that a definition of causation ought to be “at least as transitive as dependence”,
i.e., its sufficiency condition for transitivity should be at least as weak as that for
dependence. (Note that this statement can be endorsed without having to accept
Condition 1.) Before we follow through on this lead, we present an example to show
that violations of Condition 2 lead to counterintuitive results.
7.4.3 Counterexample
Since neither of the definitions from Halpern and Pearl (2005a), Woodward (2003),
and Weslake (2015) satisfy Condition 2, we will use them as illustrations.
Consider the following model, with a context such that both A and C hold.
E := D∨A.
D := C∧A.
Since D is dependent on C in this setting, by Dependence C is a cause of D. We leave
it to the reader to verify that according to all three definitions mentioned above, D is a
cause of E, even though C is not a cause of E, in violation of Transitivity. ¬C does
not contribute to E, and thus this example violates Condition 2 as well.
The following story confirms that this is a counterintuitive result.
Example 23 (Assassin). Assassin adds Cyanide to Victim’s coffee, which is certain to
kill a person. Backup adds Milk to the coffee, which reacts with the Cyanide to form
Arsenic, another lethal substance. Victim drinks his coffee, and dies.
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Our counterexample provides an appropriate model for this story.
Dies := Arsenic∨Cyanide.
Arsenic := Milk∧Cyanide.
Obviously Assassin adding the Cyanide is a cause of Victim’s death, since Dies is
dependent on Cyanide. If we focus on the first equation, then the situation is identical
to Symmetric Overdetermination. Given that all three definitions mentioned judge both
overdetermining events to be causes of the effect, the same applies here: all three of
them also consider Arsenic a cause of Dies. Further, since Arsenic is dependent on
Milk, Backup adding the Milk was a cause of the Arsenic being in the coffee. However,
the above definitions reach the counterintuitive conclusion that despite all this, Backup
adding the Milk is not a cause of Victim’s death.
7.5 Transitivity and Asymmetry
7.5.1 Asymmetry
In Section 6.5 we presented the asymmetry of causation as an appealing explanation for
why Switch should not be considered a cause of Dest in Switch. The same applies to the
second model we considered in Section 7.3.1, namely there is a remarkable symmetry
between the actual story and the counterfactual story that we get when intervening on
C: in both cases there is a chain of counterfactual dependence from the candidate cause
(C and ¬C, respectively) to the effect E. As Asymmetry and Transitivity focus on
entirely different properties of causation, it is no surprise that they conflict with each
other:
Theorem 12. Dependence, Transitivity, and Asymmetry are mutually inconsistent.
Proof. We have a look again at the Switch example. In the story such that Switch holds,
by Dependence Switch is a cause of LT and LT is a cause of Dest. By Transitivity,
this makes Switch a cause of Dest. But if we look at the story do(¬Switch), then we
can apply the same reasoning to get that ¬Switch is a cause of Dest. This is in violation
of Asymmetry.
Theorem 12 teaches us that accepting Asymmetry provides an explanation for the fact
that there are violations of Transitivity.5 In fact, picking up our earlier discussion,
Asymmetry together with Contributing helps to make sense of Condition 2, which
we can rephrase informally as:
If C causes D and D causes E w.r.t. (M,~u), then the following holds:
Transitivity should be respected unless this would violate Asymmetry.
5Sartorio (2005) also uses Switches to argue that violations of Transitivity are due to Asymmetry.
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There are now enough elements on the table to construct a coherent genesis of causation
that explains its limited transitivity.
7.5.2 Putting it all Together
We started our analysis by noting the strong connection between dependence and
causation. Specifically, by Dependence and Contributing, we know that causation
lies somewhere in between dependence and contributing. Further, in the overwhelming
majority of cases, all three of these concepts behave as a transitive relation. So as a
first approximation, we assume causation to be some relation, say Trans(X ,Y ), which
satisfies the following condition:
Condition 3. 1. Trans(X ,Y ) is transitive.
2. If Trans(C,E) then C contributes to E w.r.t. (M,~u).
3. If E depends on C then Trans(C,E) w.r.t. (M,~u).
The following generalisation of Theorem 10 offers a useful connection between
dependence and such a Trans(X ,Y ) relation.
Theorem 13. If Trans(X ,Y ) satisfies Condition 3, then:
E depends on C w.r.t. (M,~u) iff Trans(C,E) w.r.t. (M,~u) and Trans(¬C,¬E)
w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C),~u).
Proof. We start with the implication from left to right. So assume E depends on C
w.r.t. (M,~u), which is equivalent to ¬E depends on ¬C w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C),~u). Hence by
applying 3 to both statements, we get the desired result.
Remains the implication from right to left. So assume Trans(C,E) w.r.t. (M,~u)
and Trans(¬C,¬E) w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C),~u). By 2, this implies that C contributes to E
w.r.t. (M,~u) and ¬C contributes to ¬E w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C),~u). Applying Theorem 10 gives
the result.
The following is a direct consequence of this theorem, which in analogy with
Asymmetry we may call Anti-Symmetry.
Corollary 2 (Anti-Symmetry). If E depends on C w.r.t. (M,~u), then ¬E depends on
¬C w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C),~u).
Informally, this result tells us that dependence is built up out of any relation Trans(X ,Y )
that satisfies Condition 3, in conjunction with the constraint that it should be Anti-
Symmetrical.
Since for causation we only require Asymmetry, the solution is straightforward:
causation is built up out of some relation Trans(X ,Y ) that satisfies Condition 3, in
conjunction with Asymmetry. Putting all of this together, we get the following tentative
characterisation of a good definition of causation:
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Condition 4. There exists a relation Trans(X ,Y ) such that each of the following holds:
1. Trans(X ,Y ) is transitive.
2. C causes E w.r.t. (M,~u) iff Trans(C,E) w.r.t. (M,~u) and ¬Trans(¬C,E)
w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C),~u).
3. If Trans(C,E) then C contributes to E w.r.t. (M,~u).
4. If E depends on C then Trans(C,E) w.r.t. (M,~u).
Any definition of causation satisfying the first and second part of Condition 4 is a
compromise between Transitivity and Asymmetry: Transitivity is sacrificed only to
the extent that is required to satisfy Asymmetry. Add to this the other two constraints,
and we get a definition that has all the properties we have argued for.
Theorem 14. Any definition of causation satisfying Condition 4 satisfies Dependence,
Asymmetry, and Contributing, and Conditions 1 and 2.
Proof. Dependence: Assume E depends on C w.r.t. (M,~u). By 2, we need to show
that Trans(C,E) w.r.t. (M,~u) and ¬Trans(¬C,E) w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C),~u). The former is a
direct consequence of 4, so remains the latter.
Since E does not hold in (Mdo(¬C),~u), we get that ¬C does not contribute to E
w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C),~u). By 3, this implies that ¬Trans(¬C,E) w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C),~u).
Asymmetry and Contributing follow immediately from 2 and 3.
Condition 1: Assume E depends on D and D depends on C w.r.t. (M,~u). By 1 and
4 this implies that Trans(C,E) w.r.t. (M,~u). The implication from right to left in the
equivalence from Condition 1 follows from Dependence. So we need to prove that
¬Trans(¬C,E) w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C),~u) implies that E depends on C w.r.t. (M,~u).
We proceed by a reductio: assume that ¬Trans(¬C,E) w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C),~u) and
(Mdo(¬C),~u) |= E.
D depends on C w.r.t. (M,~u), and thus (Mdo(¬C),~u) |= ¬D. Together with the
fact that (Mdo(¬C),~u) |= E, this implies that (Mdo(¬C,¬D),~u) |= E. Also, since
E depends on D w.r.t. (M,~u), we have (Mdo(¬D),~u) |= ¬E. Therefore ¬E
depends on C w.r.t. (Mdo(¬D),~u). By Theorem 13, this implies that Trans(¬C,E)
w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C,¬D),~u), and thus also Trans(¬C,E) w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C),~u), which concludes
the proof.
Condition 2: Assume C causes D and D causes E w.r.t. (M,~u), and ¬C does not
contribute to E w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C),~u). By 1, we get that Trans(C,E) w.r.t. (M,~u). By 3, we
also get that ¬Trans(¬C,E) w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C),~u), and thus C causes E w.r.t. (M,~u).
Since the weakest possible choice for Trans is to take contributing to, we state here the
most straightforward definition of causation which meets all the demands of Condition
4.
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Definition 33 (Actual Causation). Given (M,~u) |=C∧E, we define C to be an actual
cause of E w.r.t. (M,~u) if C contributes to E w.r.t. (M,~u) and ¬C does not contribute to
E w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C),~u).
We leave it to the reader to go over all of the examples discussed, to see that this
definition gives the desired result. (Again, one should bear in mind our use of non-
deterministic models. One counterfactual story in which ¬C does not contribute to E
suffices for Definition 33 to be satisfied.)
7.5.3 Coming back to Production
As noted, in the current analysis we have ignored the temporal aspects at play in
causation. Concretely, we have ignored the crucial distinction between the concepts
of contributing and producing from the previous chapter, that we expressed by
extending structural models with a timing. Using these notions allowed us to formulate
Preemption, stating that causes must come before their effects. Adding this aspect
to the current analysis is straightforward: in Condition 4, extend the causal settings
with a timing τ , and replace the third part with “If Trans(C,E) then C produces E
w.r.t. (M,~u,τ)”. This ensures that Preemption is satisfied as well.
Now the weakest possible choice for Trans is to take producing. As a result, the
most straightforward definition of causation that meets all the demands of the updated
Condition 4 is precisely the definition we proposed in Chapter 6:
Definition 34. Given (M,~u,τ) |= C ∧ E, we define C to be an actual cause of
E w.r.t. (M,~u,τ) if C produces E w.r.t. (M,~u,τ) and ¬C does not produce E
w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C),~u,τdo(¬C)).
7.6 Conclusion
Starting from the observation that despite the intuitive appeal of the transitivity
of causation there are many convincing counterexamples to accepting it, we have
constructed an analysis in order to explain the precise relation between causation and
transitivity. By pointing out the connection between violations of the transitivity of
dependence, and violations of transitivity in general, we arrived at a characterisation
of the transitivity of dependence that suggested a suitable sufficient condition for
the transitivity of causation. Adding to this the principle of asymmetry resulted in
a detailed genesis of causation, that narrows down the search to a proper definition
of causation considerably. Using this we have suggested a definition which meets
all the requirements discussed. Finally, we complemented the analysis of transitivity
with the temporal properties of causation discussed in the previous chapter, to arrive
at the definition of actual causation we suggested in Chapter 6. Thus our analysis of
transitivity offers further support for the definition we have developed.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
This work has been an investigation into the concept of actual causation. First, we
have developed a flexible, general framework, that can be used to construct various
definitions of actual causation, as well as extensions to those definitions that incorporate
judgments of normality. Second, we explored actual causation starting from basic
principles, and used those as building blocks in constructing a definition of causation.
Concretely, the contributions of this work are the following.
In Chapter 2 several formal languages were introduced: the structural equations
framework (Pearl, 2000), CP-logic (Causal Probabilistic logic) (Vennekens et al.,
2009), and neuron diagrams as used by Hall (2004). We also added the most influential
definition of actual causation from Halpern and Pearl (2005a). Lastly, we presented a
translation between these three frameworks.
8.1 A General Framework for Defining and Extend-
ing Actual causation using CP-logic
In Chapter 3 we used CP-logic to develop a general parametrised definition of actual
causation. Although it expresses a probabilistic degree of causation, it continues the
counterfactual tradition of causation that started with Lewis (1973). We presented four
definitions of causation as instantiations of this general definition, based on definitions
by Hall (2004, 2007); Vennekens (2011) and Beckers and Vennekens (2012). This
allowed us to compare these definitions directly, leading to the fundamental idea that
a definition of causation should be a suitable compromise between dependence and
production.
In Chapter 4 we extended the general definition from the previous chapter, so as to
incorporate recent findings from the psychology literature on the context-sensitivity of
causal judgments (Hitchcock & Knobe, 2009; Knobe & Fraser, 2008; Moore, 2009).
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We based ourselves on a similar extension by Halpern and Hitchcock (2015). First we
translated their work from structural equations into CP-logic, and then added several
improvements that the quantified setting of CP-logic allows for.
Chapter 5 took a look at three problems facing the two main definitions of causation
from Chapter 3. The first problem pertains to the Hall07 definition, and consists in
an undesirable sensitivity to details of the model. In his criticism of Hall’s definition,
Hitchcock (2009) comes to a very similar conclusion. The second problem was pointed
out by Hitchcock as well, and applies to both the Hall07 and the BV12 definitions.
Finally, the third problem highlights the failure of the BV12 definition to satisfy a
fundamental principle regarding causation.
8.2 A Principled Approach to Defining Actual
Causation
Taking note of the problems discussed at the end of Part I, in Chapter 6 we started with
a clean slate, and proceeded to construct a novel definition of causation using structural
equations, extended with a timing. We did so from the bottom up, letting ourselves
be guided by paradigmatic examples to discover basic principles which a definition
should satisfy. Some of these principles have also been defended (in slightly different
forms) by Lewis (1973); Weslake (2015) and Sartorio (2005). Again we arrived at the
conclusion that an adequate definition of causation forms a compromise between the
concepts of dependence and production.
Chapter 7 investigated one fundamental principle in particular, that has played a pivotal
role in defining causation ever since the work of Lewis (1973): the transitivity of
causation. Reluctant to either accept or reject it, most accounts have struggled to give
it a proper place (Hall, 2000, 2004; Halpern, 2015b; Halpern & Pearl, 2005a;
Hitchcock, 2001; McDermott, 1995; Paul & Hall, 2013; Sartorio, 2005). Using
the insights from Chapter 6, we provided a detailed analysis of both the appeal and the
problems with transitivity. As a result, we came up with several interesting conditions
which a definition of causation should satisfy in order to avoid the pitfalls posed by
transitivity. Finally, these conditions lend further support to the definition developed in
Chapter 6.
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